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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a study of the impact of American domestic politics on President Jimmy 
Carter’s role as diplomat-in-chief during the Camp David peace process. It argues that Carter’s 
personal involvement in fostering an Egyptian-Israeli dialogue, the Camp David Accords and 
Palestinian autonomy talks created a circular pattern of influence between domestic politics and 
foreign affairs. Carter’s role as president-mediator engaged political actors, focused public attention 
and raised the domestic stakes. As his term progressed, he subordinated diplomatic objectives to 
political needs, which in fact had grown more urgent by controversy in Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
As chief diplomat, Carter became intimately identified with American policy, which was 
completely imbued with his own political character. That activated a number of reinforcing 
domestic factors, some general to American foreign policy and others specific to the Arab-Israeli 
arena, which served to constrain what he could achieve. By examining newly released archival 
material, and engaging with news reportage and opinion polling, this thesis demonstrates how 
advice reaching the president from multiple sources – his domestic, foreign and media advisors – 
served to augment the other. 
This thesis does not purport to offer a complete history of the Camp David peace process, 
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations or Carter’s presidency. Instead, it examines the possibilities and the 
hazards of presidential diplomacy. It argues that the domestic aspects of the dispute narrowed 
Carter’s options, limited public debate and influenced decisions at pivotal moments. These forces 
circumscribed what was politically possible, and interacted with strategic and diplomatic 
considerations to affect policy. Broadly, this thesis offers fresh perspectives on the nature and limits 
of presidential power, the role of the news media in American life, U.S. public opinion and foreign 
policy, and public engagement with the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
As James Earl Carter Jr. stepped into view on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives 
shortly after 8:00 p.m. on 18 September 1978, the hundreds of lawmakers crowded into the chamber 
erupted in rapturous applause. The 39th American president made his way to the rostrum and 
delivered a 25-minute address announcing the conclusion one day earlier of the Camp David 
Accords, signed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
with Carter as a witness. When Carter concluded his speech, he turned to Begin and Sadat, and 
quoted Matthew 5:9: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be the children of God.’ Another 
ovation followed. The moment represented the apogee of Carter’s four years in office, as politician 
and diplomat, president and peacemaker.1 
Perhaps no other president in American history has embraced his constitutional role of chief 
diplomat more enthusiastically than Jimmy Carter. To a degree unmatched before or since, the 
former Georgia governor invested his personal, presidential and national prestige in Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy. Carter’s extraordinary involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process during his one-
term presidency enabled him to achieve greater success in the dispute than any previous American 
leader. Yet that same presidential engagement also imposed political pressures and constraints on 
diplomacy that Carter could not transcend. 
This thesis is a study of the American system and the impact of domestic politics on Carter’s 
role as diplomat-in-chief during the Camp David peace process.2 It offers a president-centred 
critique of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.3 As such, full explanations for the outcome 
                                                
1 ‘Special Report: Camp David “A Framework for Peace,”’ CBS News, 18 September 1978, Vanderbilt Television 
News Archive (hereafter VTNA) record 837720; ‘Camp David Meeting on the Middle East,’ 18 September 1978, 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, Vol. II (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter 
PPP: Carter), 1533-1537. 
2 This thesis generally will use the term ‘Camp David peace process’ to refer to the negotiations beginning in 1977 that 
led to the 1978 Camp David Accords, the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the Palestinian autonomy talks in 1979-
1980. When referring to the 13-day summit between Egypt, Israel and the United States in Maryland, it will use ‘Camp 
David Summit.’ 
3 The ‘Arab-Israeli’ construction is vague, but for the purposes of this work it will be used to refer to the political 
dispute involving Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states that has led to several wars since 1948. Greatest – but not 
exclusive – attention will be paid to Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians and their main political entity, the Palestine 
                 
11 
of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations or the Palestinian autonomy talks lie beyond the scope of the 
present work.4 It will offer insight into, but not final verdicts on, Carter’s overall foreign policy and 
presidency. 
This thesis argues that Carter’s personal involvement in fostering an Egyptian-Israeli 
dialogue, the Camp David Accords and the beginning of Palestinian autonomy talks created a 
circular pattern of influence between domestic politics and foreign affairs. As the president’s 
positions grew intertwined with U.S. politics, it became virtually impossible to determine cause and 
effect. This dynamic is not unique in American history, but in Carter’s term it exerted 
unprecedented influence both on U.S. policy and Carter’s domestic political standing. 
Trends in public opinion acted in concert with assumptions of the news media and elite to 
set a narrow ‘permissive consensus’ within which Carter could pursue options in Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy.5 This process narrowed Carter’s options, limited the scope of public debate and 
influenced decisions at pivotal moments. These domestic forces circumscribed what was politically 
possible, and interacted with strategic and diplomatic considerations to affect policy. 
This thesis proposes a new way to consider ‘domestic politics’ in the context of American 
policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. Among the multifarious issues arising from the president’s 
domestic context, the electoral cycle, Congress, public opinion, the organised American Jewish 
community and associated pro-Israel lobby groups, and the national news media exerted the greatest 
influences on Carter’s position toward the conflict. Collectively, these factors constituted the 
domestic pressure to which previous works refer in structural, but rarely specific, terms. 
Direct presidential involvement in any foreign policy issue engages domestic political 
actors, focuses public opinion and shifts media coverage from diplomatic to political. Domestic 
                                                
Liberation Organisation (PLO). References to ‘U.S. policy’ are to Washington’s positions on facilitating peace and 
establishing its regional influence. 
4 Overviews of this period include James Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One-Hundred Years of War  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 165-228; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-
Arab Conflict, 1881-2001, Revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 2001), 444-93; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the 
Arab World  (London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2000), 352-83; Charles Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
2nd ed. (New York: St. Martins, 1992), 240-78; Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict  
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1994), 499-531. 
5 The term belongs to Orren. Gary Orren, 'The Salience of Public Attitudes on the Middle East,' in U.S. Middle East 
Policy: The Domestic Setting, ed. Shai Feldman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988). 
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politics have played a major role in U.S. policy toward Israel since President Harry Truman’s 
decision to recognise the Jewish state.6 But not since Woodrow Wilson has an American president 
immersed himself so deeply in the intricacies of diplomacy. Yet even Wilson never resorted to 
writing out draft treaties in longhand or negotiating with another country’s entire cabinet while his 
aides looked on, as did Carter. 
The spectres of Watergate and Vietnam haunted the 1976 presidential campaign.7 Carter 
frequently referred to the previous era as constituting the ‘Nixon-Ford administration,’ with little 
distinction between the two.8 Carter emphasised candour, integrity, an end to government secrecy, 
and promised, ‘I will never lie to you.’9 He promised a ‘government as good as its people,’ one in 
which American citizens shared in making policy.10 He believed that U.S. foreign policy should 
emanate from the inside out – that the morality that governed American behaviour at home should 
dictate U.S. actions abroad.11 This emphasis on style – candour, openness, his ‘outsider’ status – 
was based in significant part on domestic considerations, designed to define Carter against the 
Washington establishment.12 Yet it complicated his initial forays into Arab-Israeli diplomacy. 
Carter’s dual role of politician and mediator fundamentally altered the development, 
promulgation and enactment of American policy. This thesis desegregates the strands of advice 
from Carter’s international, domestic and media advisors to reveal their reinforcing tendencies. The 
introduction of presidential prestige to the talks granted greater credibility to U.S. promises; 
Egyptian and Israeli leaders knew without a doubt that he spoke for his administration. However, 
the political nature of the presidency meant that Carter had a lower tolerance for failure and, 
therefore, less leverage. If the sides failed to reach an agreement, he could offer no justification for 
                                                
6 Lawrence Davidson, 'Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel,' Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 4 
(2010); Paul Charles Merkley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus  (Westport, Conn.: 
Praeger, 2004), 1-22. 
7 Betty Glad, Jimmy Carter: In Search of the Great White House  (London: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1980). 
8 Bob Woodward, The Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 
32. 
9 ‘Our Foreign Relations,’ Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 15 March 1976, The Presidential 
Campaign 1976: Jimmy Carter, I (Washington: GPO, 1978), 109-19. 
10 Jimmy Carter, A Government as Good as Its People, 2nd ed. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1996), x. 
11 ———, Why Not The Best?  (Nashville: Broadman, 1975), 145. 
12 Carter revelled in the description of him as an ‘outsider.’ The term referred to his lack of Washington experience 
prior to his ascension to the presidency. ———, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President  (Fayetteville: University of 
Arkansas Press, 1982), 69-142. 
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diverting his attention from other pressing national issues. Avoiding failure became more important 
than achieving success. 
As Carter’s term progressed, pro-Israel forces dramatically reduced his ability to pressure 
Israel for concessions toward Egypt and the Palestinians. Domestic considerations played the 
central role in the administration’s decision to avoid a public ‘confrontation’ or ‘showdown’ – two 
words that appear frequently in the source material – with Israel. Absent such political pressures, 
Carter could have pursued more forcefully bringing the Palestinians into the negotiations, linked 
U.S. economic and military aid to Israeli concessions, and aggressively sought Israeli withdrawal 
from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Carter would have struggled to achieve these aims, irrespective of domestic pressures, given 
that the United States ‘had no strategy whatsoever for overcoming Begin – he wasn’t going to 
budge on Judea and Samaria,’ the biblical names the Israeli premier used to refer to the West Bank, 
according to William Quandt, who directed the Middle East Office of the National Security Council 
(NSC) under Carter.13 Still, Carter could have pursued an alternate course, one that would have 
further strained American-Israeli ties in the short term but with unclear implications for the peace 
process in the long term. 
Scholars continue to debate whether the United States is, in President Bill Clinton’s phrase, 
‘the one indispensable nation.’14 Regardless, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States has been 
the central outside power consistently working with the regional parties toward a settlement. This 
thesis contends that Washington’s role in the Camp David peace process was indeed significant. In 
doing so, it rejects Karsh’s argument, which gives overwhelming credit to the regional actors and 
relatively little to the ‘naïve’ Carter, who nearly spoiled the process.15 Begin and Sadat implicitly 
colluded to co-opt Carter into their designs for bilateral negotiations to allow the former to establish 
                                                
13 William Quandt, Commentator, Panel: ‘Carter, Reagan and the Middle East,’ 21 June 2013, Annual Meeting of the 
Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (hereafter SHAFR), Arlington, Virginia. 
14 William Clinton, ‘Inaugural Address,’ 20 January 1997, American Presidency Project (hereafter APP). Retrieved 10 
September 2013, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54183; Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American 
Foreign Policy in Retreat  (New York: Doubleday, 2013). 
15 Efraim Karsh, 'Israel,' in The Cold War and the Middle East, ed. Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
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peace on its southern border, and the latter to recover the Sinai Peninsula. However, neither was 
likely to conclude a bilateral agreement without U.S. economic, military and political guarantees. 
A bevy of unique factors converged in the late 1970s to complicate Carter’s task as 
president and convert the Arab-Israeli dispute into a domestic American issue. Executive overreach 
in the U.S. war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal helped embolden the press and empower the 
legislature, further eroding the weak foundation of the American state.16 Public opinion had grown 
restive and wary of American commitments overseas.17 In the Middle East, the 1973-1974 oil 
shocks and the rising wealth of oil-producing Persian Gulf states led to shifting U.S. strategic 
interests in the region and an emphasis on domestic energy policy.18 The 1970s also coincided with 
the rise of the fervently pro-Israel Christian Right, which forged a de facto alliance with Israel’s 
Likud Party.19 Meanwhile, Democrats and Republicans who disapproved of the principles of 
détente formed a core of elite opposition, represented most prominently by the virulently anti-Soviet 
Committee on the Present Danger, to criticise U.S. defence policy and Soviet restrictions on Jewish 
emigration. These stances frequently coincided with support for Israel.20 
Moreover, the lessons of the Holocaust became increasingly prominent in the collective 
American memory.21 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), for example, 
sometimes used the memories of the Holocaust in its calls to support Israel. This greater awareness 
also coincided with Begin’s ascension. According to Shlaim, the Holocaust’s horrors stood at the 
                                                
16 On the foundations of U.S. foreign policy within the early development of the American system, see Walter LaFeber, 
The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750  (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 5-
39. 
17 John Rielly, ed. American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1979 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1979), 4-5. 
18 Carter made energy policy the centrepiece of his domestic program. He called it the ‘moral equivalent of war’ and 
outlined goals for reducing American consumption, including slashing U.S. oil imports by half. ‘The Energy Problem – 
Address to the Nation,’ 18 April 1977, PPP: Carter, 1977, I, 656-662. Also see Olav Njolstad, 'Shifting Priorities: The 
Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,' Cold War History 4, no. 3 (2006). 
19 Colin Shindler, 'Likud and the Christian Dispensationalists: A Symbiotic Relationship,' Israel Studies 5, no. 1 (2000). 
Also see Caitlin Carenen, The Fervent Embrace: Liberal Protestants, Evangelicals, and Israel  (New York: NYU Press, 
2012), 161-87; Robert Freedman, 'The Religious Right and the Carter Administration,' The Historical Journal 48, no. 1 
(2005). 
20 John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), 97-136; Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the 
Politics of Containment  (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 191-276. 
21 Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life  (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 207-38. 
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centre of the military and political ideology of Begin and his immediate colleagues.22 This dynamic 
kept the public’s attention focused on the crimes of the past, even while Carter contemplated a 
showdown with Israel over settlements. 
 Throughout the Camp David peace process, all parties faced formidable, and perhaps 
impassable, diplomatic, political and strategic obstacles. Regional factors remained paramount. The 
constellation of U.S. domestic factors strongly influenced, but did not determine, the development 
of American policy, which was personally determined and carried out by the president himself. 
 
Existing literature 
The politicised popular narrative contends that Carter’s single-term presidency was an abject 
failure.23 Yet scholarly accounts show greater nuance. Dumbrell’s revisionist work argues that 
Carter enjoyed some success in forging a new direction in U.S. foreign policy, but that his own 
missteps along with the complex global circumstances of the time combined to explain his lack of 
success.24 Zelizer concurs that Carter suffered from factors beyond his control, but that he should 
also be faulted for failing to sustain a political coalition.25 In Hargrove’s view, Carter approached 
his role as one that centred on policy and issues, not politics, which was a strength in foreign policy 
but a weakness in domestic politics.26 The Kaufmans are more critical. They maintain that Carter’s 
presidency was ‘mediocre’ and his inability to craft a coherent message or offer effective leadership 
constituted his most serious failures.27  
International affairs quickly became the focus of Carter’s presidency. Initially, he attempted 
to pursue a new course in American foreign policy, one that was not based around an ‘inordinate 
                                                
22 Shlaim, Iron Wall, 353-54. 
23 Walter Russell Mead, 'The Carter Syndrome,' Foreign Policy (2010). Scott Shane, ‘Romney Team Tries Hanging a 
Jimmy Carter Label on Obama,’ The New York Times (hereafter NYT), 28 September 2012. Retrieved 12 September 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/us/politics/romney-compares-obama-presidency-to-
carters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
24 John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation  (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1993). 
25 Julian Zelizer, Jimmy Carter  (New York: Times Books, 2010). 
26 Erwin Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good  (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
27 Burton Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr., 2nd ed. (Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006), 250. 
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fear of Communism,’ but rather which tackled global problems on their merits.28 He placed concern 
for human rights at its centre, the moral foundation upon which he built all else. 
However, the most common critique of Carter’s foreign policy is that his tolerance of 
ideological differences between National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance undermined his agenda and led to policy incoherence. Vance was a traditional 
diplomat who sought to defuse tensions through quiet negotiation and the search for areas of mutual 
interest. On the other hand, Brzezinski was a strategic Cold War thinker who believed in the 
primacy of power in global politics. In this orthodox view, the ineffectual and weak Carter allowed 
himself to be buffeted and swayed by his advisors’ rivalry. As his term progressed, and especially 
after the fall of the U.S.-allied shah in Iran, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, and enhanced 
assessments of Soviet nuclear capability, Brzezinski outmanoeuvred Vance to ensure the triumph of 
his policy preferences.29 
Of Carter’s policy toward the Soviets, Mitchell concludes he had the task of leading the 
United States at a time of flagging national confidence and exaggerated belief in Moscow’s 
strength. Moreover, his complex view of global affairs resisted facile categorisation, which made it 
difficult to generate public support or understanding.30 Garthoff suggests the Vance-Brzezinski split 
led to a Soviet policy that ‘zigzagged.’31 Skidmore argues Carter’s fear of conservative opposition 
eclipsed his desire to abandon the containment doctrine.32 Similarly, many point to two Carter 
                                                
28 ‘University of Notre Dame,’ 22 May 1977, PPP: Carter 1977, I, 954-962. 
29 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign 
Policy  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the 
Carter Administration  (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008); Jerel Rosati, The Carter 
Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior  (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1987); Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years  (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Itai Sneh, The Future Almost Arrived: How Jimmy Carter Failed to Change U.S. Foreign 
Policy  (New York: Peter Lang, 2008); Richard Thornton, The Carter Years: Toward a New Global Order  (New York: 
Paragon House, 1991). Also see Erwin Hargrove et al., 'H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Betty Glad: "An Outsider in the 
White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisers, and the Making of American Foreign Policy",' H-Diplo, Retrieved 3 
September 2013, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XII-6.pdf. 
30 Nancy Mitchell, 'The Cold War and Jimmy Carter,' in The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3: Endings., 
ed. Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
31 Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan, Revised ed. 
(Washington: Brookings, 1994), 623-65. Also see Odd Arne Westad, 'The Fall of Détente and the Turning Tides of 
History,' in The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press, 1997). 
32 David Skidmore, Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform  
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996). 
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presidencies: his first two years, in which he emphasised global interdependence and human rights, 
and his second two years, in which he pursued containment and militarism.33 
However, these narratives are often reductive and simplistic, especially when it comes to 
Arab-Israeli policy. Carter’s broader foreign policy looks better, though still flawed, with age. His 
policy toward the Soviet Union, whose collapse less than a decade after his presidency underscored 
its fundamental weakness, has become less central. In addition, with perspective it is clear that the 
disaster for American policy in Iran was decades in the making and the hostage crisis would have 
been difficult, perhaps impossible, for any president to resolve.34  
Instead, Carter’s emphases on human rights, multipolarity, improving relations with the 
developing world, safeguarding Persian Gulf energy supplies and the projection of soft power 
emerge as prescient.35 Stueck observes that the changes Carter undertook actually came to fruition 
under his successors, who tended to receive the credit.36 Several scholars contend that Carter’s 
‘hands-on’ involvement in foreign policy, especially on the Middle East and Panama Canal 
Treaties, was an asset.37 Moreover, no basic disagreements roiled the relationship between 
Brzezinski and Vance on the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
Most scholars agree that three themes have animated American policy toward the Middle 
East since 1945: commitment to Israel’s survival; protection of U.S. economic and security 
interests, especially access to oil; and containment of Soviet influence, chiefly by cultivating 
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favourable relations with Arab states.38 Other writers, however, contend American policy stems 
from cultural factors and engagement, as much as strategic interests.39 
Nevertheless, John F. Kennedy cemented the U.S.-Israeli alliance, while Carter became the 
first president to commit the prestige of the office to the peace process.40 Every subsequent 
president has launched a Middle East peace initiative. None has been successful. Moreover, as 
Khalidi contends, American policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute has often been defined more by 
‘process’ than ‘peace.’41 Aruri reaches similar conclusions, arguing Washington’s strategic 
relationship with Israel precludes it from acting as an impartial mediator.42 
Carter wanted to chart a different course. For the new president, a devout Baptist, the 
commitment to Arab-Israeli peace constituted a ‘religious commitment.’43 Carter’s early approach 
was deeply informed by a 1975 Brookings Institution report, which called for an end to step-by-step 
diplomacy in favour of a comprehensive settlement.44 He devoted much of his first year in office 
toward filling these prescriptions. Only a comprehensive settlement would ensure stability, diminish 
the potential for an American-Soviet confrontation, protect oil supplies, and keep oil prices under 
control, Carter felt. His approach was regional, not global. The president envisioned agreements 
based on the land-for-peace formula in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.45 He sought Israel’s 
withdrawal from the territories occupied after the 1967 war, with minor border adjustments, and a 
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process for Palestinian self-determination in the occupied territories. Carter also sought cooperation 
with the Soviet Union in bringing all parties together at a conference. Moreover, he became the first 
American president to call publicly for a Palestinian ‘homeland’ and the only one to label Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories ‘illegal.’ 
Carter’s failed attempt to pursue this course, and his subsequent policy reorientations, has 
been well documented. Yet a historiographical lacuna remains around how and why this process 
occurred. This thesis addresses the domestic obstacles that Carter faced in pursuit of his preferred 
objectives, conceding that U.S. desiderata alone could not determine the outcome of Egyptian-
Israeli, broader Arab-Israeli and Palestinian autonomy negotiations. 
Supporters of Carter’s efforts consider the Camp David Accords, and his subsequent 
mediation of the peace treaty between Israel and the largest Arab state, to be a landmark of Middle 
East diplomacy. However, Stein’s account, for example, is congratulatory, devotes little attention to 
the Palestinians, and fails to incorporate domestic political history with his diplomatic approach to 
produce fresh insight.46 For Camp David’s critics, the agreements were too vague to be judged a 
success, did not quell regional instability, and, moreover, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty allowed 
Israel to protect its southern flank while invading Lebanon and consolidating its hold on the West 
Bank.47 
Quandt offers the seminal analysis of the Camp David peace process. As a member of the 
U.S. delegation at Camp David, he brings unique insight into the personalities and also benefits 
from ‘unusually full access to relevant documents.’ Perhaps as a result, it is sparsely footnoted, 
leaving historians with few breadcrumbs to follow. Quandt contends that Carter’s experience offers 
proof positive that the American system delimits any efforts by an administration to approach 
forcefully an issue as complicated as the Arab-Israeli conflict: presidential terms are too short, 
turnover in top national-security posts occurs too rapidly, and the constant need to appeal for 
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congressional and public support all conspire to blunt sustained initiatives. Yet while he concedes 
that domestic politics complicated the administration’s role, his analysis does not reach into 
American society to limn the influence of specific actors on policy.48 
In contrast to this thesis, Quandt places the policymaking process at the centre of his 
narrative. He faults Carter’s lack of strategic vision and his inability to tend to his domestic base. 
Quandt’s critique of the limitations placed on Carter is structural. Conversely, this thesis prioritises 
Carter’s personal and political roles in the negotiations, arguing that the two were inseparable. It 
contends that the overlapping advice Carter received from his aides merged with societal pressures 
to constrain his diplomatic manoeuvrability and damage him politically. 
Spiegel takes a regional approach. He contends the Carter administration based its interests 
around preventing major oil production cuts and price rises, which strained its Arab-Israeli policy.49 
However, Lenczowski indicates Carter’s investment in Arab-Israeli peace amounted to a 
‘superfluous exertion’ of presidential resources. His efforts yielded nothing beyond what Egypt and 
Israel wanted anyway and, additionally, they consumed time that should have been spent on Iran.50 
Brands asserts Carter’s interest in peacemaking stemmed from his religious beliefs and because he 
recognised its potential political benefits.51 Yet none of these accounts are augmented by fresh 
primary research. 
One of Carter’s policy innovations was to emphasise the Palestinians’ centrality to the 
conflict.52 However, his attempts to bring the Palestinians into the negotiations were opposed by 
Israel and aroused fierce domestic criticism. Khalidi argues that Carter’s experience on the 
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Palestinian issue ‘served as a bitter object lesson’ to U.S. administrations about the perils of policy 
innovation.53 
Pressman contends Carter’s approach was ‘pragmatic’: he helped achieve the outer limits of 
what was possible at the time – an Egypt-Israel treaty – while setting in motion a process for 
Palestinian autonomy that he hoped would outlast Israel’s Likud government. Pressman’s archival 
research is thorough, but it devotes little attention to Egypt and does not delve into the domestic 
politics of Carter’s presidential diplomacy.54 This thesis elaborates on Carter’s ‘pragmatism,’ the 
reasons for which Pressman leaves vague, arguing that it resulted from regional challenges in 
conjunction with his considerable domestic pressures. 
Separately, Terry criticises the president for abandoning the comprehensive approach and 
instead merely reverting to shuttle diplomacy.55 Others contend that in the case of the Palestinians, 
Carter’s human rights emphasis fell victim to other strategic imperatives.56 Still, just by speaking 
publicly about the Palestinian situation, Carter elevated the issue on the American policymaking 
agenda.57 
 The U.S. role in Arab-Israeli negotiations was essentially non-legislative during Carter’s 
term, but that did not obviate congressional influence. Carter had to contend with congressional 
power and influence to gain support for controversial items on his agenda. He consequently had to 
expend political capital, which in turn limited his tolerance for sustained controversy over his stance 
in Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
Carter’s relationship with Congress, both houses of which were controlled by his own 
Democratic Party, was generally poor. As Jones contends, Carter conceived of his role as president 
‘as that of the trustee – an official entrusted to represent the public or national interest, downplaying 
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short-term electoral considerations.’ But such a principled stance did not endear him to 
lawmakers.58 Carter later admitted that he ‘sometimes … was not adequately concerned with how 
[his] proposals affected the views of voters on whom they relied for re-election.’59 Moreover, as 
Congress wrestled with the White House for control of the foreign policy agenda, lobbyists had 
unprecedented access to decision-makers on international affairs.60 
En route to the presidency, Carter overcame ‘latent suspicion’ from some members of the 
Jewish community about his Southern Baptist background61 to win 71 percent of the Jewish vote.62 
More than 60 percent of the substantial donors to the Democratic Party were Jewish and even while 
Carter was still a relative unknown in the race, he received more than one-third of his funding from 
Jewish donors.63 Carter attributed the backing to his support for Israel and anti-boycott legislation, 
which was adopted to punish American citizens and firms that conducted business with companies 
that participated in the Arab League economic embargo against Israel.64 
Jews comprise around 2 percent of the American population – about 6 million people – but 
they have the highest percentage voter turnout of any ethnic group. The centres of American Jewry 
are also located in electorally critical states, such as California, Florida and New York. The societal 
support for Israel provided fertile ground for organised American Jewish groups and other pro-
Israel lobbyists to gain support.65 Conversely, Americans have been less supportive of the Arab 
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cause generally, and the Palestinian one specifically.66 This thesis will not make reference to a 
‘Jewish lobby,’ which is a nebulous term insufficient for this level of analysis. However, a number 
of actors combined to constitute a pro-Israel lobby in the United States. 
 The former editor of AIPAC’s biweekly Near East Report defines the pro-Israel lobby as 
‘those formal and informal actors that directly and indirectly influence American policy to support 
Israel.’ The ‘informal lobby’ influences policy indirectly, and derives from patterns of Jewish 
voting behaviour and broad trends in American public opinion. The ‘formal lobby,’ represented 
most prominently by AIPAC, attempts to influence legislation.  
AIPAC distributes information, encourages involvement in the political process and serves 
as a conduit of opinion to Congress. Unlike traditional political action committees, it does not rate, 
endorse or finance candidates.67 It was established to counteract ‘pro-Arab’ sentiment detected in 
the Defense and State Departments, according to its co-founder.68 Conversely, the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations (Presidents’ Conference) is the main contact 
between the organised Jewish community and the White House. Comprised of dozens of 
organisations, it formulates positions, meets with executive branch officials, including the president, 
and allows the American Jewish community to speak with one voice. The lobby has no effective 
rival in Washington; the pro-Arab lobby has limited means and influence on Arab-Israeli issues.69 
Although Bard overstates the case, the pro-Arab network has greater success lobbying for economic 
and defence interests.70 
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Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the domestic strength of pro-Israel factions compels 
American politicians to tilt U.S. policy toward Israel despite its strategic failures.71 But their work 
lacks historical context, archival research or adequate reference to Americans’ broader policy 
preferences. It was also written more than a quarter century after the Carter administration, by 
which time the lobby – especially AIPAC – had developed into a much different entity than it was 
in the late 1970s. 
Tivnan’s account concludes that the lobby had a significant influence on Carter’s policy, but 
refrains from contextualising that influence within broader American policy preferences.72 Tillman 
reaches similar conclusions, contending that the lobby has been ‘the root cause of a chronically 
unbalanced policy that … remains a strategic failure.’73 
Conversely, Bard argues the lobby’s influence is a salutary part of the pluralistic U.S. 
system. During the Carter administration, he believes that pro-Israel factions exerted ‘an observable 
degree of influence’ on American policy by reducing U.S. leverage over Israel.74 Miller tends to 
agree. He acknowledges that many U.S. negotiators have held biases, but that nothing is nefarious 
about the influence of domestic politics on Arab-Israeli policy, as long as the issue is discussed 
publicly.75 Although Lazarowitz does not examine the pro-Israel lobby per se, she argues that Carter 
dealt with the organised American Jewish leadership in a similar way to other special interest 
groups, with little regard to the emotional bond between many Americans and the Jewish state.76 In 
contrast to these accounts, this thesis contends that the pro-Israel lobby’s influence on Carter’s 
policy can only be understood in the context of mass opinion and broader domestic pressures. 
This thesis contends that the heavy media coverage of Carter’s involvement in Arab-Israeli 
negotiations piqued the public’s interest. Once aroused, Americans expected rapid results in the 
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peace process. As the diplomatic slog stretched into months, news coverage of the stalemated 
negotiations, coupled with elite criticism of Carter’s approach, contributed to an image of a weak 
president. Moreover, Carter’s determination to involve the American people in policymaking 
engaged the public as a collective entity. The public, thus engaged, soon became a principle arena 
of competition between Egyptian and Israeli leaders, who looked to American opinion to fortify 
their positions.77 
Carter grounded his political approach, expressed frequently during his campaign, in the 
belief that the Washington establishment had led American government astray. His administration 
would be different, and his foreign policy would not be predicated on the received wisdom. Carter 
committed himself to pursue a foreign policy that ‘the American people both support and … know 
about and understand.’78 Implicit in this approach was the need to cultivate popular support for his 
program. Yet virtually no analyses of Carter’s foreign policy have incorporated public opinion 
analysis into the study of the archival record.79 
Although Americans’ policy preferences were pro-Israel, the enthusiasm generated by 
Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem created a climate more conducive than ever to pressuring Israel for 
concessions. Sadat became extremely popular, but that did little to diminish overall public 
favouritism toward Israel. Additionally, Americans generally disapproved of Begin’s settlements 
policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the ascension of his right-wing government only 
notionally influenced the trend of public support for the Jewish state.80 Carter discovered that some 
courses – namely, pressuring Israel by withholding arms or economic aid – were unavailable to 
him. 
In his classic work on public opinion and U.S. foreign policy, Rosenau contends the media 
circulates opinions between decision makers and elites, whom he collectively refers to as ‘opinion 
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makers.’ In turn, these opinion makers sway the preferences of the public, which otherwise merely 
sets the outer limits for policy.81 Powlick and Katz conclude public opinion becomes significant 
‘when an issue produces a debate among elites that is covered by the media in such a way as to 
focus the public’s attention.’82 Similarly, Brody asserts that Americans ‘form and revise their 
impressions of the quality of presidential performance on evidence contained … in the news 
media.’ That process of opinion formation is inherently ‘politicized,’ Brody contends.83 Separately, 
Gilboa believes that since 1948 ‘American public opinion has had some effect on U.S. policy in the 
Middle East and on certain critical Israeli policies,’ but during the Carter years it played ‘a 
significant role.’84 
Lippmann argues that foreign policy should be the domain of the elite because most 
members of the public are either uninterested or unable to make reasoned judgments on 
international affairs.85 Moreover, he contends that public opinion reacts not to the environment, but 
to the ‘pseudo-environment’ constructed by the news media because the world ‘we have to deal 
with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind.’ The press acts ‘like the beam of a 
searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into 
vision.’86 Additionally, the news media’s searchlight has rested on the Middle East more than most 
other regions.87 
The issues emphasised in the major American news outlets, and in particular The New York 
Times, set the agenda for national news coverage and become the issues regarded by the public as 
the most important. This dynamic has come to be called the media’s ‘agenda-setting role.’88 As 
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Cohen notably wrote, the press ‘may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.’89 
Complaints about unfair news coverage are a common trope in every administration. 
However, Carter’s task of winning over the media was particularly arduous because of the moment 
in which he served. The 1970s was a heady decade for the American news media. By the time 
Carter entered the White House, journalists felt empowered to ask questions, challenge authority 
and generally demonstrate a newfound scepticism toward authority. 
Moreover, throughout the 1970s, technological changes made international reporting more 
accessible to the American public and facilitated a greater number of foreign news stories on 
television.90 The Middle East featured most prominently in that coverage.91 Additionally, according 
to one 1978 study, U.S. newspapers ran more stories on foreign policy than on any other issue out 
of Washington. White House correspondents also wrote more frequently on, and showed a keener 
interest in, foreign policy than anything else.92 
Carter’s personal involvement in Arab-Israeli negotiations ensured the proceedings were 
often reported on and interpreted by White House reporters, rather than or in addition to diplomatic 
correspondents. White House correspondents tend to focus on the ups and downs of politics, rather 
than the slow grind of diplomacy.93 Consequently, coverage tended to view Carter’s role through 
the prism of its domestic political ramifications.94 
The Carter administration generated consistently more negative coverage than his 
predecessors, a dynamic that contributed to the public perception of a president incapable of strong 
leadership.95 His moralistic tendencies, ‘outsider’ status and seeming lack of humour failed to 
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endear him with seasoned Washington journalists.96 Primed for presidential misconduct, the media 
pounced in summer 1977 when allegations surfaced that Carter’s confidante and new director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, Bert Lance, had engaged in shady practices in his pre-
Washington businesses in Georgia. Lance was cleared of wrongdoing, but the uproar prompted his 
resignation and badly damaged Carter. 
This work contends that the news media played a pivotal role in developing public opinion 
and shaping Carter’s political environment. Historians often rely on news coverage to supplant the 
documentary record, but with little regard to the influence that reporting has in creating the 
consensus within which policy can be developed. Too often historical analysis has omitted the study 
of television news. This study agrees with Iyengar and Kinder’s assertion that ‘for good or ill, 
television news has become a regular participant in the American political process,’ while further 
contending that the main print coverage drives TV news.97  
Carter’s political acumen propelled him from obscure local official to the Georgia 
governorship and then to the Oval Office in less than seven years, but it rarely surfaced during his 
presidency. Once ensconced in the White House, he concentrated on managing the country’s 
problems, not generating support for his policies or offering a national vision. President Carter bore 
scant resemblance to candidate Carter. 
As part of Carter’s ‘trusteeship’ mentality, he sought to make decisions based on their 
merits, not on what was politically beneficial. ‘Many times the one argument that I would find 
would ruin a person’s case is when he’d say, “This is good for you politically.” He didn’t want to 
hear that,’ Vice President Walter Mondale said. ‘He wanted to know what’s right.’98 While such an 
approach fuelled Carter’s willingness to tackle difficult problems, it also alienated key members of 
the Democratic coalition and eroded his popularity. 
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This work is also a study of presidential leadership in foreign policy. Due to its domestic 
political repercussions, the key to understanding U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute resides 
not in the foreign policymaking bureaucracy, but rather the presidency.99 Carter took responsibility 
for detailed issues and expected results of himself. He looked to lasting solutions to complex 
problems that extended beyond his time in office. 
Little historical work has been done on presidential performances as chief diplomats. 
Plischke mentions Carter’s role at Camp David in his study of presidents’ engagement in summit 
diplomacy, but does not analyse the 39th president’s sustained involvement in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. He contends that presidents who act as diplomats-in-chief find their greatest success when 
their activities easily reconcile both their immediate image and long-term prestige.100 Simon argues 
that summits consistently have an impact on U.S. presidential popularity, bilateral relations and 
foreign economic relations. That data-heavy approach, however, differs from the present one in that 
it looks for longitudinal patterns over decades, does not incorporate primary documents and is not 
centred on a specific policy area.101 
Typically, a president’s leadership is exercised through his influence on elite opinion, 
journalistic coverage and congressional debate rather than through the general public.102 In his 
seminal work, Neustadt argues that the main weapon in the president’s arsenal is ‘the power to 
persuade.’ But his source of power should be tapped judiciously; otherwise, the president risks 
depleting his wellspring.103 Greenstein does not rate Carter highly in the two qualities he 
emphasises – communicative ability and, above all else, ‘emotional intelligence.’104  
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Instead, Carter’s style of leadership more closely resembled that described by Kernell. The 
president appealed directly to his electorate for support in an attempt at ‘forcing compliance from 
fellow Washingtonians by going over their heads to appeal to their constituents.’105 However, 
Carter did not ‘go public’ in an attempt to bolster his position in Washington. Rather, his public 
comments were predominantly intended to call attention to certain domestic issues, such as the 
energy crisis, and to educate the public on complex foreign affairs like the Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
However, his goals were nebulously defined, his tactics unorthodox and his style helped turn elite 
opinion against his administration. 
Carter demonstrated ample ability to bargain, cajole and compromise in his direct talks with 
Begin and Sadat. Yet he did not show a similarly deft hand with his own citizens. Had he been a 
smooth persuader, rather than a blunt advocate, it is conceivable that Carter could have generated 
public and congressional support for pressuring Israel for concessions. 
 
Sources and methodology 
The rich first-hand accounts of the Camp David peace process are a mixed blessing.106 They 
provide a useful record of an extraordinary period in diplomacy. However, they have also led to a 
scholarly overreliance on accounts by participants who may lack distance and balance. As a result, 
most studies tread similar ground using the same source base. Moreover, standard diplomatic 
approaches have failed to appreciate the political reverberations of Carter’s role in the negotiations. 
The present work is based predominantly on research in government and private archives in 
Britain, the Middle East and the United States. It developed a unique source base in order to 
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facilitate a fresh perspective on events and issues often subsumed within the larger historiography 
of the Carter presidency. This thesis takes advantage of the growing amount of primary material 
available from this period, but does not purport to offer the final verdict on Carter. 
Research for this thesis was carried out principally at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library 
in Atlanta, Georgia, not the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) in College Park, 
Maryland, because the work concentrates on the presidency rather than the foreign policy 
bureaucracy. Available material at NARA on Carter’s role in the Camp David peace process was 
sparse during the research for this work. Unfortunately, requests at the Carter Library for 
Mandatory Declassification Review yielded Camp David Summit materials that were essentially 
devoid of content. Additionally, the State Department’s Office of the Historian published the first 
volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series on Carter’s Arab-Israeli policy, 
covering January 1977 to August 1978, in the very final stages of preparation of this thesis.107 
Nevertheless, a significant amount of new material became available at the Carter Library 
during the research for this thesis. The Presidential Handwriting File consists of papers that have 
crossed Carter’s desk and was therefore indispensable. Brzezinski and his staff’s daily reports, 
which are contained in the National Security Affairs collection, provide a record of policymaking-
in-progress. Brzezinski, in particular, proved a master at controlling the paper flow to the president; 
his memos are filled with strategic advice for Carter. Many of these documents, especially those 
available exclusively on the Remote Archives Capture terminal at the Carter Library, were 
declassified in the course of this project. 
Hamilton Jordan’s files were critical. As one of the president’s longest-serving advisors, his 
central role soon became ‘trying to reconcile [Carter’s] foreign policy interests and objectives with 
the political realities.’108 Many new national security documents also became available with the 
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2010 opening of Mondale’s donated collection. The vice president was an experienced foreign 
policy hand and a conduit between the Jewish community and the administration.  
Cyrus Vance did not leave a voluminous paper trail, participate in any of the post-Carter 
administration oral history projects consulted for this thesis or donate historical materials to the 
Carter Library, so his voice is somewhat muted in previous studies. Thus, his papers at Yale 
University were examined, although they are more substantial on the campaign and transition than 
his tenure at Foggy Bottom. Similarly, the recently opened papers of U.N. Ambassador Andrew 
Young, held at Atlanta’s Auburn Avenue Research Library, proved relatively thin on his time in 
New York. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with this project’s contention that Carter’s involvement in Arab-
Israeli diplomacy was fundamentally political, it also engages with primary materials from his 
domestic and media advisors held at the Carter Library. Although head of the Domestic Policy 
Staff, Stuart Eizenstat consistently acted as an advocate for Israel, while White House Counsel 
Robert Lipshutz also had an informal role as Middle East advisor.109 The files of both Eizenstat and 
Lipshutz yielded rich dividends of rarely accessed documents on Middle East policy, public opinion 
and contacts with the American Jewish community. Moreover, Eisenstat’s personal papers, opened 
in 2011, were examined at the Library of Congress. He often transmitted ‘personal messages’ 
between Jerusalem, Israel’s embassy in Washington and the president.110 Transcripts of interviews 
conducted by Eizenstat for an unwritten book on the Middle East proved especially pertinent to this 
study. 
The Carter Library papers of Press Secretary Jody Powell were also consulted. Powell’s role 
went beyond that of mere spokesman; he frequently provided advice on the press-policy link. His 
collection also contains extensive polling and analysis on the domestic politics-foreign policy nexus 
by Carter’s influential pollster, Patrick Caddell. The files of communications chief Gerald Rafshoon 
were also illuminating. Rafshoon’s focus on the president’s image often became intertwined with 
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political and even diplomatic advice. Taken together, these documents reveal the remarkable 
confluence of advice from Carter’s domestic, foreign policy and communications staffs. By 
integrating the study of domestic and foreign policy sources, this thesis shows how each served to 
augment the other in Carter’s approach toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
Many other U.S. collections were consulted, including the congressional records at the 
National Archives Building in Washington, D.C., the personal papers of several former members of 
Congress and manuscript collections at the Library of Congress. These collections provided 
documentary evidence from figures inside and outside the administration. 
This thesis, however, does not focus solely on government decision-making, but also on the 
broader political and societal pressures brought to bear on Carter during Arab-Israeli negotiations. 
Foremost, it treats the news media as a political actor. Print and television news reporting and 
commentary are used as a primary source for the insight they provide into the political environment 
in which Carter operated. 
The most important news organisations constituted what Hess calls the ‘inner ring.’111 
Basing its analysis on Hess’ categorisation, this thesis devotes greatest attention to the daily 
coverage of three television networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) and five newspapers (Chicago 
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington 
Post). The personal or corporate archives of several notable journalists and institutions were also 
accessed. Unfortunately, the Walter Cronkite Papers, which opened in 2010 at the University of 
Texas, and The New York Times Foreign Desk Archives at the New York Public Library provided 
less insight than hoped. 
In order to ascertain the public’s preferences, a variety of polls, mainly through the 
electronic resources of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, were accessed. The author 
interviewed several subjects both inside and outside the administration, but requests for others, 
including Carter, Brzezinski and Eizenstat, went unheeded. Regardless, a number of oral history 
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collections provide first-hand accounts and opinions from individuals in or close to the Carter 
administration. These include the Carter Presidency Project at the University of Virginia’s Miller 
Center, the Frontline Diplomacy collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training 
at the Library of Congress, and Columbia University’s Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy 
Project, all of which were used liberally. 
The materials of non-governmental groups were also consulted. Access to AIPAC archives 
was denied. However, this project makes use of the group’s biweekly Near East Report, as well as 
the annual reports of the Presidents’ Conference, both of which are available at the Library of 
Congress. The archives of the Committee on the Present Danger at Stanford’s Hoover Institution 
gave insight into that group’s beliefs and strategies. 
This thesis mostly avoids analysing the actions of non-American parties. However, where 
necessary, documents from non-American sources have been consulted to provide context. The 
British National Archives in Kew released several files – including eloquent and insightful 
dispatches from British diplomats – during the course of research for this project. These materials 
are mostly located in the Prime Minister’s Office and Foreign Office files. The Israel State Archives 
(ISA) in Jerusalem holds a number of English-language documents. In March 2013, ISA released a 
slew of documents online from the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s 
Office pertaining to Carter’s 1979 trip to Jerusalem. These materials offer necessary supplemental 
perspectives on Carter’s role. Finally, the materials held at the Institute for Palestine Studies in 
Beirut, Lebanon, provide a useful regional context, especially from the Palestinian perspective, 
which was otherwise absent from the negotiations. In particular, the daily reports from WAFA, 
described by Khalidi as ‘the P.L.O.’s news agency,’ were instructive for commentary, news and 
official releases.112 
This methodology has been employed in order to gain a new understanding of Carter’s 
political role in the negotiations. As new American material becomes available, especially from the 
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State Department, the underpinnings of American policy will need to be revisited. The forthcoming 
releases of the relevant FRUS volumes will likely spawn a new surge in interest and scholarship. 
Moreover, future researchers with facility in either Arabic or Hebrew – or both – who can gain 
access to new Egyptian, Israeli and Palestinian materials can help provide a corrective to what has 
been a U.S.-centric narrative. 
 
Structure 
The present study explores the political reverberations of Carter’s role as chief diplomat in 
the Camp David peace process and, in turn, how those consequences influenced the American 
contribution to Arab-Israeli negotiations. It offers fresh perspectives on the nature and limits of 
presidential power; the role of the news media in American life; the link between U.S. public 
opinion and foreign policy; and public engagement on American policy toward the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
This work takes a chronological approach. Chapter One examines the Carter 
administration’s first months, when the new president carried over his campaign commitments to 
candour and open diplomacy into loose rhetoric on his emerging Arab-Israeli policy. Chapter Two 
considers the administration’s response to domestic and international backlash over Carter’s style 
and substance, and its concomitant recognition of the ‘need for a political plan’ on controversial 
foreign policy initiatives. In Chapter Three, the path to the politically disastrous U.S.-Soviet Joint 
Communiqué on the Middle East is examined. 
Chapter Four is centred around the administration’s response to Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, an 
event that threatened to render meaningless the political knocks the president had theretofore taken 
on his way toward pursuing a regional conference. Chapter Five mostly steps away from Arab-
Israeli negotiations. It offers the first archive-based examination of a U.S. warplanes deal to Egypt, 
Israel and Saudi Arabia in the context of shifting American priorities in the Middle East. Chapter 
Six presents a fresh analysis of Carter’s extraordinary role in the Camp David Summit. It focuses on 
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the administration’s effort to gain control of media coverage of the negotiations – a move that was 
done for diplomatic purposes but had an ancillary domestic political benefit. 
In Chapter Seven, this thesis traces the path from the Camp David Summit to the Carter’s 
last-minute March 1979 trip to the Middle East to conclude the peace treaty. Finally, Chapter Eight 
spans the early phases of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. It contemplates how the bitter 
residue left by Carter’s sustained involvement in the peace process contributed to a domestic 
political narrative of failure and incompetence. 
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Chapter One: The Limits of Candour –  
Carter’s Early Forays Into “Open Diplomacy” 
 
Introduction 
Less than two months after Carter was sworn into office, a sketch on the popular NBC 
comedy programme ‘Saturday Night’ captured the growing public perception of Carter’s 
personality. Spoofing on the previous week’s first-ever presidential radio call-in show, which had 
enabled Americans to query – directly and on-air – Carter, on any issue, the skit portrayed the 
president’s ability to respond intelligently to every caller’s problem in detail, no matter how 
insignificant.113 Among other wisdom doled out, ‘Carter’ helped a postal worker repair a 
mechanical sorting device and advised a panicky caller on an acid trip to drink a beer and listen to 
the Allman Brothers.114 
Whatever its humour, the sketch accurately portrays Carter’s use of earnest competency and 
openness, rather than inspiration and vision, to lead. Carter came across as alternately 
sanctimonious, humble, awkward and intelligent. In these initial months, Carter’s call-in shows and 
impromptu public comments underscored his intention to govern differently: he plunged into 
complicated issues in full public view, trying fresh approaches to old problems. Carter extended this 
openness into the arena of Middle East diplomacy, most notably when he became the first U.S. 
president to speak publicly on the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This chapter argues that the course of Arab-Israeli diplomacy early in Carter’s term cannot 
fully be understood without an appreciation of the new president’s style and domestic political 
environment. However, it does not contend that these communicative, political and stylistic aspects 
determined the course of the peace process at this moment. Carter’s forthright approach and open 
discussion of his Arab-Israeli policy narrowed policy options, shifted the public debate and 
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established a climate of criticism. These efforts at ‘open diplomacy’ turned large segments of the 
American elite against the administration, displeased foreign leaders and began to alienate elements 
of the American Jewish community.115 
Carter’s advisors encouraged him to make the most of his early-term political capital by 
making bold moves in foreign policy, especially in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, the haste 
with which Carter moved during that early period helped determine the problems his diplomatic 
efforts encountered later. Carter’s ‘public statements sometimes seemed to be a little bit ill 
considered. … He would make them just because there was an occasion to say something,’ 
according to the NSC’s William Quandt. ‘I think that caused more problems than were necessary in 
the Middle East [because] everybody’s antenna is so finely tuned. … He talked too much in public 
about things.’116 
Historical scholarship has mostly neglected this aspect of Carter’s early months as president. 
One exception is Quandt, who is critical of the president’s tendency to act as an ‘unguided missile’ 
in his public remarks.117 On the other hand, Christison’s contention that as president Carter 
‘changed the vocabulary’ and ‘to a great extent changed the frame of reference for the Palestinian 
issue’ for U.S. policymaking dates to this period, when he spoke of the need for a Palestinian 
‘homeland.’118 
 Carter’s initial months, from January through May 1977, set the tone for the opposition he 
faced in his remaining years in office. This period also demonstrated the difficulty in translating 
positions taken in a political campaign for domestic gains into diplomatic practice. Carter’s early 
attempts to do things differently in the Middle East – speaking openly about terms for an 
agreement, pressuring Israel for territorial concessions and trying to bring Palestinians into the 
negotiating process – agitated problems that worsened as his administration proceeded. 
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The inheritance 
 Initially, the administration devoted its energies in Arab-Israeli diplomacy toward devising 
with regional actors an acceptable format and procedure for reconvening the Geneva Peace 
Conference. The Geneva conference had been dormant since December 1973, when it was held 
following the October War. The meeting, co-chaired by the Soviet Union and the United States, 
arose out of UNSC 338, which called on all belligerents of the war to begin negotiations on the 
basis of 242 ‘under appropriate auspices.’119 
In substance, the conference achieved little.120 However, Kissinger used it to generate 
momentum toward two U.S.-mediated disengagement-of-forces agreements between Egypt and 
Israel, and one between Israel and Syria.121 He effectively excluded the Soviets from the process.122 
However, in order to obtain Jerusalem’s signature on the second Egypt-Israel agreement, known as 
Sinai II, Washington pledged it would ‘not recognize or negotiate’ with the PLO so long as it ‘does 
not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept’ 242 and 338.123 
It remained unclear whether that commitment prohibited any contact whatsoever between a 
U.S. official and PLO figure, or if it was legally binding.124 Regardless, in political terms Israel, its 
friends in the United States, and both the Ford and Carter administrations interpreted the agreement 
as binding. The pledge had significant repercussions. ‘From that point on our greatest vulnerability 
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in pursuing an effective mediatory role in the peace process was our inability to have dialogue, real 
dialogue with the PLO,’ U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts believed.125 
Nevertheless, the Ford administration recognised the need to facilitate a political solution for 
the Palestinians. Indeed, 242 had referred only to ‘refugees.’ In 1975, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold Saunders told a House subcommittee that the 
Palestinians constituted a ‘political factor,’ and their status represented ‘the heart’ of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.126 However, while this necessity may have been recognised in theory, diplomatic 
and political exigencies conspired against any genuine American-led initiative. 
Despite the limitations imposed by Sinai II, various channels remained open between 
Washington and the PLO throughout Carter’s term. For example, several lawmakers kept the 
administration informed of their meetings with top PLO officials, including leader Yasser Arafat.127 
Carter also used educator Landrum Bolling as an intermediary during U.S. attempts to convince the 
group to accept 242 and recognise Israel’s right to exist.128 In Beirut, Washington maintained 
regular contact with the PLO through the CIA’s source in Arafat’s inner circle, Ali Hassan 
Salame,129 while Ambassador John Gunther Dean said American officials met PLO figures over 
U.S. security interests in the country.130 Additionally, the U.S. ambassador to Austria met twice 
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with the PLO’s European representative131 and the PLO acted as a go-between with the Iran 
hostage-takers to help free the American captives held there from 1979-1981.132 
Moreover, signs emerged early in Carter’s term that some leading PLO figures sought a U.S. 
dialogue. Through contacts in Beirut, the CIA learned in January that Yasser Arafat, at Sadat’s 
suggestion, was ‘seeking ways of establishing a dialogue’ with U.S. officials but was ‘uncertain’ 
how to go about it.133 
However, while diplomatic obstacles to bringing the organised Palestinian political 
leadership into the process were formidable, domestic factors added further complexity for 
American policymakers. With Israel opposed to any U.S. contact with the PLO, its supporters in 
Congress, the media and the public objected to any indication of an American policy shift. 
Moreover, Soviet patronage of the PLO intensified U.S. – especially conservative – animosity 
toward the group. Finally, the frequent conflation in the American media and in public discourse of 
the Palestinians as a people and the PLO as a political body virtually ruled out the prospect of any 
meaningful contact between U.S. officials and Palestinians, whether members of the PLO or 
otherwise. 
 
Transformative agenda 
Despite being a global-affairs neophyte, Carter came to office with an ambitious agenda for 
transforming American foreign relations. In a document outlining the administration’s priorities in 
its opening months, Brzezinski urged Carter to ‘initiate a new phase in U.S. foreign policy, going 
beyond the Atlanticist/East-West Cold War framework of the years 1945-1976.’ Carter’s advisors 
said the four ‘most urgent’ foreign policy issues to be addressed were stabilising the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship, beginning work ‘toward a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement,’ improving the 
North-South relationship and containing the arms race. All of these issues had pertinence to Arab-
Israeli policy. 
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Carter was determined to abandon Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in favour of a Middle East 
policy that resolved all outstanding issues through ‘direct negotiations between the parties.’ Carter’s 
advisors perceived ‘the urgent need for U.S. initiatives to bring about negotiations’ before the end 
of 1977. At the outset, the central goal would be to work toward a settlement through direct 
negotiations in which the United States would have little more than an ‘intermediary role.’ Carter 
was advised to consult with Congress and leaders of the American Jewish community while 
developing U.S. policy toward multilateral talks and, especially, the form of Palestinian 
representation in any negotiations. The United States and Soviet Union should engage in a 
‘consultation,’ but otherwise Washington’s envisioned role for the Kremlin remained nebulous.134 
Brzezinski believed that the ‘prospect of a Geneva Conference … should be used as a form 
of pressure on the Israelis and inducement for the Arabs, though not as an end in itself.’ Substantive 
negotiations on the issues should take place beforehand and Geneva ‘should be held to legitimize 
any agreement previously reached by the parties through U.S. efforts.’135 Quandt suggested the 
conference itself was mostly symbolic, but its pursuit provided the administration cover to achieve 
its goals. ‘Geneva was sort of a mythical notion that was held out there to … entice the Arabs but it 
was always something you wanted to have three or six months off in the future and not rushed,’ he 
said.136 
The decision to work toward Geneva had taken time to develop. For example, Vance’s pre-
election memo to Carter offered similar – though more modest – prescriptions. He advised Carter 
that they should ‘nudge the (Arab-Israeli) situation along, but not take any strong initiative in the 
first several months, which should be devoted to quiet diplomacy … I believe we should urge the 
parties to reach a general settlement to be carried out in stages.’ Vance added that the new president 
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should make Congress and ‘the America people joint partners in foreign policy matters’ and must 
take leadership to educate the public about his international agenda.137 
Less than three weeks after the election, Kissinger and other Ford administration officials 
visited Carter to discuss foreign policy challenges facing the president-elect. Of all of the topics, the 
Middle East was the only discussion held off the record. Nevertheless, the minutes note that Carter 
said ‘he would try to avoid going to a Geneva Conference out of concern for the role the Soviets 
might play there.’138 
What changed between that discussion and Carter’s first day in office is unclear. However, 
the foreign policymaking bureaucracy felt a sense of urgency. Just days before Carter’s 
inauguration, an interagency intelligence analysis for the incoming administration concluded, ‘It is 
now evident that in the absence of progress toward … a settlement, there will be a slide toward 
renewed Arab-Israeli confrontation with all of its possible consequences …’ It suggested that ‘the 
end of 1977 seems the outer limit by which it will be necessary to be able to point to concrete 
progress in the negotiations.’ Geneva was the best option because it would offer a chance of a 
comprehensive settlement, which is something upon which the Arabs insisted, including some form 
of Palestinian solution. ‘The question is therefore probably not “whether Geneva,” but “when and 
how,”’ they wrote.139 
Expectations for Carter were high. The United States had finished its electioneering, the 
Lebanese civil war had temporarily abated, and the two key powers – Egypt and Israel – were both 
looking to the United States as the powerbroker. Editorial opinion in U.S. newspapers reflected the 
optimism. The Washington Post wrote that ‘a better world’ was ‘within Jimmy Carter’s reach’ and 
urged Carter to take his first months ‘to strengthen the domestic political base he will need to 
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undergird the difficult measures … that effective diplomacy will require.’140 A New York Times 
analysis suggested that ‘more than any other region of the world’ the Middle East ‘clamors’ for 
Carter’s attention.141 
On 21 January, Carter requested a review of the U.S. position toward the Middle East, 
including reconvening Geneva, Palestinian representation at any such conference and official 
contact with the PLO.142 The administration further forged details of its policy over the course of 
three meetings in January and February, before and after Vance’s initial visit to the region.143 
Prior to Vance’s departure, Carter’s aides agreed on the ‘urgency of an American initiative.’ 
They decided against ‘a largely damage-limiting policy of temporizing, maneuver and apparent 
activity’ and instead chose to pursue a policy ‘designed to gain early control of the situation by 
active and serious initiative in structuring and pursuing a negotiating process, and by making clear 
our willingness to put our full weight on the scales behind these negotiations.’ Geneva was the 
preferred forum. ‘If [the Palestinians] are left out entirely, then any agreement that is reached will 
be dangerously incomplete,’ they added. ‘The questions are whether to try to find a way to get them 
in early or at the end, and whether some alternative to the mainstream PLO can speak for the 
Palestinians authoritatively.’144 
Upon Vance’s return, policymakers agreed at an NSC meeting to work out as many 
substantive details as possible ahead of Geneva.145 The administration’s approach offered a sharp 
contrast to its predecessor, Brzezinski believed. Kissinger ‘tried to take small steps toward an 
indefinite future in the Middle East. We should try to define the future first, and then move by small 
steps in implementing an agreement. This is a key difference,’ he said. Carter concurred. Vance 
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believed the case for Geneva was urgent, but he counselled that the United States should move 
cautiously until Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s visit the following month in order to avoid 
antagonising Congress or American Jewry.146 
However, the main sticking point for Geneva remained Palestinian representation. Israel 
refused to negotiate directly with the PLO, but Arab states insisted on some form of Palestinian 
presence, perhaps in the form of the PLO or other Palestinians subsumed within Jordan’s 
delegation. Agreement on that, Carter believed, would ‘determine whether we have Geneva or not.’ 
He placed the onus on Israel. ‘We will have to judge what the Israelis can really accept,’ he said. 
‘For example, recognition of the PLO, not necessarily officially, but at least recognizing their 
existence. This might be a useful step.’147 
The desire to press the Palestinian issue – whether with the PLO, Israel’s settlements or 
otherwise – onto the agenda proved to be the root cause of Carter’s friction with two successive 
Israeli prime ministers and provoked controversy at home. Ultimately, he took tentative steps 
toward involving Palestinians both early and late in his administration; neither was successful. 
Regardless, the contours of Carter’s position began to take shape: he sought a 
comprehensive peace, believed Israel should withdraw to its pre-1967 boundaries with minor 
adjustments, the Palestinians should get a ‘homeland’ and ‘self-determination,’ Israeli military rule 
in the West Bank and Gaza violated Palestinians’ civil and human rights, and Jewish settlements in 
the territories were illegal under international law. As his term progressed, Carter alternately 
loosened and clung to these principals. Egypt’s role in the negotiations became pivotal, while the 
Palestinian issue faded as a central component of the president’s vision for a settlement. 
The president intended to facilitate the negotiations, but emphasised his disinclination to 
impose a settlement on the regional players. Stating ‘this year is the brightest hope for peace that I 
remember,’ Carter enunciated in February for the first time publicly his determination to convene 
Geneva by the end of 1977. He was careful to stress the American role as ‘the stimulating factor.’ 
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Rather than ‘to exert an improper, outside pressure’ on the negotiating parties, the United States, 
Carter said, wanted a peace ‘done among those who lived there.’148 
From the start, however, the administration knew that domestic politics were intrinsically 
wrapped up in Arab-Israeli policy. For example, Vance had actually been Carter’s second choice for 
secretary of state. He preferred George Ball, but decided against nominating him because Ball’s 
criticism of Israel ‘would have made it difficult for him to pass confirmation hearings.’149 Still, Ball 
remained an informal advisor throughout Carter’s presidency.150 
Then, less than two weeks after the inauguration, Senator Richard Stone (D-Fla.) made ‘a 
strong appeal’ that the NSC establish ‘close contact’ with Morris Amitay, AIPAC’s executive 
director. Stone also ‘attacked the pro-Arab bias he detected in the analyses of the Defense 
Department’ and ‘supplied the names of officials who were allegedly very anti-Israel.’151 Shortly 
afterward, Quandt met with Amitay and the two ‘agreed to work for a common definition of peace 
based on the principle of mutual recognition and acceptance of the right to independent 
existence.’152 
In early February, the Carter administration decided to block Israel’s sale of 24 Kfir jets to 
Ecuador because they were made with American engines. The administration also decided against 
supplying Israel with cluster bombs, despite the previous administration’s commitment to provide 
them.153 These stemmed from Carter’s determination to limit weapons proliferation, but strained 
U.S. relations with Israel and upset many American supporters of the Jewish state. 
Although Arab-American groups never had the clout or success of pro-Israel organisations, 
they did make inroads during this period. In January 1977, the National Association of Arab 
Americans sent the White House a letter advocating U.S. humanitarian aid to war-ravaged Lebanon 
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and urging a resumption of the Arab-Israeli peace process.154 Shortly afterward, three members of 
the group met with an NSC official and the head of Carter’s Office of Public Liaison. They 
discussed Vance’s forthcoming Middle East trip, the president’s arms sales policy and American 
assistance to Lebanon.155 
 
Style and substance 
A month after the election, Carter pollster Patrick Caddell sent the president-elect a 10,000-
word memo that closely mapped out the beginning of the administration. Caddell argued that 
because the traditional party structure had broken down, the president needed to take symbolic 
actions to retain public support and confidence. That, in turn, would give Carter the political base 
necessary to govern. ‘The old cliché about mistaking style for substance usually works in reverse in 
politics,’ Caddell wrote. ‘Essentially, it is my thesis that governing with public approval requires a 
continuing political campaign.’156 
Carter accepted Caddell’s advice – to an extent. Most prominently, he moved to cut down 
on the imperial trappings of the office. Early in his term, for example, he banned the playing of 
‘Hail to the Chief’ at appearances, made a point of carrying his own luggage on official trips and 
lowered the White House thermostat to save energy. On foreign policy, this emphasis on style 
manifested itself most evidently in Carter’s willingness to conduct policymaking in the open. 
Indeed, his loose manner of speaking was not generally a feature of his domestic policy discourse. 
Carter’s initial efforts proved largely successful. His first fireside chat, delivered 2 February, 
received a 65 percent favourability rating, according to Carter’s pollster.157 The effort was praised 
in the media, which judged the casual address to be pitch-perfect and made frequent mention of the 
unbuttoned beige cardigan worn by the president. The sweater ‘may prove to be the most 
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memorable symbol of an Administration that promises to make steady use of symbolism,’ Time 
noted.158 
Carter attempted to introduce openness and accessibility to the office in other ways, too. In 
March, he held the aforementioned call-in show, hosted by Cronkite, for the first time.159 The White 
House received more than 9 million calls during the two-hour program.160 Carter noted in his diary: 
‘The Congress has got to know that I can go directly over their heads when necessary. And, of 
course, I wouldn’t hesitate to do it.’161 
This willingness to take his case directly to the American people did not endear Carter to his 
own party and damaged his relations with Congress. Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) served 
as Speaker of the House for the entirety of Carter’s term. In most circumstances, a speaker from the 
president’s own party could be counted on as an ally on Capitol Hill. However, their relationship 
was often strained. O’Neill never displayed a willingness to fight for Carter’s legislative agenda. In 
February, he complained about Carter’s proclivity for bypassing lawmakers in favour of ‘going 
public’ with his political messages. Taking his message directly to ‘the people,’ O’Neill told a 
reporter, is ‘the biggest mistake Carter could ever make.’162 
Those strains, in turn, fed Carter’s poor relationship with the press. ‘I would say he started 
off with the benefit of the doubt from the media,’ said then-Washington bureau chief for The New 
York Times, Hedrick Smith. ‘That didn’t last, in part because I think a lot of a lot of reporters began 
to understand very quickly that Carter was in trouble with Congress. … That led to a lot of 
scepticism on the part of the press toward the Carter White House.’163 As a political outsider, 
Carter’s determination to bring his own style to Washington weakened ties with the two other major 
power centres in the American capital: Congress and the press, both of which he needed to cultivate 
for a successful presidency. 
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Nevertheless, early press assessments of Carter’s efforts at openness were positive. ‘No 
president since FDR so easily and effectively uses the means of communication with the public and 
he’s done it best of all with that old fashioned medium of the Roosevelt era, … the electric radio,’ 
CBS News commentator Eric Sevareid said.164 Polls indicated that a majority of the public also felt 
the phone-in show represented genuine efforts by Carter to ‘keep in touch.’165 Americans overall 
assessed that first show and Carter’s subsequent ones positively.166 More broadly, the early returns 
on Carter’s political style were glowing. One March poll found that 70 percent of respondents said 
they liked the ‘style and tone of government’ that Carter was setting.167 A separate poll reported that 
82 percent of respondents liked Carter’s informality.168 
Among the keys to Carter’s style was his emphasis on transparency. Indeed, he came to 
office promising unprecedented openness in foreign-policy formulation and governance. ‘We can 
… have a foreign policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and 
understand,’ Carter said in his first major foreign policy speech. ‘And we are confident of the good 
sense of the American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy 
decisions. … Our policy must be open; it must be candid …’ On the Middle East, he said, ‘The 
historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in 
either nation; it’s derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search 
for permanent peace.’169 Reporting to London, British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham concluded 
the speech represented ‘a reaffirmation of the principle of involving the whole American people in 
international issues.’170 
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Carter met with the major Middle Eastern leaders in a flurry of activity from March through 
May 1977 as he attempted to generate support for a Geneva conference on mutually acceptable 
terms.171 During this period, Carter proved fearless in making extemporaneous public statements on 
the Arab-Israeli dispute. These remarks often struck Israeli’s supporters as seeking more 
concessions from Israel than from Arab states. Consequently, they had a lasting detrimental impact 
on his support from pro-Israel groups and helped set the tone for American involvement in the 
peace negotiations. 
Carter’s early efforts demonstrated his lack of patience with standard diplomacy. Brzezinski 
‘favored as rapid movement as possible’ because he felt that any American president had maximum 
political influence during his first year.172 He felt this sense of urgency especially strongly toward 
Arab-Israeli negotiations. ‘We have to move toward a more active role. We can’t wait. I believe the 
situation is more propitious than it has been in the past 23 years,’ he said in February.173 Carter’s 
spokesman, Jody Powell, concurred. The president ‘understood very well’ that his ‘leverage at 
home and abroad’ was greatest in his first year, ‘and he was determined to waste no time in using 
it,’ Powell wrote.174 Vance, however, counselled Carter to proceed slowly ‘to avoid exacerbating 
Israeli apprehension and stirring unnecessary anxieties in Congress and the American Jewish 
community about American “pressure” on Israel.’175 
 
“The open mouth policy” 
Carter’s lack of patience for protocol was most apparent in his dealings with Israel. Carter 
spoke without a text when he welcomed Rabin on 7 March. The president said that any Middle East 
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peace settlement would require that Israel have ‘defensible borders’ so that any peace agreements 
‘would never be violated.’176 
The term ‘defensible borders’ caught the attention of followers of Middle Eastern diplomacy 
because it appeared the president had just articulated a major shift in U.S. policy in Israel’s favour. 
With just a few syllables, Carter had gone beyond the language of 242, which called for ‘secure and 
recognized’ borders for Israel, and statements made by American presidents since 1973. The term 
‘defensible borders,’ for Israel, suggested the Israelis would be able to retain control of virtually all 
of the territories it seized in the 1967 war. For Rabin, Carter's initial comments were ‘music to my 
ears’ but the talks soon took ‘an ominous turn’ as Carter pressed him on the PLO.177 
Nevertheless, Carter’s comments spurred Vance to rush out a statement: ‘There is no change 
in position by the use of the words “defensible borders,”’ he told reporters.178 Asked whether 
Carter’s use of the phrase indicated a shift in American policy, Powell exercised damage control: ‘It 
should not be construed as any sort of departure or a breaking of new ground.’179  Still, the 
confusion of where U.S. policy stood was reflected in The Washington Post’s headline the 
following morning: ‘Carter View on Borders Buoys Rabin.’180 AIPAC somewhat disingenuously 
disregarded subsequent clarifications of Carter’s remarks, which it felt represented a policy shift in 
Israel’s favour. ‘[F]oreign policy in the United States is formulated at the top – by the President – 
and not by an “evenhanded” State Department,’ it wrote.181 
Subsequent closed-door talks achieved little on substance and were strained at the personal 
level.182 Carter told Eizenstat that ‘he liked Rabin but didn’t think Rabin liked him.’183 From the 
outset, Carter expressed his desire to conduct diplomacy openly. ‘The president spoke at length 
about his mission to restore the American people's faith in the presidency by eliminating secrecy in 
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diplomacy,’ according to Rabin. ‘He must tell his people what he wanted to achieve and how he 
meant to go about it.’184 They also differed on Palestinian representation. Rabin insisted that the 
need to resolve the Palestinian issue be kept separate from the question of PLO representation. 
Carter, however, responded: ‘It may or may not be possible to separate the two issues.’ Vance 
concurred: ‘They are intertwined.’185 Rabin was disconcerted.186 
Then, with peacemaking efforts already running into obstacles, both the Americans and the 
Israelis made their cases publicly. Speaking to reporters in Washington, Rabin implied that Carter 
backed Israel on ‘defensible borders.’ In Israel’s view, Rabin said, ‘defensible borders’ precluded a 
return to the 1967 lines.187 Afterward, Rabin set off on a cross-country speaking trip, where he 
discussed policy with American audiences. Nevertheless, Rabin expressed irritation. ‘If [Carter] 
publicized his views on the Middle East, in keeping with his credo of frank speaking, he would 
bring comfort to the Arabs and weaken Israel's negotiating position,’ the premier believed.188 
Carter pursued this strategy energetically. At a 9 March press conference, he dismissed the 
controversy over ‘defensible borders’ as ‘just semantics.’ The three elements of the negotiations 
would involve a peace deal, recognised borders and addressing the Palestinian question, Carter said. 
He also suggested, for the first time, that ‘defense lines’ might exist separately from legal borders. 
‘There may be extensions of Israeli defense capability beyond the permanent and recognized 
borders,’ Carter added. That idea was contrary to both Arab and Israeli hopes. In addition, Carter 
suggested – again, for the first time – that a deal might include demilitarised zones for a period of 
two to eight years, as well as electronic ‘monitoring stations.’189 Carter wrote that these comments 
were intended ‘to plow some new ground.’190 
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Shortly afterward, at a town-hall meeting in Clinton, Mass., Carter weighed in again, this 
time on the Palestinians. After initially discussing his ideas for peace in general terms, Carter 
became the first president to call for a Palestinian ‘homeland’: ‘There has to be a homeland 
provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.’191 He publicly 
repeated the point twice in the following two months.192 Even more so than the phrase ‘defensible 
borders,’ the word ‘homeland’ was electric for Israel’s supporters because it was reminiscent of the 
1917 Balfour Declaration on the need to create a ‘national home’ for the Jewish people.193 
Carter’s remarks ‘surprised’ Brzezinski, but he was ordered not to issue any clarifications.194 
Quandt said use of the word ‘homeland’ was Carter’s ‘own contribution. We certainly didn’t brief 
him on it or suggest it.’195 Eizenstat noted that Carter’s comments had ‘taken by surprise’ both the 
president’s advisors and Israel.196 Journalists who queried a White House spokesperson laughed 
audibly when the aide insisted ‘the word “homeland” does not have a specific connotation. … It 
developed later that the briefer fumbled his answer because he was afraid to say anything that he 
wasn’t sure the President would say.’197 Such a display suggested a lack of professionalism and 
disorganisation at the centre of foreign policymaking. 
Harold Saunders believes Carter’s remarks represented an early attempt to change the 
diplomatic discourse. ‘I think he felt at that moment that he could break some of the semantic 
crockery because he was a new boy on the block; he probably felt he was in a position to get the 
Palestinian issue on the agenda,’ Saunders said.198 Quandt concurs. Carter ‘didn’t really care much 
about the niceties of the diplomatic formulations which in some ways [was] refreshing and in some 
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ways caused him problems,’ he said. ‘He felt one of the virtues of being new on the job was that he 
could … break through some of the taboos.’199 
Meanwhile, Egypt’s Sadat reaffirmed his support for the Rabat Declaration that the PLO 
was central to the peace process and rejected Carter’s reported support for Israel’s ‘defensible 
borders.’200 ‘The Palestinian people must take their own decisions on everything related to their 
destiny and their cause,’ he told the Palestine National Council (PNC). ‘We (in Egypt) also insist on 
… the choice of the PLO as the Palestinians’ sole legitimate representative and defender of their 
rights and interests.’201 In response to Carter’s comments, the PNC overwhelmingly affirmed its 
rejection of 242 and vowed to escalate its ‘armed struggle.’202 Later, however, the PLO heralded the 
president’s ‘homeland’ statement as ‘a step forward’ in U.S. policy.203 
Israel was displeased. ‘I would have been happy had he used another expression in place of 
the term “homeland.” I do not know what it is, this homeland,’ Rabin said. ‘I accept this 
formulation if we agree that their homeland is in Jordan.’204 Later, he argued that Israel ‘should 
prepare for a campaign to win over public opinion, Congressional opinion and the U.S. 
administration’ to Israel’s view on ‘defensible borders’ and ‘the entire [complexity] of the 
Palestinian issue.’205 
 Less than a week after Clinton, Carter encountered a PLO envoy at a U.N. reception. 
Coming soon after the earlier controversies, his aides were uneasy and advised Carter against 
attending the function. Even a fleeting encounter would grant the group legitimacy, cause bad 
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publicity and could even strengthen Israel’s right wing ahead of elections, Eizenstat argued.206 
Nevertheless, consistent with his ‘open’ style, Carter shook hands with the PLO official as part of 
the reception line. ‘It didn’t hurt anybody,’ he wrote in his diary.207 
The push for ‘openness’ affected not only the Middle East. Carter’s decision to outline 
American objectives for a comprehensive proposal on arms reductions in a speech to the United 
Nations in March and a background briefing to the press likely contributed to Moscow’s decision to 
reject the American proposals. The Soviets grew angry over U.S. ‘propaganda’ and SALT II was 
dealt a setback.208 ‘The administration’s “openness” violated that canon (confidentiality of 
negotiations) of the SALT process and may have contributed to Moscow’s suspicions,’ Vance 
judged.209 In retrospect, Carter conceded that making public his position had been a mistake.210 
This tendency generated a backlash from elite opinion. Although Carter’s initial attempts at 
communicating directly to the American people earned praise, the efforts began to take their toll. In 
a column, The Washington Post’s David Broder noted ‘puzzlement’ about Carter’s foreign policy: 
‘The frequent “clarifications” of comments from assorted foreign policy spokesmen … and the 
president’s own eagerness to rush in verbally where others fear to tread … have caused a degree of 
consternation …’211 
Sevareid’s 11 March TV commentary took aim at Carter’s ‘breezy’ statements on an Arab-
Israeli settlement and criticised the administration’s tendency to ‘talk now, think later.’212 A week 
later, Cronkite noted the ‘string of surprises [Carter] has sprung on foreign policy experts. … Many 
people like the idea of an open foreign policy’ but questions remained as to whether it could ever 
work.213 Describing Carter’s method as the ‘the open mouth policy,’ James Reston opined that 
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Carter may be making ‘blunders, but he has calculated them, and what startles Washington is the 
increasing evidence that he means what he says, even when it thinks he says the wrong and 
unconventional thing.’214 
An analysis in The New York Times said that Carter’s ‘public pronouncements in foreign 
affairs have sometimes caught his own aides by surprise and have enmeshed the Carter 
Administration in complications … even before normal diplomacy can gain momentum.’215 
Statements by Carter’s foreign policy team ‘give an impression the United States Government is a 
centipede, none of whose feet knows what the others are doing until they go into the creature’s 
mouth,’ one columnist noted.216 ‘The upshot has been confusion, a multitude of explanations and a 
hardening of suspicion among Palestinians and Israelis,’ wrote another.217 
Foreign diplomats also noted this tendency. Ambassador Ramsbotham acknowledged ‘the 
president has been enunciating his main foreign policy objectives, without waiting for the full 
bureaucratic study of the issues involved.’ That, in turn, had ‘caused some of the apparent 
contradictions and the impression among allies that policy was being made without full 
consultation,’ he wrote. Ramsbotham saw Brzezinski’s hand in Carter’s public statements, ‘while 
the retractions, corrections and refinements of those statements, which have often followed, reflect 
the advice of Vance and the State Department machine.’218 
Following the March uproar over his Arab-Israeli comments and the Soviets’ rejection of 
the SALT II proposals, Carter was queried about his proclivity to speak publicly. He stood his 
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ground: ‘I don’t intend to refrain from expressing very clearly my position on foreign issues to the 
public on occasion when negotiations are going on.’219 
Nevertheless, concern over Carter’s public statements began to percolate in the American 
Jewish community. In late March, the administration invited dozens of American Jewish leaders to 
the White House for a consultation. ‘The peace issue and the prospects for a Geneva conference 
were the basis for the dialogue between us and the Administration people,’ according to James 
Weinberg of the New York United Jewish Appeal.220 Brzezinski, Eizenstat and Lipshutz hosted the 
discussions, while Mondale spent an hour with the visitors and Carter about 10 minutes. 
The Jewish leaders opposed any suggestion of a return to Israel’s pre-1967 borders, 
expressed concern about the acceptance of the PLO as a negotiating partner and voiced anxiety over 
Carter’s discussion of a Palestinian ‘homeland.’ White House officials emphasised that the U.S. 
commitment to Israel’s security was ‘organic’ and unbreakable. The visitors were told that the 
administration felt the Palestinians ‘need a place,’ but did not support the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state.221 
Regardless of the concerns that had arisen over Carter’s public statements, officials stressed 
that the president intended to continue speaking out. Carter would ‘resume two traditional roles lost 
to the Presidency in recent Administrations.’ First, he would consistently ‘articulate the central aims 
of foreign policy’ and, second, he would become ‘the public educator.’ Although such open 
diplomacy continued to roil the administration’s relations with both Israel and its American 
supporters, Weinberg concluded his report by writing he felt reassured of the administration’s 
support for Israel.222 
Following the uproar over Carter’s Palestinian ‘homeland’ remarks, and concerned that 
Arab-Israeli policy could prove politically damaging, the administration named Mark Siegel as 
                                                
219 ‘The President’s News Conference,’ 26 May 1977, PPP: Carter, 1977, I, 1016-25. 
220 James Weinberg, ‘Report on March 23, 1977 Meeting at the White House,’ Folder 1, Box 13, Edward Sanders 
Papers, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio (hereafter Sanders Papers). 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. Also see: Theodore Mann, ‘Report on White House Meeting of March 23, 1977,’ Folder 1, Box 13, Sanders 
Papers. 
                 
58 
White House liaison to the American Jewish community. Siegel, who was a deputy on political 
advisor Hamilton Jordan’s staff, was ‘to communicate administration goals to Jewish American 
leaders while also relaying back policy concerns of U.S. Jewish groups to the White House.’ 
Siegel’s brief included reaching out daily to the Presidents’ Conference and other organisations to 
inform them about American policy. Siegel arranged for Jewish leaders to come to the White House 
monthly to meet with senior policymakers. But improving communication had its limits. ‘The 
problem (for the Jewish groups) was not how the policy was communicated. The problem was the 
policy,’ Siegel, who later resigned in protest over U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, said.223 
 However, Carter’s public posture sometimes limited the options of his own policymakers. A 
paper prepared for an NSC meeting on the Middle East in April noted that the United States had 
introduced into the debate ‘ideas of our own on the key issues of withdrawal and borders, 
normalization, security and the Palestinian issues’ – the very issues on which Carter had taken such 
public, and often improvised, positions. ‘We have done so in a way that has not required the Middle 
East Governments to take formal positions in response, but our ideas stand on the record and will 
influence the direction of the negotiations,’ the author argued.224 
At the Presidential Review Committee (PRC) meeting, it was agreed that Washington would 
work to achieve ‘as much prior agreement on general principles as possible’ before Geneva, which 
remained a ‘high-priority goal.’ ‘This should be the focus of our diplomatic effort between June and 
September. It is unclear whether we can reach agreement on principles primarily by talking to the 
parties, or whether we should go public at some point with our own views.’225 During the summer, 
the administration would assess the feasibility of contacts with the PLO. These conclusions 
underscore the tension maintained by the administration between quiet diplomacy and the desire to 
use the public forum to generate support for, and pressure on behalf of, its recommendations. 
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In late April, Carter also delivered two major speeches on energy policy, which was his 
chief domestic priority. ‘In his mind, a comprehensive energy policy was a corollary of a 
comprehensive Middle East policy,’ according to Quandt.226 The link between the Arab-Israeli 
peace process and U.S. energy policy arose continually throughout Carter’s term. 
 
Israel’s “earthquake” election 
 Meanwhile, plagued by scandals and the fallout from intelligence failures in the 1973 war, 
Rabin’s Labour Party was sputtering.227 On 8 April, Rabin stepped down over revelations that he 
and his wife had maintained an illegal U.S. bank account. Labour was defeated the following month 
and a Likud government, headed by Herut’s Menachem Begin, a Polish-born former resistance 
fighter during the British mandate, was formed. 
 Likud’s ascension represented a sea change in Israeli politics; it ended a half-century of 
Labour domination of the politics in, first, mandatory Palestine, and then the modern state of Israel. 
Rabin’s loss was due to many factors, especially his party’s series of scandals and as part of a 
broader ethnic and sociological shift in Israeli society to include the Sephardic Jews, who 
overwhelmingly supported Likud.228 
Nevertheless, Begin made Rabin’s strained ties with Carter an issue in the campaign229 and, 
later, Rabin suggested Carter was partly to blame for Labour’s defeat.230 Even initial assessments by 
the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv pointed to American-centric factors to explain Labour’s loss, chiefly 
‘the uncertainty of current US/Israeli relations’ and ‘the recent flap over the arms transfer priority 
issue in US Congress.’ U.S. officials believed ‘the Israeli electorate foresees tough times ahead and 
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has prepared to batten down the hatches by taking a strong swing to the right.’231 Some U.S. 
commentators also blamed Carter for Rabin’s loss, which fed the distrust felt by Israel’s American 
supporters toward the president.232 While such accusations overestimated American influence on 
Israeli politics, they nevertheless became commonplace in U.S. discourse during this period. 
 Likud’s ascension had immense ramifications for the peace process, especially on the 
Palestinians. Referring to the West Bank by the biblical names ‘Judea and Samaria,’ its platform 
stated that the territory would ‘not be handed to any foreign administration; between the Sea and 
Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.’ Foreshadowing disputes with the Carter 
administration, it took a clear stand on Jewish settlements in the occupied territories: ‘Settlement, 
both urban and rural, in all parts of the Land of Israel is the focal point of the Zionist effort to 
redeem the country, to maintain vital security areas and serves as … strength and inspiration for the 
renewal of the pioneering spirit.’ It labelled the PLO ‘an organization of assassins’ and said a Likud 
government would ‘strive to eliminate’ the group.233 
WAFA opined that it was ‘almost sure that the victory of the Likud Bloc means greater 
Israeli inflexibility’ and called for a ‘major reinforcement of Arab military potential.’234 The ‘main 
conclusion we draw in light of Likud’s impending rise to power in Israel, is the overwhelming 
importance of stopping the Arabs from gambling on US policy in our region, and of strengthening 
our unity,’ it editorialised.235 
The United States was unprepared for Labour’s loss. ‘Much of our strategy toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict has been predicated on the assumption that a strong and moderate Israeli government 
would at some point be able to make difficult decisions on territory and on the Palestinians,’ Quandt 
wrote to Brzezinski. ‘Now we face the prospect of a very weak coalition, a prolonged period of 
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uncertainty, and an Israeli leadership which may be significantly more assertive in its policies 
concerning the West Bank, Palestinians, settlements, and nuclear weapons.’236 
 Yet Likud’s rise also provided opportunities, Quandt believed. ‘American public support for 
a Likud-led government is likely to be less than it has been for Labor governments … This may 
give us some room for maneuver. … [A]t the right time, we may be able to act without fear of a 
serious domestic backlash,” he wrote.237 Immediately after the election, Caddell analysed for Carter 
poll results to determine Israelis’ attitudes toward the government and peace negotiations, with an 
eye toward determining whether the administration could reach beyond the Israeli leaders to the 
public if necessary.238 
Similarly, in a 19 May meeting with Carter and Eizenstat, Brzezinski argued that ‘precisely 
because Begin is so extreme, the President will be able to mobilize on behalf of a settlement a 
significant portion of the American Jewish community. … This will make it easier for the President 
to prevail and to have the needed congressional support.’239 
Within days of Likud’s victory, White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz spoke to the United 
Jewish Appeal. ‘… I placed the most emphasis on the importance of American Jewish leaders 
becoming very active and positive in expressing their opinions and giving their advice to the leaders 
and people of Israel,’ he informed Carter. Lipshutz conveyed the attendees’ suggestion that the 
administration arrange for a pro-Israel member of Congress to communicate White House attitudes 
to Begin prior to the prime minister’s first U.S. visit.240 
Carter heeded the advice. Two weeks later, the president invited Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-
Minn.), a long-time Israel supporter, to the White House to ask him to make a public statement 
supporting Carter’s policy. Humphrey accordingly did so.241 
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 The organised American Jewish community began to mobilise after Begin’s victory to pre-
empt pressure on the young government. Regional organisations urged their members to contact the 
White House to voice concerns about perceived pressure on Israel.242 From Washington, AIPAC 
wrote that in the wake of the election, ‘a spate of false and unfounded statements (had appeared) in 
the media regarding the prospective new government and its leadership.’ It asked members to ‘act 
immediately’ to make ‘every effort … to set the record straight.’ AIPAC distributed talking points 
to combat what it referred to as ‘myths’ spread in the American media: that ‘Menachem Begin is a 
terrorist,’ that ‘Begin’s Irgun committed a massacre at the Arab village of Deir Yassin,’ that the 
‘Irgun bombed the King David Hotel and killed innocent people,’ and that ‘the Palestinians have a 
right to the West Bank.’243 The information campaign launched by the grassroots Jewish 
community and professional lobbyists made for a potent counterweight to administration pressure 
on Israel. 
Carter was not unusual in believing that he needed the support of American Jewish leaders 
for his policy to be effective. However, his readiness to admit to his domestic constraints was 
unusual. For example, when Syria’s Hafez al-Assad questioned why Carter was so eager to have the 
PLO accept 242 before Geneva, the president replied that much of the American Jewish community 
believed the PLO wanted to destroy Israel. If the PLO accepted 242, that argument could no longer 
be made. ‘I need to have American Jewish leaders trust me before I can make progress,’ Carter told 
al-Assad in May.244 
Meanwhile, Carter continued his efforts at open diplomacy. In a 26 May news conference, 
the president again stumbled while discussing specifics of the conflict without notes. Carter 
incorrectly stated that UNSC resolutions affirmed the right of Palestinians to a homeland and ‘to be 
compensated for the losses they have suffered.’245 Carter’s subsequent attempts to clarify his 
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comments only fed his critics because they seemed to endorse a narrower definition of Israel’s 
borders than even the pre-1967 frontiers. Brzezinski sought to reign in Carter by reminding the 
president that 242 and 338 provided the only agreed upon framework for negotiations, and that the 
United States had never backed a resolution calling for a ‘Palestinian homeland.’246 
 
Conclusion 
New to Washington, Carter did not feel bound in his early days by the established foreign 
policy parameters. To him, the Arab-Israeli conflict’s anodyne diplomatic phrases seemed stale and 
emblematic of policy inertia. By speaking out, Carter hoped to create fresh possibilities for debate 
and progress. Yet he soon became captive of his own formulations, such as the term ‘Palestinian 
homeland.’ 
Carter’s remarks stirred the concerns of Israel and its U.S. supporters, who feared such a 
homeland could prejudice Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, and made Arab leaders – none of 
whom he had yet met – uneasy because of the ambiguity of his remarks. Carter did not appear to 
appreciate the issue’s sensitivity for Israelis, the American Jewish community and even Arab 
leaders. 
Carter later acknowledged that he ‘lost a tremendous amount of Jewish support because I 
talked about (a) Palestinian homeland’ and ‘dealt with very sensitive issues in a politically foolish 
way.’247 Moreover, Carter’s insistence that Geneva was the only way toward peace, and that 
Palestinian representation at such a gathering was essential, meant that any public backtracking had 
the appearance of a political defeat. The president’s early months also set all parties hurtling down 
the path of open diplomacy, which soon characterised the negotiations. 
The problem with Carter’s decision to ‘go public’ with his Arab-Israeli diplomacy was that 
his objectives were ill defined. It was never clear how public support would strengthen his 
diplomacy. Nor was it obvious how the United States would allay the concerns of Israel, which had 
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a greater direct interest in the terms of a settlement. Carter’s eagerness to speak directly to ordinary 
people dovetailed with his campaign rhetoric but in practice had few salutary diplomatic effects. 
Caddell’s advice to Carter to run a continuous political campaign through the generous use 
of symbolism missed the mark. Style counts, but only inasmuch as it serves to complement 
substance. Caddell’s memo did not anticipate the president’s need to persuade the public to support 
his policies.  
Despite Carter’s campaign pledges, he did not consult with the American people about 
foreign policy. Rather, he informed them about his administration’s decisions. That may have 
represented greater openness than previous administrations, but without a commensurate political 
plan to capitalise on existing trends in U.S. opinion, it did not improve his chances of success. 
Instead, the president stirred the ire of Israel’s most devoted supporters and alienated elite 
opinion. His tendency to speak openly and appear to make foreign policy on the fly suggested 
confusion at the top of the new administration. These forays into open diplomacy also intensified 
the identification of the chief executive with the Arab-Israeli peace process. As policy became more 
controversial, the toll on the president mounted. 
Carter took office with an approval rating of nearly 70 percent. In March, it peaked at 75 
percent. Perhaps not coincidentally, the gradual fall in his ratings began just as he began his forays 
into public diplomacy.248 Immediately before his meetings with Rabin, Carter’s efforts at ‘running 
an open government’ garnered a 77 percent positive rating.249 Two months later, that figure had 
dropped 14 points.250 It is difficult to conclude but that the drumbeat of negative coverage of 
Carter’s ‘open’ style helped degrade his support. 
Carter’s rush to spend his political capital on a range of ambitious initiatives quickly eroded 
his support base. This weakening was not merely the result of his foreign policy. However, Carter’s 
missteps during these scattershot efforts contributed to the image of the president as a well-meaning 
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man who was out of his depth, and one whose ideas about global interconnectedness translated 
poorly from the campaign trail to government. The public pressure that Carter placed on Israel 
helped mobilise pro-Israel groups and the American Jewish community in support of the Jewish 
state, regardless of whether it was led by Labour or Likud. A softer approach – ‘staying private’ 
rather than ‘going public’ – in Carter’s early months may not have stoked anxieties that Washington 
was ready to impose a settlement on Israel.251 
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Chapter Two: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy – 
“The Need for a Political Plan” 
 
Introduction 
In June 1977, Hamilton Jordan personally typed a 54-page memo and placed it in President 
Carter’s in-tray. He locked the only other copy of the document, innocuously entitled ‘Politics and 
Foreign Policy,’ in his office safe. Jordan’s memo asserts ‘the need for a political plan’ in order to 
win ‘public and Congressional support for specific foreign policy initiatives,’ with an emphasis on 
the Middle East. Noting that the “American Jewish lobby’ was ‘something that was not a part of our 
Georgia and Southern political experience and [is] consequently not well understood,’ he proceeded 
to analyse Jewish voters and outline a plan for relations with the American Jewish community. The 
community was ‘very nervous,’ Jordan warned Carter. ‘You have discussed publicly things that 
have only been said before privately to the Israelis with assurances,’ he added.252 That the 
administration devised such a detailed strategy of consultation and consensus building on a non-
legislative issue underscores the unique place Arab-Israeli policy occupies in American political 
discourse. 
 Indeed, by summer 1977 it had become abundantly clear that the administration needed to 
devote greater attention to the politics of its Arab-Israeli diplomacy. As Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin formed his Likud government in Israel, Carter faced increasingly organised 
opposition at home. During this June-July period, the administration began to create and execute a 
political plan intended to cultivate the domestic support needed to make the difficult decisions en 
route to Geneva. The White House sought to apply the lessons learned from the backlash over 
Carter’s open diplomacy to achieve a more successful second half of 1977. 
This chapter argues that the political plan was fundamentally flawed. It was predicated on 
the belief that the administration could generate support by notifying the main domestic actors on 
Arab-Israeli policy of the course it had already decided to take rather than through patient 
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intellectual and moral suasion. The White House overestimated its ability to convince key actors to 
back its policy based on the rectitude of its position, with little regard to existing beliefs. Moreover, 
the administration incorrectly believed Begin’s government would be susceptible to indirect 
pressure through domestic American figures. 
Carter’s tendency to follow a diplomatic style characterised by ‘thinking out loud,’ as Vice 
President Walter Mondale described it, had mobilised those most concerned with specific policies, 
including lawmakers, the elite and American Jewry.253 These voices then exerted a powerful 
influence on the public debate. ‘In the addressing of issues that were highly politically sensitive in a 
kind of open and frank way you don’t accumulate support from the moderates who say that is a 
good idea,’ Carter later conceded of his stance on Arab-Israeli issues. ‘You accumulate collectively 
[the] fervent opponents – the true believers … on the Middle East’ and other issues.254 
Four events shaped this period. First, in an effort to placate growing domestic restiveness, 
Mondale delivered a major speech on the administration’s Arab-Israeli policy on 17 June. Shortly 
afterward, Jordan sent Carter the aforementioned strategy memo. On 6 July, the White House 
hosted dozens of American Jewish leaders for policy consultation ahead of the final major event, 
Begin’s first official visit to Washington on 19-20 July. 
Detailed treatments of this period in the Camp David Peace Process place primary emphasis 
on the Begin-Carter meetings.255 However, the present work is unique in emphasising the 
administration’s prior political preparation, especially the way in which Jordan’s memo sets forth 
operative assumptions for generating domestic support.256  This study does not underestimate the 
diplomatic significance of the Begin-Carter meetings. Rather, it offers an alternative focus to 
explain the significance of domestic influences in shaping Carter’s policy. 
Analysis of this episode contributes to the understanding of Carter as both a peacemaker and 
a president. He pursued a somewhat reckless style of diplomacy in his initial months in an attempt 
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to ‘plow new ground.’ Now, however, he and his aides sought to inaugurate a sophisticated political 
strategy to heal wounds and prepare the way for future diplomatic objectives. 
Carter’s political and foreign policy advisors were in concert on, in Jordan’s phrase, ‘the 
need for a political plan.’ The administration considered whether it could persuade Israel’s 
supporters in the American Jewish community and in Congress to exert pressure on Israel, and 
some members weighed the idea of a public ‘confrontation’ with Jerusalem. This episode offers an 
extraordinary example of a president and his staff learning, six months into the job, how to tackle 
perhaps the most explosive diplomatic and political issue on their agenda. 
 
First mention of a “public showdown” 
The sight of the president out front on controversial policy disconcerted White House 
advisors. In May, Zbigniew Brzezinski urged other senior administration members to speak out in 
defence of the Arab-Israeli policy because the national security advisor ‘was becoming increasingly 
fearful that the President was overly identified as the sole spokesman on the Middle Eastern 
issue.’257 
Early the following month, Carter convened a meeting with Brzezinski, domestic advisor 
Stuart Eizenstat, Jordan and Mondale to discuss AIPAC’s campaign against his policies.258 ‘It was 
during this period that the President first discussed the possibility of a public showdown over our 
policy toward Israel,’ according to Brzezinski. Additionally, the president, who sought to strengthen 
his domestic standing in advance of Begin’s anticipated summer visit, told his aides he felt too 
much of the burden for defending his policies had fallen to him.259 
 That evening, Brzezinski spoke with House Speaker Tip O’Neill, who told him ‘point-blank 
that if the choice came down between the President and the pro-Israel lobby, the country would 
clearly choose the President – but only if the choice was clearly posed.’ Such a choice was never 
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made explicit, however. ‘The President felt that it would be too divisive and that it was not 
necessary at this stage,’ Brzezinski wrote.260 
Shortly afterward, Brzezinski advised Carter to make the domestic aspect of Arab-Israeli 
policy his first controversial issue ‘rather than second or third or fourth’ because he would then 
have more political capital to spend on it. ‘Our strategy domestically should be designed to give 
[American Jewish groups that believed Israel should make concessions for peace] credibility and 
support,’ he continued. In the meantime, the White House should engage in ‘consolidation and 
education of the public and the Arabs and Israelis as to why all of this is in our collective interests.’ 
On domestic opposition, he advised, ‘We should be careful not to overreact and thereby contribute 
to a crisis atmosphere.’ The administration’s efforts at building domestic support for its policy 
should be handled in a ‘deliberately low-key and discreet fashion,’ he emphasised.261 
Brzezinski offered these thoughts as the organised American Jewish community raised its 
profile regarding U.S. policy. In addition to AIPAC’s advocacy, the Presidents’ Conference 
reported that in 1977-78 it ‘was called upon as never before to serve as the voice of American Jewry 
in speaking to our own Administration and to the Government of Israel …’ Within a week of 
Begin’s election, he invited President Alexander Schindler and Executive Director Yehuda Hellman 
to Israel for consultations. On 7 June, Schindler and Hellman described these meetings to 
administration officials, including Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Middle Eastern Affairs Alfred Atherton, Eizenstat and White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz.262 
During the transition between Labour’s loss and the ascension of Begin’s government, a 
group of pro-Israel senators advised Senator Richard Stone to carry a message to Begin. They 
wanted the Florida Democrat to tell Begin ‘in very strong terms that “an inflexible posture will not 
sell with Congress or the executive Branch,”’ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance relayed to Carter. 
During Stone’s visit, Begin should be informed that he should be willing to compromise on 
                                                
260 Ibid. 
261 NSC Weekly Report #16, 10 June 1977, NLC-SAFE 16 B-28-14-7-3. Emphases in original. 
262 Report of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations for the Year Ending March 31, 
1978 (New York), 1-7, LOC. 
                 
70 
territorial issues, especially on the West Bank, the lawmakers believed. New York Republican 
Senator Jacob ‘Javits told Stone that he should warn Begin that an uncompromising position will 
tear the American Jewish Community apart because it is basically a moderate group,’ Vance 
added.263 More broadly, Carter increased efforts in June to cultivate congressional support for his 
initiative.264 
Publicly, however, Schindler brushed aside queries about whether the administration might 
try to drive a wedge between American Jewry and the Begin government. ‘I don’t know whether 
any such effort is being planned or is under way, but it will without question be rejected by 
American Jews and the organizations that represent them,’ he insisted.265 Carter was also kept 
abreast of the outcome of visits to Israel by U.S. lawmakers and others, such as American Jewish 
Congress President Arthur Hertzberg.266 
Meanwhile, Begin’s personal representative, Shmuel Katz, visited Washington to meet with 
American officials to discuss the new government’s views. According to Katz, Begin believed that 
the Jewish people had a right to ‘Western Palestine as a whole’ (i.e., all territory west of the Jordan 
River), Israel should not have to refrain from creating new settlements because that would indicate a 
prejudging of the outcome of negotiations, and the creation of any Arab entity west of the Jordan 
would pose a threat to Israel. On the Palestinians, Katz provided a glimpse of Begin’s perspective 
when he said, ‘Some say the heart of the problem is the Palestinians, but this is not true historically. 
… The conflict stems from the Arab refusal to recognize our existence in any area.’267 
To the Americans, that suggested that Begin’s vision of peace negotiations contained an 
underlying ‘harshness.’268 Katz also provided an early indication of the U.S.-Israeli battle for public 
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opinion. ‘We are confident that the Jewish community in America will stand out courageously and 
challenge its government if it becomes necessary,’ he said.269 
 The administration also kept tabs on Israeli public opinion. Brzezinski notified Carter that 
Israeli press reports reflected a concern about erosion of U.S. support for Israel. ‘This concern has 
produced a noticeable closing of the ranks within the country and the press has focused on the need 
for Israel to secure its base of support in the U.S. – in Congress, the Jewish community and among 
the public at large,’ he informed the president. Brzezinski suggested that Begin was facing growing 
pressure ‘to make changes (in his positions) which would facilitate Israel’s public relations 
campaign.’270 Meanwhile, however, the Israeli press stepped of its criticism of Carter’s style. 
‘President Carter’s utterances on Middle East questions are beginning to remind one of a see-saw,’ 
one daily Israeli newspaper asserted in mid-June.271 
Shortly afterward, Quandt met with the United Jewish Appeal’s Gordon Zacks. In order to 
bolster the administration’s support in the Jewish community, Zacks made several suggestions, 
including ‘continuing consultations with American Jewish leaders’ and conducting less diplomacy 
‘in public.’ At some point, he added, ‘a confrontation’ between Israel and the United States was 
inevitable, but it could be contained so long as it did not threaten Israel’s basic security. ‘It should 
come later rather than sooner, and should not resemble the Kissinger reassessment,’ he told 
Quandt.272 
The following day, Brzezinski received an AIPAC-compiled list of concerns about 
administration policy that was ‘circulating on [Capitol] Hill.’ Brzezinski’s aide noted ‘that what is 
at the root of this mood is the fear that the President has been taken in by Arab protestations of 
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wanting peace, and has neglected to look for tangible proof of that desire …’ Most of the 21 points 
of contention listed related to the administration’s public statements and subsequent clarifications 
on the nature of a peace agreement, weapons sales policy, and its emphasis on the Palestinian 
question as a ‘core issue’ of the conflict.273 
Still, whatever its later positions, even AIPAC initially seemed to underestimate the depth of 
Begin’s ideological commitment to Greater Israel. It suggested that Begin’s rhetoric might have 
been mere election sloganeering rather than indicative of any deeply held ideological belief. ‘There 
is often a difference between what politicians say when they are out of office and how they actually 
act after they take over the responsibilities of government,’ it argued.274  
Yet any careful reading of Begin’s public statements would have shown categorically the 
consistency of his beliefs. The day after the 1947 U.N. partition vote, which helped provide basic 
legitimacy for the creation of an independent Jewish state, Begin stated the underground fighters’ 
credo: ‘The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. … Jerusalem was and 
will forever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And 
forever.’275 In 1970, Begin resigned from Israel’s unity government after it accepted the principle of 
land-for-peace as set forth in 242.276 This was no passing phase. 
 The American Jewish community soon became a highly sought after demographic during 
the Carter era. With Jewish groups expressing reservations about Carter’s Arab-Israeli policy and 
also having an interest in the plight of Soviet Jewry, conservative organisations such as the 
reconstituted anti-Soviet and pro-defence Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) saw an 
opportunity to make common cause. In June, the organisation sought to spread its message and 
attract new members by calibrating its pitch to three groups of opinion leaders: members of 
Congress, newspaper and magazine editors, and the ‘American Jewish Community.’ American 
Jewry’s liberal political tradition could broaden its base, but also ‘inroads could be made quickly in 
                                                
273 Memo with attachments from Tuchman to Brzezinski, ‘Middle East Policy,’ 10 June 1977, Folder: ‘Middle East: 5-
6/77,’ NSA, Brzezinski, Office, Box 31, JCL. 
274 ‘Israeli Elections,’ NER, XXI: 21, 25 May 1977. 
275 Avi Shlaim, 'The Iron Wall Revisited,' Journal of Palestine Studies 41, no. 2 (2012). 
276 ———, Iron Wall, 296. 
                 
73 
this community because of their concern over the continuance of the freedom of the state of Israel,’ 
a strategy memo argued. ‘Many members of this community understand that the strength of Israel is 
today inextricably tied to the strength of the United States …’277 Throughout Carter’s term, the 
CPD and other neoconservatives drew a connection between U.S. policy in the Middle East and 
toward the Soviet Union, using opposition to one to reinforce opposition to the other.278 
 
Mondale outlines administration policy 
Against this backdrop, the administration sent Mondale to clarify the administration’s 
policy. The vice president’s carefully crafted 17 June speech in San Francisco was intended to 
relieve the pressure on Carter as the primary spokesperson on Arab-Israeli issues and demonstrate 
the administration’s unity on policy. Mondale was tapped to deliver the speech because of his 
strong ties with the American Jewish community and his record of supporting Israel while serving 
as a senator. The American Jewish Congress, for instance, believed he was its ‘best friend’ in the 
White House.279 Carter’s communications chief, Gerald Rafshoon, described Mondale as ‘more pro-
Israel than Begin.’280 
In the California speech, which was written with input from both domestic and foreign 
policy advisors, Mondale used sensitive terms to revisit the issues that Carter had addressed in 
March. He continually emphasised Washington’s commitment to Israel’s security, that the United 
States had no interest in imposing a settlement and that its goal remained a comprehensive peace 
through Geneva by the end of 1977. He also attempted to ease concerns about American arms 
transfer policy. ‘We do not intend to use our military aid to pressure Israel,’ Mondale said. ‘If we 
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have differences over military aid … it will be on military grounds or economic grounds but not 
political grounds.’281 Indeed, whatever U.S.-Israeli disputes arose during his presidency, Carter 
never touched U.S. economic or military assistance to Israel.282 
However, Mondale’s final speech had been watered down from earlier versions. On the 
Palestinian question, a 3 June draft used the word ‘homeland’ three times in reference to a 
settlement and included this phrase: ‘the key ingredients as we see them [are] genuine peace; 
withdrawal and security; and a Palestine homeland.’283 A 15 June draft was limited to two 
‘homeland’ references.284 In the final speech, Mondale referred just once to ‘the possibility of some 
arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity – preferably in association with Jordan.’ The ‘key 
elements’ had become: ‘a commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts 
to normalize relations … ; the establishment of borders for Israel which are recognized by all and 
which can be kept secure; a fair solution to the problem of the Palestinians.’285 Based on its timing, 
it seems likely that Mondale’s speech was adjusted in significant measure to respond to domestic 
pressures. 
Mondale’s address did not mollify domestic criticism, however. AIPAC criticised the 
speech for being ‘compulsively “even-handed,”’ assigning ‘peaceful positions’ to Arab leaders who 
have ‘have never expressed’ such, and its delivery by the vice president, not the president.286 
‘Because the speech gave added credence to the growing impression that the United States is 
enunciating an overall plan for a Middle East settlement, it actually reinforced fears both here and 
in Israel,’ it wrote.287 Subsequently, AIPAC exhorted members to pressure their legislators during 
the forthcoming congressional recess. ‘In your conversations emphasize [the] need for defensible 
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borders, direct negotiations, and testing of Arab peace intentions in advance of Israeli territorial 
concessions,’ it advised. ‘If you cannot have a meeting with your legislators please write them and 
[the] White House immediately.’288 
The unease went beyond AIPAC, however. In response to Mondale’s speech, Javits made a 
statement on the Senate floor criticising Carter’s approach and the public nature of his 
diplomacy.289 Meanwhile, Carter received two letters of complaint about his policy from Jerold 
Hoffberger, head of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.290 Brzezinski felt 
compelled to write to Hertzberg, of the American Jewish Congress. It would be ‘morally wrong and 
politically stupid’ for the administration to sacrifice its relationship with Israel, he assured 
Hertzberg.291 Schindler complained that the administration’s statements ‘have not served to allay 
our fears’ because they were a ‘mere recapitulation of what gave rise to these apprehensions in the 
first place.’292 
Regional reaction to Mondale’s articulation of U.S. policy was unenthusiastic. Israel said the 
speech offered nothing new.293 The PLO rejected any hint of being linked to Jordan. ‘It is for the 
Palestinians themselves to decide whether their homeland should be “tied” to the Hashemite 
Kingdom or not,’ it wrote.294 
A PRC held the week after Mondale’s speech focused on weapons sales and the 
negotiations. In an unsigned discussion paper for the meeting, the author noted that U.S. policy was 
at a ‘delicate moment’ during which the Americans needed to balance four broad objectives: 
maintain momentum for a comprehensive peace through Geneva in 1977; establish a working 
relationship with Israel’s new government; retain the confidence of ‘moderate’ Arab leaders, ‘and 
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try to bring the Palestinians into their orbit of influence’; and ‘gain’ – not keep – the support of 
Congress, public opinion and American Jewry.295 
In the meeting, the committee decided to recommend approval of a relatively modest arms 
package to Israel and Egypt, while the likely more controversial F-15 sales to Saudi Arabia were 
temporarily placed on hold. On the diplomatic front, the committee decided to keep the focus on a 
comprehensive approach. The United States would try to get Begin to reaffirm Israel’s commitment 
to UNSCR 242, restrain settlement building and accept a pre-Geneva process intended to establish 
an agreed framework for negotiations. The attendees also noted with some concern – and mild 
humour – that the U.S. approach ‘might make Begin appear intransigent; that an image of 
intransigence might help him to build domestic support; and that then “we would have him just 
where he wants us!”’296 While Vance favoured quiet diplomacy, Brzezinski apparently was more 
willing for a clash.297 
The U.S. public campaign against Begin’s interpretation that 242 did not apply to the West 
Bank gathered speed in late June. Partly as a response to Javits’ Senate speech, which suggested 
that a return to the pre-1967 boundaries would leave Israel vulnerable, the State Department 
released a text outlining the elements Washington believed necessary for a comprehensive peace. 
Essentially, the U.S. statement said that negotiations needed to include the West Bank – otherwise, 
it would be contrary to the principle of negotiations without preconditions.298 According to Quandt, 
this was also an attempt, pushed by Brzezinski, to place State, rather than Carter, at the centre of the 
debate.299 Israel issued its official rejoinder that ‘everything is negotiable.’300 
This statement again provoked controversy at home. According to Eizenstat, the ‘disastrous’ 
statement had been neither seen nor approved by Carter, Mondale, Jordan, Powell or himself – in 
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other words, the president’s main domestic advisors. The administration needed to tune its political 
radar better, he believed: ‘Foreign policy is too important for experts.’ Going forward, he suggested 
that Jordan clear all future statements. ‘… [W]e have galvanized public opinion in Israel against us 
and – I am afraid – alienated in a permanent way the American Jewish community. … [W]e have 
talked too much,’ he added. ‘Now we look like the heavys [sic] and Begin the good guy. I really 
think you should orchestrate this thing.’ Eizenstat viewed the State Department’s statement as a 
‘self-inflicted wound that serves no good purpose and makes every dimension of this problem more 
difficult.’301 
 
Jordan’s plan to build support 
It was in this context that Jordan sent Carter the memo on building and sustaining domestic 
support for foreign policy.302 Jordan focused mostly on three areas, all of which had domestic 
implications: the Panama Canal Treaties, SALT II and the Middle East negotiations. However, of 
these three, only the Arab-Israeli issue was non-legislative in nature. 
Jordan contended that ‘this confluence of foreign policy initiatives and decisions will require 
a comprehensive and well coordinated domestic political strategy if our policies are to gain the 
understanding and support of the American people and the Congress.’ He believed the public had a 
‘limited … understanding of most foreign policy issues. … This is not altogether bad as it provides 
us an opportunity to present these issues to the public in [a] politically advantageous way.’ 
Jordan lists the five main administration figures to be used in foreign policy consultation: 
the president, who would work on key committee chairmen, Southern senators and senators up for 
re-election in 1978; the vice president, who would attend to liberal Democrats and Republicans; the 
secretary of state, who would be assigned to key Democrats and Republicans ‘who would be 
flattered’ to have him consult with them; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who would 
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concentrate on conservative Democrats and Republicans especially concerned with the military; and 
the national security advisor, who would be assigned a mix of all of those figures. Jordan suggested 
a 10-week process, during which each person would spend an hour per week meeting with two 
senators, would be sufficient. 
Yet the emphasis of Jordan’s memo was on the Middle East.303 Jordan informed Carter that 
the ‘cumulative impact of the Jewish lobby is even greater when one considers the fact that their 
political objectives are pursued in a vacuum,’ because no effective political counterforce existed in 
Washington. The memo also dissects Jewish American voting patterns, political contributions, ‘the 
Jewish lobby,’ and the ‘widespread uncertainty’ felt by many Jewish groups about the ascension to 
power of Begin’s Likud government.  
This constituted a unique moment in which to sway these groups to the administration’s 
point of view, Jordan suggested. ‘One of the potential benefits of the recent Israeli elections is that 
it has caused many leaders in the American Jewish community to ponder the course the Israeli 
people have taken and question the wisdom of that policy,’ he informed Carter. ‘This new situation 
provides us with the potential for additional influence with the Israeli government through the 
American Jewish community, but at present we are in a poor position to take advantage of it.’ 
Jordan set out an eight-week consultation plan, specific to Middle East policy, in which the 
top foreign policy figures as listed above would meet with lawmakers, leaders of Jewish 
organisations, the Jewish press and lay leaders. In the Senate, Jordan suggested, AIPAC could 
consistently rely on 65-75 votes on any issue pertaining to Israel: 31 ‘hard votes’ that were virtually 
always supportive of Israel; 43 ‘sympathetic’ votes that AIPAC could ‘count on in [a] showdown’ 
over Israel; 23 votes that were depended on the issue; and three votes that were ‘generally negative’ 
toward Israel. 
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This memo is significant because it spells out the major concerns, goals and tactics of the 
administration’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy within a domestic context. Moreover, it demonstrates the 
administration’s belief in the need for public support for its peacemaking aims and the need to forge 
an approach that was not just palatable to Israel’s supporters in the United States, but also one that 
took their concerns into account. After first ‘educating’ the public to a certain point of view, the 
administration hoped the Jewish community would present those concerns directly to Israeli 
officials. ‘Our efforts to consult and communicate must be directed in tandem at the Israeli 
government and the American Jewish community,’ Jordan wrote. ‘It is difficult for me to envision a 
meaningful peace settlement without the support of the American Jewish community.’ 
The memo lays out the complex way in which the administration hoped its wooing of 
American Jewry could help sway policy outcomes.304 It included some errors, however. For 
instance, Jordan appeared consistently to confuse AIPAC and the Presidents’ Conference, which 
although both strongly supportive of Israeli policy, differed in composition and mission. 
Nevertheless, Jordan’s memo helped grab the president’s attention. Subsequently, Carter 
occasionally sat in on high-level policy deliberations.305 
While it would be a mistake to believe that Jordan’s memo explains fully Carter’s policy 
and his attitude toward American Jewry, the aide’s advice should not be discounted easily. It was 
Jordan, after all, whose bold 58-page year-by-year strategy plan to then-Governor Carter in 1972 
served as a blueprint for his victorious White House run.306 Nevertheless, that it took the 
administration nearly six months to consider these tactics seriously points to the relative 
inexperience of Carter’s inner circle. 
By this time, Brzezinski had become distressed by the personal nature of the negative media 
coverage about the administration’s policy. ‘I was presented as anti-Israeli, perhaps even worse than 
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that, and the references to my Polish and Catholic background became increasingly pointed in some 
of the commentaries on the subject of the Middle East,’ he believed.307 
 Even so, an ABC News report in June noted that U.S. opinion had generally become more 
sympathetic toward the Arab cause. Israel, and especially Begin’s Likud government, correspondent 
Ted Koppel reported, faced new criticism in the American media. In terms of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, ‘These are the battlegrounds now: the White House, the Congress and the U.S. news 
media,’ he reported.308 
The following week, CBS’ Eric Sevareid tackled the U.S.-Israeli relationship. He opined 
that ‘the impression sets in that while the Carter team does not love that Arabs more, they do love 
the Israelis less, or at least, differently.’ Sevareid recognised that the president needed to balance 
competing interests in the region, including keeping such Arab states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia in 
the American camp, partly to ease oil supply concerns. ‘What is sure is that Mr. Carter is taking on 
himself more and more responsibility for the outcome,’ he noted.309 
 
Carter prepares to meet Begin 
 Ahead of Begin’s July visit to Washington, Carter felt he ‘had to repair his political base 
among Israel’s American friends, and in the process build further support for our peace effort.’310 
Carter had his work cut out for him. By early summer, the organised effort to criticise the 
administration’s policy had gathered pace.311 In the last week of June, for example, 95 percent of 
the 1,552 letters on the Middle East received by the White House opposed Carter’s position that 
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Israel would have to relinquish some of the territory conquered in 1967 as part of a settlement.312 
The following week the White House received 359 telephone calls on the same issue; all of them 
opposed Carter’ stance.313 
‘People thought they had seen a Jewish lobby operate before. They haven’t seen anything 
yet,’ a board member of the Zionist Organization of America told Time. ‘If Carter had said in 
October what he has been saying this spring, he would not be in the White House,’ the same article 
quoted a New York rabbi as saying.314 As Newsweek reported, ‘What began as a mild concern in the 
American Jewish community has rapidly escalated to outright worry – and in some cases, genuine 
alarm – as Jews have sensed what they consider to be a pro-Arab drift in the President’s words and 
deeds.’315 
As these concerns grew, Carter invited around 50 people – the Presidents’ Conference and 
several lay leaders from key Jewish communities – to the White House in early July to discuss the 
negotiations. By then, Brzezinski had become anxious about a ‘growing impression that Carter 
would not stand fast and that he would accommodate (on the Middle East) if pressed.’ Brzezinski 
was also mindful of the adverse reaction Carter’s earlier forays into public diplomacy had 
provoked. ‘We will see whether we can hold to [the American framework] in the face of domestic 
pressure,’ he noted after a PRC the day before the meeting with Jewish leaders.316 
 In preparing Carter for the meeting, Jordan informed him that these leaders had continually 
been ‘refused’ an audience with the president. But with criticism growing in some quarters as to the 
administration’s approach, the president’s aides decided such a meeting was necessary before 
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Begin’s visit. The meeting, which would be presided over by Mondale, but would include Carter, 
Brzezinski, Eizenstat, Jordan and Vance, was intended ‘to get the main issues out on the table.’317 
Jordan stressed that Carter should engage in consultation and information exchange with the 
visitors. That would contrast the president with the style of Kissinger, who tended to lecture to 
visiting Jewish groups rather than listen to them, Jordan wrote. He suggested the president deflect, 
though not necessarily deny, the suspicion that the administration hoped ‘to orchestrate public 
opinion in this country and in Israel in such a way as to hasten Begin’s possible downfall.’ 
Generally, Jordan advised Carter to outline his vision for a settlement, with an emphasis on the 
American commitment to Israel’s security.318 
In a separate memo, Brzezinski advised the president not to use the term ‘Palestinian 
homeland’ because it was a ‘red flag’ due to its vague echoing of the Balfour Declaration. Instead, 
the president could refer to the need for a ‘home’ for the Palestinians, preferably linked to Jordan, 
or even a ‘political home.’ The key was to avoid the implication that it would be a PLO-dominated 
state, Brzezinski suggested.319 
 When the meeting finally came, the president and his aides spent nearly 80 minutes 
attempting to reassure the visitors of U.S. support for Israel. Carter emphasised his emerging 
definition of a settlement: first, ‘real peace’ as defined by full diplomatic relations, open 
communication and travel and free trade; second, withdrawal of ‘some territory’ occupied by Israel 
in 1967; and, third, resolution of the Palestinian question, which was ‘a cancer that must be cured.’ 
Carter said he foresaw ‘a Palestinian entity tied to Jordan,’ but that a ‘separate Palestinian nation’ 
would pose a threat to peace in the region. ‘As long as we have influence, I would certainly not 
favor an independent Palestinian nation between Israel and Jordan,’ he added. Carter conceded that 
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it would be easier politically if he did not oppose Israeli policies, but he emphasised that sometimes 
that would be necessary to retain the trust of all sides.320 
 Still, the attendees registered their concern about both the style and substance of 
administration policy. ‘We don’t doubt your intentions – you want to act as a catalyst, to shake 
things up,’ Schindler told the president. ‘But the world isn’t used to your open diplomacy, and your 
words are interpreted to be a blueprint to be imposed. … [T]his leads to a toughening of the Israeli 
backbone and raising Arab expectations,’ he complained.321 Schindler left for Israel immediately 
afterward to reassure Begin about Carter.322  
 Carter was unusual not only in his public candour, but also the readiness with which he 
confessed to Arab leaders the constraints that domestic opinion placed on his Middle East policy. In 
May, he told Saudi Crown Prince Fahd that Riyadh should pressure the PLO to accept 242 because 
it would have a positive effect on American opinion.323 In his description of his meetings with 
Carter in September 1977, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy claimed Carter told him it 
would be ‘personal political suicide’ for him to apply too much pressure on Israel.324 For Carter to 
admit a domestic political weakness in an international diplomatic context was highly unusual. 
 Carter administration members sometimes met with Arab-American groups. However, they 
were not as well organised or connected as Israel’s supporters. Middle East staff members on the 
NSC recommended that the president agree to meet with Arab-American groups in late July325 and 
again the following month.326 Brzezinski responded to the latter memo by writing in the margin, 
‘Talk to me. I am skeptical!’ Nevertheless, Brzezinski passed along the request to Jordan with a 
disclaimer. ‘On foreign policy grounds, I do not recommend that the President meet with this 
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group,’ he wrote. ‘However, the Arab-American community is clearly beginning to organize itself 
and we will be hearing from them more often (and more effectively) in the future than in the 
past.’327 
In November, Vance met with representatives of the National Association of Arab 
Americans and the Association of Arab-American University Graduates. The visitors emphasised 
the need to include the PLO in the negotiations. Carter himself met with Arab-Americans for the 
first time on 15 December, six months after he had first conferred with American Jewish groups. 
According to Terry, although the meeting was devoted to a range of issues, much attention was paid 
to the role of the Palestinians and the PLO in the peace process. Still, the meetings served mostly as 
an exchange of views.328 
 
Begin visits Washington 
Meantime, Begin was busy forming Israel’s first non-Labour coalition. In presenting his 
government to the Knesset, Begin emphasised its willingness to go to Geneva, to negotiate with 
Israel’s neighbours, and the Jewish people’s ‘eternal and inalienable right to the Land of Israel.’329 
Begin believed that between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, there should be only Jewish 
rule. His view was consistent with that of his ideological mentor, Vladimir Jabotinsky, a militant 
Zionist who had articulated the concept that a Jewish state would need to construct a metaphorical 
‘iron wall’ of defence to protect against its Arab neighbours.330 
 In Washington, however, Begin was largely an unknown entity. ‘Begin is highly self-
disciplined intellectually [and] he has an excellent memory and a sharp analytical mind,’ 
Ambassador Samuel Lewis wrote to Vance ahead of the premier’s arrival. ‘He is preparing for his 
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meeting with the president by carefully reviewing and familiarizing himself in detail with the 
historical record, probably to include everything he can find that the president has written or 
said.’331 Lewis also reported on his meeting with Israeli opposition figures Shimon Peres and Abba 
Eban. ‘What neither can imagine is Begin’s ultimate agreement with either the US or the Arabs on a 
formula for final resolution of the West Bank and the Palestinian questions,’ he informed Vance 
starkly.332 
Meanwhile, Terror Out of Zion, a book largely about the Irgun underground and its leader, 
Begin, in pre-independence Israel, was passed around the White House in an attempt to gain insight 
into Israel’s new leader.333 Brzezinski forwarded excerpts to Carter. He informed the president that 
it had been well received and the author was respected, thus ‘the book must be fairly close to the 
mark.’334 
Still, the United States was slow to understand the fundamental difference between the 
foreign policy approach of Begin’s Likud government and its Labour predecessors. For Labour, 
policy toward the territories conquered in 1967 was governed by security concerns. But for Likud, 
these territories were viewed through an ideological lens.335 Indeed, the ‘cornerstone’ of Begin’s 
foreign policy was ‘his effort to maintain Israel's control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. … 
On the West Bank his beliefs were a matter of theological faith.’336 In their initial meetings, Begin 
showed the Americans that he was much more adamant than the previous government in insisting 
that Israel retain the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yet it took the administration time to appreciate 
fully this distinction.337 
As it girded itself for potential strains in the relationship with Israel, the Carter 
administration kept close tabs on public opinion. It hoped a favourable domestic base would grant 
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the president sufficient political capital to push all sides, especially Israel, toward a settlement. In 
early July, Brzezinski brought to the president’s attention a Gallup survey that found that American 
attitudes toward Israel were largely unchanged in the wake of Israel’s elections.338  
 Then, just days before Begin’s arrival, Caddell rushed the results of his firm’s new survey 
on American Jewish attitudes toward Carter and Israel. The survey found no indication of 
diminished support in the population at large or among Jewish Americans for Israel as a result of 
Likud’s victory. It found that Jewish respondents were ‘always more definite in their opinions and 
as expected were more likely to be “hawkish” on territorial questions’ than Americans in general. 
The key findings: 
• A majority of Jewish Americans and Americans in general favoured a return of at least 
some territory held by since 1967, although the former group was more likely to endorse 
the concept of ‘defensible borders.’ 
• A near majority of all Americans favoured a Palestinian homeland or a return of the West 
Bank to Jordan, but an overwhelming majority of Jewish Americans favoured its retention 
by Israel. 
• On Jerusalem, most Americans favoured an international city, although most Jewish 
Americans favoured its retention by Israel. 
• A majority of Americans were unsure of the impact of Likud’s victory on peace prospects 
but by a wide margin Jewish Americans felt it would make no difference. 
• Jewish Americans gave Carter a 78 percent job approval rating. 
As Caddell summed up, ‘Despite some disagreements on the Mid East, American Jews give 
President Carter high personal favorable and job approval marks, although not with the intensity 
that might be normally be expected’ for a Democrat.339 
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 Caddell’s survey results underscore the consistency of American public support for Israel. 
More immediately, however, the figures suggest that despite some U.S. scepticism toward Likud, 
public opinion did not offer the White House a clear mandate for a ‘confrontation’ with Israel. 
Moreover, the disagreements on territorial and Palestinian issues foreshadowed fissures to come. 
Any strategy of ‘confrontation’ needed to be developed meticulously and pursued cautiously in 
order to keep domestic opinion behind the president. Carter would need to marshal his best powers 
of persuasion in order to retain – and, indeed, bolster – his support at home. 
Ahead of Begin’s arrival, ‘some commentators and officials have been led to predict a tense 
confrontation, perhaps even worse,’ The New York Times opined.340 Media speculation was rife 
about how pivotal the visit would be for peace hopes. For example, a Jerusalem-datelined report 
asserted that Begin’s visit would be ‘one of the most important and eagerly anticipated meetings 
ever held between an American President and an Israeli leader.’341 The Washington Post’s 
diplomatic correspondent reported the talks could ‘determine the future of Carter’s Middle East 
diplomacy.’342 
Yet as Quandt wrote, ‘For reasons that are still not clear, Carter apparently concluded that 
the best way to deal with Begin was to avoid sharp controversy and be very polite on the personal 
level.’343 In a later work, Quandt indicates that the determination to keep the talks respectful 
stemmed from Carter’s advisors’ belief that Begin would become more rigid if pressured.344 
However, the present account argues that Carter’s sensitivity to domestic opinion also helps explain 
his determination to keep the talks with Begin cordial, and minimise differences in procedure and 
substance. 
When Begin travelled to the United States he brought with him a much-anticipated ‘secret 
plan’ for negotiations. Begin preferred for an American-Israeli agreement to help bring the parties 
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together, but thereafter only bilateral talks between Israel and each of its adversaries would do. He 
opposed a unified Arab delegation at Geneva, which would likely lead to negotiations on the 
Palestinians. Israel would negotiate with ‘accredited delegations of sovereign states’ – Egypt, 
Jordan and Syria, but not the Palestinians – without preconditions. The conference would open in a 
plenary but quickly break into three sets of bilateral negotiations between Israel and each of its 
neighbours. The conference would reconvene once the treaties were ready to be signed. If the Arab 
states insisted on a PLO role at Geneva, which Israel rejected, Israel offered instead the possibility 
for negotiations through ‘mixed commissions’ or ‘proximity talks’ established ‘through the good 
offices of the United States.’345 
Begin’s emphasis on the ‘good offices’ of the United States was significant. He believed 
Washington should limit its role to bringing the parties together, but thereafter have little 
substantive input. Begin appeared to fear that U.S. positions would be closer to Arab stances. He 
also firmly believed that the United States should not introduce its own ideas into the negotiations. 
In this way, Israel’s new government departed from its predecessors, which tended to formulate 
policy in consultation with Washington. Begin did not feel that need. Still, his proposals offered a 
procedural starting point for the Americans. 
Begin and Carter’s talks were more cordial than the president’s meetings with Rabin in 
March. Both sides avoided making controversial comments and, on the surface, got along well.346 
Begin made clear to Carter that he would accept ‘no foreign sovereignty’ in the West Bank, but he 
also suggested Israel would consider a unified Arab delegation at Geneva, with some provisions for 
Israeli concerns, as a face-saving measure. Begin expressed adamant opposition to the 
establishment of a Palestinian ‘entity,’ which he believed would become a beachhead for Soviet 
expansionism and would pose a ‘mortal danger’ to Israel, and especially any negotiations with the 
PLO.  
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In turn, Carter outlined his proposed set of principles: a comprehensive peace through 
Geneva based on 242 and 338; an extensive peace, including open borders and free trade; Israeli 
withdrawal from territory to secure boundaries; and a Palestinian ‘entity’ would be created.347 
Israel, however, was not prepared to accept the principles calling for Israeli withdrawal from all 
fronts, which included the West Bank, nor would it accede to a process that led to Palestinian self-
determination. Carter also agreed to make a significant arms sale to Israel, allowing the Jewish state 
for the first time to build its own tanks with U.S. credits.348 
Carter also somewhat ironically, given he was the prime example of speaking out, 
articulated his desire that the negotiations become less public. ‘All the nations and leaders involved 
in Geneva – including ourselves – you here, the Arab leaders, and, we too, have made strong 
statements in the past of a controversial nature,’ he told Begin. ‘I would hope that until Geneva 
convenes restraint will prevail in what we can accept and cannot accept.’349 
News coverage350 and commentary351 of the Begin-Carter talks and their aftermath was, 
moreover, generally positive. It shifted the locus of attention from Arab issues generally, and 
Palestinian issues specifically, to Israeli security concerns. It also showed that, not for the last time, 
Begin proved a master at controlling the agenda. Attention was focused on his willingness to 
negotiate at Geneva, rather than the many obstacles that remained between Israel’s vision and the 
visions held by the Arabs and the United States. Begin shifted the emphasis from issues of 
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substance toward ones of procedure. However, the U.S. team seemed to overlook, or at least 
underestimate, Begin’s determination to keep the Palestinians out of the process and the West Bank 
under Israeli control. 
Nevertheless, from a purely domestic level, the White House’s political plan initially 
appeared to be working. The administration had acted quickly to assuage the concerns of the 
influential Jewish community after the strains of June. Carter had chosen a conciliatory, rather than 
confrontational, approach toward Begin and adopted a conservative public posture. In his public 
comments, the president emphasised points of agreement, such as the determination to go to 
Geneva, rather than points of divergence, especially Palestinian and West Bank issues. 
Nevertheless, a poll conducted after Begin’s visit found that half of respondents did not think that 
Carter would be successful in bringing peace to the Middle East.352 
For Carter, any ‘feelings of optimism had a short life.’353 The day after Begin’s return to 
Israel, his cabinet conferred legal status on three settlements established under the preceding 
government.354 That appeared to have a major impact on the administration. The State Department 
responded that it was ‘deeply disappointed,’ that the settlements were ‘not … contrary to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention’ and that their establishment ‘constitutes an obstacle to progress in the peace 
making process.’355 
Raising the ante, Carter then became the first president to say publicly that the ‘settlements 
in the occupied territories’ constituted an ‘illegal action.’ Although the three previous 
administrations had maintained the same position, Presidents Johnson, Nixon and Ford had never 
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uttered the words publicly, adding to the chagrin of Israel and its supporters. Yet Carter also 
conceded that he ‘did not think about talking to him (Begin) concerning the granting of legal status 
to those settlements.’356 That ‘oversight,’ among other slipups, again contributed to the image of a 
president out of his depth with delicate, and complex, issues.357 Moreover, in an illustration of his 
irritation, Carter noted in his diary the following week that he felt the Arab leaders wanted ‘peace’ 
but complained the ‘Israelis don’t want a settlement.’358 These two intertwined issues – 
disagreements over Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and settlements – continually caused 
profound strains in the American-Israeli relationship throughout the Carter years. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite its careful political preparation in the early summer, the White House failed to 
appreciate the degree to which PLO inclusion in the negotiations, the establishment of a Palestinian 
‘entity’ and territorial withdrawal were anathema to Israel’s new government. Yet Carter’s initial 
meetings with Begin had provided ample evidence that the Israeli premier had no intention to 
compromise on those issues. In Carter’s drive for cordiality in his relationship with Begin and his 
overwhelming focus on reconvening Geneva, the president glossed over these significant 
substantive differences. 
By mid-summer 1977, the White House believed it had made inroads politically with 
American Jewry and had developed a plan of action going forward. Carter also reined in his public 
remarks, while the administration put other figures forward, most notably Mondale, to act as 
spokesmen for U.S. policy. The president worked to improve the process of consultation with 
influential communities on Arab-Israeli issues, and recognised the need to develop a domestic 
strategy to go hand-in-hand with its diplomacy. Yet the fact that it took nearly six months into his 
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presidency to devise such a plan indicates the president had launched his diplomacy without 
sufficiently appreciating how deeply the negotiations would impact his standing at home. 
Jordan’s memo in June detailed a plan that was adhered to with alternately greater and lesser 
intensity as Carter’s presidency proceeded. It did not determine all subsequent policy decisions. But 
it nevertheless provides invaluable insight into how a young administration found its way around a 
complicated policy. The advice set forth in the document shows the operative assumptions of Carter 
and his top political aides, and informed their future gestures toward generating domestic support 
for their Middle East policy. 
This period demonstrated that when mobilised, the organised American Jewish community 
could pressure effectively the administration and compel it to alter its tactics, if not its objectives. It 
also helped establish the domestic constraints within which Carter could work. These limits were 
imposed partly by administration concerns of alienating the American Jewish community, but they 
extended beyond that. Protests from Israel’s U.S. supporters over the administration’s tactics and 
objectives in Arab-Israeli diplomacy were reflected negatively in the media. Consequently, these 
noisy domestic debates contributed to the climate of elite criticism of Carter as a president and 
statesman.  
Analysis of this period provides clues to the administration’s subsequent political woes. As 
July came to a close, Carter likely believed he had regained much of his political equilibrium vis-à-
vis the Arab-Israeli dispute. Now, he could afford to take greater political risks, including reaching 
out to the PLO. However, in retrospect, Carter only ever had shallow domestic support for his 
policy. He had not taken the time to cultivate domestic backing, but seemed to believe that his open 
style could substitute for dissatisfaction over policy substance. The president failed to consolidate 
his domestic base and generate fresh momentum before undertaking, from August to October 1977, 
a political course that proved fatal for his hopes of reconvening Geneva.  
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Chapter Three – Geneva Roadblock: Fallout 
from the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué 
 
Introduction 
           Jimmy Carter had a rude awakening on his 53rd birthday. Despite the administration’s 
summer efforts, Carter found himself on 1 October 1977 again stuck in the nexus between domestic 
politics and foreign policy. On that day, Washington and Moscow issued the U.S.-Soviet Joint 
Communiqué on the Middle East, in which the Geneva co-chairmen set forth the principles they 
believed necessary to convene the conference before the end of the year.359 The Americans and 
Soviets intended it as a procedural document, in which the rivals outlined their points of agreement. 
Yet the political opposition the statement provoked caught the Carter administration flat-
footed. Critics were incensed for three reasons. First, anti-Soviet U.S. hardliners felt the Carter 
administration had invited Washington’s global rival into a position of influence in a negotiating 
process from which it had been recently excluded. Next, the White House and Kremlin appeared to 
be applying their combined influence to pressure regional actors toward a settlement. Finally, the 
statement’s reference to the ‘legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ outraged Israel and its 
supporters because it mirrored language used by the PLO in demanding the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. 
For Carter, however, the communiqué merely represented the obvious: the Soviet role as 
Geneva co-chairman had to be acknowledged and the Palestinian issue needed to be addressed. 
‘When it’s confronted frankly, the screams arise immediately,’ he observed in his diary.360 
The U.S.-Soviet statement and its backlash had immense significance for the development 
of Carter’s approach toward Arab-Israeli peace. The episode effectively terminated the American-
led drive toward a comprehensive settlement through Geneva. Moreover, taken together, the Carter 
administration’s gestures toward involving the PLO and the Soviets between August and October 
1977 constituted a third rail in American domestic discourse on foreign policy; touching it had 
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deleterious consequences for Carter’s standing at home. With the communiqué politically artless 
and diplomatically suspect, Carter came out a loser on both fronts. 
This chapter argues that the administration’s failure to foresee the troubled diplomatic and 
political course it was treading represented a searing indictment of its operational acuity. It had just 
expended considerable effort devising a political plan to match its diplomatic initiative, yet it now 
appeared to stumble blindly into its predicament. As the present chapter demonstrates, the 
administration’s policymaking changed immediately after the episode to include greater input from 
the president’s political staff. 
This chapter does not argue that a Geneva Conference would have been held in the absence 
of domestic pressure on Carter. Unquestionably, the diplomatic issues – especially the nature of 
Palestinian participation, the launching of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Soviet 
role – posed considerable obstacles. Nevertheless, domestic politics played a role – a contributory 
but not a determinative one – in ending the American drive toward gathering the parties together at 
Geneva. Moreover, the president’s frank admissions to Arab and Israeli officials alike of his 
domestic constraints undermined their confidence in Carter as a powerbroker and enabled regional 
actors to tilt events toward their purposes.  
In Quandt’s telling, Carter gave ‘clear priority to domestic political concerns’ after the joint 
communiqué by issuing the U.S.-Israeli Working Paper in order to quell the uproar. However, 
Quandt’s concern is the policymaking process, not specifically the role of the president. His work is 
replete with references to ‘domestic politics,’ but he resists analysis of what that means.361 
Khalidi locates the communiqué episode within the broad arc of U.S. policy toward the 
Palestinians. He argues the Carter administration genuinely sought a new approach toward the 
dispute. However, the joint communiqué episode symbolised the societal and systemic constraints it 
faced, and suspicion of the PLO and antipathy toward the Soviets gravely injured Carter’s effort.362  
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The joint communiqué represented the zenith of American-Soviet cooperation during the 
Carter years. Subsequently, its effective abnegation by the United States also spelled the end of an 
effort toward a multilateral solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict, at least until the 1991 Madrid Peace 
Conference. U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis contends that the communiqué served as an 
‘unintended success’ because its fallout caused the final exclusion of the Soviets from the Middle 
East negotiating process and indirectly led to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, 
Camp David and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.363 Saiveiz concludes that the net regional effect of 
the joint communiqué fallout was to shift U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East from the Arab-
Israeli dispute toward the Persian Gulf and eventually Afghanistan.364 
After a relatively quiet previous couple of months, the negotiations again became extremely 
public, with much of it playing out through the media. Using a content analysis of American 
network television news coverage, Kern contends that Carter was outmanoeuvred by Israeli Foreign 
Minister Moshe Dayan’s skilful use of media diplomacy. Israeli officials successfully presented 
their side without major challenge from the networks. Carter, on the other hand, could not reconcile 
the image of himself he was trying to project (of the leader of an ‘open, honest administration’) with 
that offered in the media (an ‘inconstant, waffling president’).365 Separately, Cohen contends Israel 
successfully resisted the power of the United States because it felt that its interests were gravely 
imperilled by the communiqué and thus no benefit offered by Washington could offset the 
perceived existential threat.366 
The present account is unique in marshalling the growing amount of documentary material 
available to offer a narrative approach to the episode. Matched with contemporaneous news reports 
and opinion polls, the new evidence underscores how the Carter administration should have paid 
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greater heed to the potential fallout not just of the communiqué’s sudden announcement, but also of 
Carter’s entire diplomatic course. This study is again focused on Carter’s central role in 
policymaking and the challenges faced by a figure who tried simultaneously to perform the roles of 
politician and mediator.  
 
Reaching out to the PLO 
By August, momentum seemed to be gathering toward Geneva. Having now met all the 
regional actors, Washington accelerated its efforts. The end of 1977 was looming, and all wanted 
progress before the year finished. 
Despite Israeli objections, the United States still sought a way to include Palestinians in 
Geneva, and the PLO represented their main organisational body. The Arab parties all agreed on the 
need for a Palestinian role, although they differed on its precise nature. From the Carter 
administration’s standpoint, however, direct communications could not be held unless the PLO met 
minimum conditions: acceptance of 242 and recognition of Israel. Otherwise, Washington would 
not risk violating its Sinai II pledge to Israel regarding the PLO. Nonetheless, in pursuing this 
course, the Carter administration underestimated Begin’s hostility to the PLO. 
On 26 July, a PLO message reached the White House. It suggested the group was willing to 
live in peace with Israel, and that Fatah leader Yasser Arafat would make clear as such in both 
public comments and private commitments. In return, the PLO wanted the United States to commit 
to the establishment of a Palestinian ‘state unit entity,’ possibly linked to Jordan. Carter noted on 
the message: ‘If PLO publicly and privately meets minimum requirement of Kissinger-Israeli 
agreement, we will begin discussions with them. Get message to them.’367 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance set off in early August for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia and Syria.368 His trip was in large measure intended to work out a formula for direct 
                                                
367 Document 51, Memo from Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Message from Arafat,’ n.d. [circa 19 July 1977], FRUS, 1977-
1980, VIII, 335-36 
368 For records of Vance’s trip see Documents 63-92, ibid., 376-476. 
                 
97 
American-PLO contacts.369 Carter instructed Vance to bring with him a revised set of five 
American principles for the negotiations, as well as four possible ways in which the Palestinians 
could participate in Geneva. Carter told Vance to keep the Soviets informed of U.S. moves and to 
consider arranging for discussions with the PLO if the group met American conditions.370 
 Meanwhile, Carter was souring on Menachem Begin – over the prime minister’s positions 
on negotiations, Israel’s settlements and military incursions into Lebanon. In an interview, Carter 
said if any Middle Eastern leader found that his position ‘is in direct contravention to the position of 
all the other parties involved including ourselves and the Soviet Union … (then) there would be a 
great impetus on that leader to conform with the overwhelming opinion.’371 Carter’s comments 
were clearly aimed toward Israel’s new premier. 
Upon receiving Vance’s reports while the latter was still in the region, Carter concluded in 
his diary that Israel would be ‘adamant against any sort of progress’ and would probably ‘stir up 
trouble in Lebanon, with the Palestinians, Syrians, with Arabs in general.’372 He returned to that 
theme upon receiving Vance’s full post-trip report on 14 August. ‘The Israelis are going to be 
typically recalcitrant, but the more we go public with a reasonable proposition the more difficult it 
will be for them not to make an effort,’ the president wrote.373 
During Vance’s talks in the Middle East, he was led to believe the PLO was close to 
adjusting its stance on 242. He also informed Israel that Washington did not accept the ‘legitimacy” 
of its settlements.’374 In order to incentivise the PLO, Vance recommended that Carter speak 
publicly about Washington’s willingness to deal with the group if it accepted 242.375 
The president did so on 8 August. He and the reporters posing questions to him used the 
terms ‘PLO’ and ‘Palestinians’ interchangeably. ‘The biggest obstacle (to convening Geneva in 
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October) that we’ve detected … is whether or not the Palestinians would participate in the 
discussions,’ the president said. If the PLO accepted 242 and 338, he continued, that could facilitate 
its participation in Geneva. ‘We’ve not had any direct conversations with them … (but) we have a 
means to contact them and to exchange ideas with them indirectly,’ Carter added.376 
Generally, Carter attempted to show compassion for the Palestinians’ plight. On 10 August, 
he said that any settlement required ‘some solution to the question of Palestinian refugees who have 
been forced out of their homes and who want to have some fair treatment.’377 Still, the following 
day, Carter was informed that the PLO leadership remained divided on 242 and recognition of 
Israel. These issues were the subjects of intense debate within the PLO’s inner circle.378 
 These developments alarmed Israel’s American supporters. Alexander Schindler of the 
Presidents’ Conference immediately visited Israel, where he ‘assured’ Begin ‘that U.S. Jewry would 
mobilize public protests against the Carter Administration’s willingness to deal with the PLO’ in 
the event the group complied with U.S. terms. Upon returning, Schindler and colleague Yehuda 
Hellman handed a letter of complaint directly to Carter, with whom they met on 26 August.379 
Carter responded immediately to Schindler’s concerns. His position toward the PLO was ‘consistent 
with commitments previously made voluntarily to the Israeli government, with private and public 
statements made to present leaders in the Middle East, and with my personal beliefs and hopes for 
permanent peace,’ Carter assured Schindler.380 
Regardless, from the U.S. standpoint, the outcome of Vance’s August trip was mixed. On 
the one hand, all sides began to develop substantive ideas, while Egypt and Israel had both agreed 
to draw up draft peace treaties for negotiation. On the other hand, no agreement had been reached 
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on PLO representation at Geneva.381 Washington favoured including a unified Arab delegation that 
included Palestinians, but Israel insisted it would only accept non-PLO Palestinians as part of 
Jordan’s national delegation. Other Arabs, however, wanted PLO representation in some form.382 
Publicly, the PLO called for the United States to ‘take the initiative … by launching talks 
with the Palestinians, who represent the root of the Middle East conflict.’383 However, the group 
continually rejected the minimum U.S. requirements for direct contact. At a meeting of the PLO’s 
Palestinian Central Council in August, the group voted 11-4 against accepting a revised formulation 
of 242 to help facilitate participation in Geneva.384 It claimed Washington was ‘submitting to 
Zionist pressure’ by not talking directly to the PLO. ‘The Human Rights issue of President Carter is 
only for local and international consumption and stops where politics and US interests start,’ it 
added. The PLO dismissed 242 as ‘outdated.’385 
Brzezinski informed Carter that the result was a victory for the ‘rejectionists’ and a defeat 
for the ‘moderates.’ However, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy had informed the 
Americans that Arafat, considered by the United States to be a ‘moderate,’ sought clarification on 
what Washington meant by a Palestinian ‘homeland’ or ‘entity.’386 Carter’s public comments had 
piqued Arafat’s interest, it seemed. Neither side had yet decided to give up completely the 
possibility of some agreement. 
Meanwhile, the administration’s latest diplomatic moves caused domestic problems for 
Carter – if not with the public at large, certainly with the media and elite opinion. For example, the 
disputes between Israel and the United States over the procedures for Geneva as well as Israeli 
settlements reflected poorly on the White House.387 Conservative commentators, such as columnists 
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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, criticised Carter’s approach as consisting of ‘intricate 
stratagems that seem preposterous for normal diplomacy.’388 
Additionally, the media largely characterised Vance’s August Middle East trip negatively.389 
Furthermore, reporting and analysis of the administration’s possible work with the PLO was replete 
with references to impending problems between Washington and Jerusalem.390 After a meeting of 
Carter’s top advisors on the Middle East – Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Brzezinski, Vice 
President Mondale, Press Secretary Jody Powell and Vance – the national security advisor felt that 
both the president and secretary of state had become ‘extremely tough-minded’ toward Israel and 
were prepared for a confrontation.391 However, editorial opinion suggested the time was ripe for 
quiet Middle East diplomacy, carefully prepared.392 
Meanwhile, however, the domestic constraints on his foreign policy irked the detail-oriented 
president. ‘Although we’ve done a lot of things, we’re not moving fast enough to suit me …’ Carter 
wrote in his diary. ‘It would be easier if I was a dictator and didn’t have to worry about Congress or 
other foreign leaders who don’t agree with us.’393 
 In early August, Carter had a contentious meeting with the leaders of the anti-Soviet, pro-
Israel Committee on the Present Danger.394 The meeting was focused on the administration’s policy 
toward the Soviet Union and arms control, but nonetheless underscored the extraordinary access 
enjoyed by the group. According to pre-meeting talking points, Eugene Rostow would stress that 
the CPD’S ‘purpose is to be helpful in promoting a disciplined and responsible public discussion of 
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the issues as we perceive them.’395 Afterward, Carter asked for regular meeting with the group so he 
could ‘have our advice and, where we could give it, our support’ on aspects of ‘foreign and defense 
policy,’ according to the CPD.396 In his diary, Carter called it simply ‘an unpleasant meeting.’397 
 This meeting did not directly focus on the Arab-Israeli dispute, but it demonstrated one of 
the many domestic pressures Carter faced over his foreign policy. It also showed the tremendous 
influence enjoyed by the CPD, whose co-founder Paul Nitze believed the Middle East to be the 
‘strategic fulcrum’ in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.398 For the neoconservative-led CPD, U.S. policy 
toward the Soviet Union was intertwined with its position in the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
Still, Carter’s public ratings remained relatively strong. In September a Roper poll found the 
president’s approval ratings stood at 66 percent, similar to his standing at the start of his term, and 
higher than the two succeeding Democratic presidents at the same time. ‘One explanation by 
experts is that we hadn’t backed down on any of the hotly disputed issues,’ Carter wrote in his diary 
notes.399 However, the same propensity Carter had for agitating on controversial issues alienated 
elite opinion, which in turn led to a gradual erosion of his broad public support and thus his political 
mandate. 
 
Secret U.S. emissary to Arafat 
That month, the United States also launched a fresh bid to open a dialogue with the PLO. On 
6 September, Brzezinski met with Landrum Bolling, an American educator who was known to 
Arafat and trusted by Carter, to brief him on instructions for a meeting with the Palestinian leader. 
Bolling was to stress that he was acting in a private capacity, but that he could ‘indicate that he has 
some personal and direct knowledge of the predispositions of the highest level policy makers in the 
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US.’ Bolling was to emphasise the Americans’ sense of urgency: ‘Arafat should see that a dialogue 
with the US would transform his position. Timing is essential. If he holds out too long, events may 
pass him by.’ Ultimately, Carter’s message to Arafat came down to this: Washington would agree 
to meet with the PLO if the group accepted 242 with a statement of reservation about its inadequacy 
at addressing the Palestinian question.400 Quandt believes that had Arafat and the PLO been 
prepared to accept 242 – even with reservations401 – the United States ‘would have tried to make the 
case that they should be allowed into the diplomatic arena.’402 That was not to be.403 
Nevertheless, Arafat heralded as a ‘positive step’404 the State Department’s 12 September 
statement that ‘the Palestinians must be involved in the peacemaking process’ at Geneva for the 
‘Palestinian question to be solved.’405 WAFA also praised it: ‘If peace begins in Palestine, so then, 
peace cannot be reached except with the Palestinians and the achievement of their legitimate rights 
in Palestine.’406 Yet the group’s refusal to accept or modify its position on 242 largely scuttled 
chances of an imminent PLO role in the negotiations. 
The American statement on the Palestinians displeased Israel. Dayan delivered a ‘vehement 
protest’ to Ambassador Lewis after it was issued. Still, Brzezinski noted that despite Israel’s 
objections, Begin’s government had ‘sought to avoid … any semblance of confrontation with the 
U.S.’ The premier, in fact, had said in an interview that the statement did not represent a ‘disaster’ 
in the relationship because every party had a right to express its opinion.407 AIPAC also criticised 
the statement, believing it insinuated further courtship of the PLO.408 
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The president shrugged off the criticism. Vance informed Carter that the United States had 
told Israel that it issued the statement merely to express its position, which was necessary because 
in Washington’s view, ‘the Israeli Government had been leaking every day its negotiating strategy, 
which inevitably created pressures for us to clarify our views.’ Carter responded: ‘The statement 
was OK.’409 Informed later by Vance of ‘cries of distress’ from Congress over the call for a 
Palestinian role, Carter replied simply: ‘So be it.’410 
Of this frustrating period for U.S. diplomacy Brzezinski later observed, ‘Our inability to 
modify PLO demands was matched by our impotence in stopping new settlements.’411 Carter noted 
the consensus in a 16 September foreign policy breakfast was that ‘the Israelis are deliberately 
trying to block an agreement by creating disturbances in Lebanon, being adamant on Palestinian 
representation, and supporting their settlements.’412 
However, the domestic criticism Carter’s outreach on the Palestinian issue generated seemed 
to be taking a toll on the president. During a question-and-answer session, he became defensive 
when a journalist asked about his ‘embracement’ of the PLO. ‘With all due respect, that’s one of the 
most distorted assessments of my own policy that I’ve ever heard,’ the president replied. ‘I’ve never 
endorsed the PLO. Our Government has had no communication, at all, directly with the PLO. ... We 
have never called on the PLO to be part of the future negotiations.’ Carter carefully spelled out the 
principles he believed necessary to lead to peace, including a Palestinian ‘entity,’ probably 
‘associated’ with Jordan. ‘We are not just an uninterested intermediary or mediator,’ he added. ‘Our 
country has a direct, substantial interest in a permanent peace in the Middle East.’413 
 
Secret Egyptian-Israeli contacts 
Israel submitted its first draft peace plan to the United States on 2 September. In his cover 
letter, Dayan informed Vance that Israel believed its draft applicable to peace with Egypt and could 
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serve as the basis for bilateral negotiations with Jordan, Syria and possibly Lebanon. Its emphasis 
was on security and territory, but it left the borders and settlements in Sinai – the recovery of which 
was Sadat’s absolute priority – vague. ‘In seeking a solution to the outstanding problems of 
territorial delimitation, the partition should be guided by the general principle that the respective 
national and security interests of all of them should be equally taken into account,’ Dayan wrote. 
The Palestinians were not mentioned by name, but he noted that ‘a comprehensive peace settlement 
must also make full provisions for the refugees, both Arabs and Jewish.’414 Jordan and Syria also 
later submitted draft principles for negotiation.415 
Regardless, both Egypt and Israel remained uneasy about Washington’s Geneva orientation, 
and began considering ways to bypass U.S. mediation.416 Israel sought to deal directly with Egypt 
because it feared Washington’s pressure to conclude a comprehensive peace deal through Geneva 
might jeopardise its security and include a role for the PLO. Egypt was deeply sceptical of the hard 
bargaining that the United States envisioned at Geneva because it did not want its negotiating 
options limited by other Arab states, particularly Syria.417 
In late August, Begin visited Romanian President Nicholae Ceausescu, a friend of Sadat’s, 
to convey his interest in peace with Egypt. Ceausescu passed the message to Egypt’s president. In 
doing this, Israel was responding to signals emanating from Cairo earlier in 1977 about direct 
contacts.418 Next, Moshe Dayan travelled to Morocco, where he asked King Hassan II to help 
facilitate a parley with Egypt. For the trip, Dayan, the famous one-eyed soldier-statesman, was 
disguised in makeup, the fake ‘mane of a beatnik,’ a ‘mustache of a dandy’ and large sunglasses.419 
Hassan accordingly set up the meeting. On 16 September, Sadat bypassed his own foreign 
ministry and sent Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami to confer with Dayan in Morocco. The 
talks remained general, but both sides established their willingness to negotiate directly. Dayan and 
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Tuhami also agreed to exchange draft treaties and set up another meeting. According to Israel’s 
account, Tuhami did not want the United States to know of the Egyptian-Israeli contacts. If an 
understanding were reached, then ‘it should be made out as if our agreement was the Americans’ 
initiative, and then it should be handled as an American peace effort, as a “Face Saving” 
operation.’420 
 Both Egypt and Israel were content to sidestep the United States at this phase in order to 
prod the negotiations toward a course more to their liking. Begin, in particular, only ever wanted 
bilateral negotiations – first with Egypt, then Syria and finally Jordan. He appeared willing to 
consider Geneva to appease Washington, but it was not his preference.421 He also felt U.S. policy 
under Carter was fundamentally pro-Palestinian. Begin’s diplomacy at this stage seemed predicated 
on the premise that the best way for the West Bank to remain under total Israeli control was to 
remove Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict.422 Sadat, for his part, was most interested in regaining 
Sinai and feared Syria’s potential as a spoiler if Geneva proved to be a substantive negotiating 
forum; the Soviet role as co-chair also worried him. At the appropriate moment, however, both 
Cairo and Jerusalem would again seek U.S. influence to help secure an agreement.423 
 
Involving the Soviets 
 Despite their rivalries, Washington and Moscow needed to work together at some point in 
order to act as Geneva co-conveners. According to Vance, he and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko first discussed the possibility of issuing a joint communiqué in May.424 Carter’s penchant 
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for going on the record with new, apparently improvised diplomatic formulations during his first 
year in office did not make the painstaking process of finding areas of agreement any easier. Carter 
later wrote that he and his aides ‘were determined that none of my previous public statements or 
private commitments could be changed as we worked out with the Soviets the rules for commencing 
the peace talks.’425 
 As with so much of the Geneva preparations, the difficulty for U.S. diplomacy was in 
striking the balance between procedure and substance. While the Soviets had been present at the 
1973 conference, subsequent American diplomacy excluded them from the Kissinger-brokered 
disengagement agreements. Now the White House needed to determine to what extent it should 
attempt to work with the Kremlin on substance, or whether their respective roles as co-chairmen 
would be largely procedural and ceremonial, providing cover for behind-the-scenes talks. 
U.S. intelligence experts expressed scepticism about Soviet motives. A CIA assessment in 
June concluded Moscow wanted to reconvene Geneva in order to demonstrate that it still played a 
central role in Arab-Israeli negotiations. However, it also believed that Moscow had neither the 
desire nor the ability to force Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table. Rather, the Soviets had 
their greatest influence ‘during periods of tension and “no-war-no-peace.”’ Moscow ‘should not be 
expected to play an effective, positive role’ in any negotiating forum, it cautioned.426 Such an 
assessment of Soviet thinking did not bode well for superpower cooperation at Geneva. 
 Nevertheless, the Carter administration accelerated efforts to arrive at a modus operandi 
with the Kremlin. In September, Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin exchanged 
several drafts of a possible statement as the two sought to develop mutually acceptable language. 
Vance kept Carter informed throughout the process.427 
Separately, Carter and Gromyko discussed the complicated nature of the pre-Geneva 
negotiations. According to Carter, Gromyko told him on 23 September that ‘if we would just 
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establish a miniature state for the Palestinians “as big as a pencil eraser,” that would lead to a 
resolution of the PLO problem for the Geneva conference.’428 Gromyko may not have been serious, 
but his remark nonetheless underscores the frustration the outside powers felt about the 
intractability of the issues at stake. 
 The domestic pressure Carter felt on the Middle East question was again wearing on the 
president. On 19 September, two White House political advisors, Edward Sanders and Roger Lewis, 
warned of a possible ‘explosion’ in administration-Jewish relations over Arab-Israeli policy. Carter 
had temporarily alleviated the community’s concerns following their 6 July meeting. However, 
concern was rising again, especially over the president’s comments on settlements, Geneva and the 
Palestinians. ‘No issue is more controversial than the question of the Palestinians,’ the authors 
warned.429 
In his account of his talks with Carter in Washington on 21 September, Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Ismail Fahmy writes that his delegation was ‘shocked’ by the frankness with which Carter 
admitted to his domestic political constraints.430 However, Fahmy’s account differs markedly from 
the U.S. version of the conversation. Carter did, in fact, confess to domestic constraints on his Arab-
Israeli policy, but not nearly to the degree cited by Fahmy, who was not a disinterested 
participant.431 
The Egyptian foreign minister claims that Carter said that for him to ‘exercise major 
pressure on Israel’ would ‘be a personal political suicide.’432 However, the American notes of the 
meeting contain no such emotive language. In the U.S. notes, the president did say: 
My influence is based on the support of the American people, the support of Congress, and 
the support of the Jewish community. … It would be a mistake for the Arabs to believe that 
we can control Israel. … I have influence that can be used, but I need the support of 
Congress, the American people and the American Jewish community.433 
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Nevertheless, Sadat, who was in Cairo, read Fahmy’s reports of this meeting. Fahmy implies that 
experience contributed greatly to Sadat’s conviction that Carter lacked the political strength to exact 
concessions from Israel.434 
 However, virtually simultaneously an incident occurred in September that provided the 
United States with, in Brzezinski’s words, ‘an opportunity to assert itself over Israel.’435 Carter had 
grown increasingly irritated by Israel’s military activities in southern Lebanon. Washington felt that 
Israel’s actions might undermine Carter’s credibility with other Arab leaders and harden PLO 
opinion, thereby marginalising the ‘moderate’ leaders it hoped could be persuaded to accept 242 
and 338.436 
 In late September, Washington discovered that Israel had deployed U.S.-manufactured 
armoured personnel carriers into Lebanon to support Christian militiamen. Such use violated the 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which prohibited American-made weapons from use by another 
party for offensive purposes. 
 Carter was furious. He informed Begin that he was ‘very disappointed’ and demanded that 
Israeli forces be withdrawn from Lebanon ‘immediately.’ If not, Carter said he would inform 
Congress and that ‘further (weapons) deliveries will have to be terminated.’437 According to 
Quandt, Begin grew ‘mildly hysterical,’ but responded to Carter’s demands. For U.S. policymakers, 
Begin’s retreat suggested that such dire threats could affect Israeli behaviour.438 The administration 
may have assumed that such pressure on Israel would work again. ‘I was much encouraged by this 
incident, for I felt that it indicated that a firm and clear position by the United States could be 
sustained, provided that we persisted,’ according to Brzezinski.439 But the White House did not yet 
appreciate Begin’s willingness to show flexibility on issues not central to his ideology, like 
Lebanon. The West Bank proved another matter entirely. 
                                                
434 Fahmy, Negotiating for Peace, 195-96. 
435 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 107. 
436 Quandt, Camp David, 100-03. 
437 Document 110, Telegram from State Department to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv (from Carter for Begin), 24 September 
1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, VIII, 564-66. 
438 Quandt, SHAFR. 
439 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 107. 
                 
109 
 Carter delivered that message to Begin privately, but the diplomatic process was still 
unfolding in public view. One analysis found that from mid-September to mid-October 1977, U.S. 
networks each averaged more than a minute and a half of coverage nightly on the Middle East.440 
This is an impressive figure for picture-reliant television news because this coverage generally 
featured diplomatic manoeuvring and bargaining in New York and Washington, rather than 
dramatic conflict on the ground in the region. 
In a 29 September press conference, Carter again stated ‘there can be no Middle Eastern 
peace settlement without adequate Palestinian representation’ and that the United States was 
working to establish a Geneva format acceptable to all parties. The question of whether the PLO 
would serve as the Palestinians’ representatives ‘has not been answered in my mind,’ Carter said. 
He also suggested that the Soviets had increasingly shown a ‘cooperative attitude’ on a range of 
issues.441 Carter’s words foreshadowed impending diplomatic moves. 
The following day, in a tactic that became common during the Carter administration, Israel’s 
Dayan appealed to American Jewish leaders as the ‘key and lever’ to gain U.S. public support for 
Begin’s policies. ‘They should go and explain to the Senate, the Congress, the press, the 
communities, on television and to their gentile friends,’ he said the day before the communiqué was 
issued but after Vance had already informed him of its content. Dayan then set off on a speaking 
tour of American Jewish communities.442 
 Vance and Gromyko issued the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué on 1 October. The key 
paragraph: 
The United States and Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive 
settlement of the Middle Eastern problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be 
resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories 
occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and 
establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the 
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.443 
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The statement ‘set forth the principles which I had decided to pursue, but which neither the Israelis 
nor the Arabs were ready to accept,’ Carter later wrote.444 These remarks suggest the president had 
slipped beyond the role of mediator. Instead, he felt the onus was on the regional parties to accede 
to his formulations. 
Three major issues provoked critics’ ire. First, the use of the phrase ‘legitimate rights,’ 
rather than ‘legitimate interests,’ of the Palestinians dismayed Israel and its supporters. They felt 
that formulation was a recapitulation of PLO demands and served as diplomatic code for a 
Palestinian state. Second, many observers felt the statement implied Washington had invited the 
Kremlin back into a position of influence in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Such criticism was 
compounded by the fact that Carter’s stance toward the Soviets and SALT II was already under 
attack by hawkish Americans of all political persuasions. Finally, Israel and its backers were upset 
that the outside powers seemed to be applying pressure on regional parties for a settlement. Thus, 
the statement seemed to confirm Carter’s critics’ suspicions. 
Israel, despite having been consulted about the draft ahead of time,445 reacted angrily to 
what it saw as unwarranted pressure.446 Although one former American official claims that Sadat 
praised the statement as a ‘brilliant maneuver’ for applying pressure on the recalcitrant Arab parties 
Syria and the PLO,447 others have argued that the Egyptian president viewed the U.S.-Soviet 
statement with a ‘mixture of contempt and confusion.’448 ‘We kicked the Russians out of the door 
and now Mr. Carter is bringing them back through the window,’ Sadat reportedly said.449 
Regardless, even after his November trip to Jerusalem, Sadat publicly insisted he still wanted to 
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convene Geneva.450 He believed it offered the best mechanism for incorporating the Palestinians 
into a settlement, but he insisted on a preparatory stage of talks under American stewardship.451 
 Reaction to the communiqué was not universally negative. The PLO lauded it.452 In a New 
York Times op-ed on 6 October, Palestinian-American Edward Said, a professor at Columbia 
University, commended its mention of Palestinian rights, which suggested a recognition that more 
than mere strategic advantage was at stake in the Middle East.453 
However, the domestic criticism proved to be especially virulent and once again put Carter 
on the defensive. ‘The American Jewish [community] went bonkers. We had a very serious political 
problem off that, and we needed to get bodies and people out getting our side of the thing on 
record,’ Powell recalled.454 The handling of the communiqué ‘left much to be desired,’ he 
confessed. ‘The press and political operations in the White House had not been brought into the 
picture until just before the statement was to be released, and we made no serious effort to get a 
delay so the proper groundwork could be laid.’455 
Many lawmakers seized on the appearance of American collusion with the Soviets on a 
crucial geopolitical issue. Three House members co-signed a letter of complaint to Carter that itself 
was co-sponsored by 150 others.456 Staunchly anti-Soviet members of Carter’s own party like 
Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel Patrick Moynihan came out against the statement. Moynihan 
labelled it ‘disturbing in the extreme that the United States government has clothed Soviet purposes 
in the Middle East with the cloak of respectability implicit in the assertion of shared interests.’457 It 
also enraged the Committee on the Present Danger, members of which came out against the 
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statement.458 The communiqué seemed inimical to Cold War orthodoxy, which suggested an 
American strategy predicated on ‘containing,’ not collaborating with, the Soviets. 
Unsurprisingly, AIPAC expressed similar disapproval. It argued the ‘statement marks a 
major shift in U.S. policy and a victory for the Soviet Union and the PLO.’ The phrase ‘legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people,’ according to AIPAC, was ‘a euphemism for the creation of a 
Palestinian state and the dismemberment of Israel.’459 The American Jewish Congress and Anti-
Defamation League also denounced it.460 
Schindler of the Presidents’ Conference immediately sent Vance a telegram. The group was 
‘profoundly disturbed’ over the statement, which ‘represents an abandonment of America’s historic 
commitment to the security and survival of Israel and imperils our country’s interests by giving a 
major role to the USSR, no merely at Geneva but in the Middle East itself,’ he wrote.461 Schindler 
later pointed to the communiqué as ‘an explosion … something that shattered the (Jewish) 
community an awful lot.’462 
The Presidents’ Conference held an emergency meeting on 3 October to coordinate its 
response. Schindler joined Israel’s Dayan on a speaking tour to Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles 
to assess public reaction. In mid-October, the group issued a four-point programme of ‘political 
action and public education’ to ‘serve American interests and the cause of Middle East peace.’ It 
called on its members to oppose openly a PLO role in the negotiations, to reject the idea of a 
Palestinian state, to insist that an agreement must come from direct talks, and to emphasise a firm 
repudiation of the of the principles embodied in the U.S.-Soviet communiqué. The group told its 
members that their role lay in ‘interpreting these vital issues to our fellow Americans.’463 
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Newspaper opinion was also negative. ‘If there is strength or wisdom in this kind of 
diplomacy, it eludes us. If there is long-range good for U.S. interests, we can’t see it,’ The Los 
Angeles Times wrote.464 The Washington Post wrote that ‘on its face this joint statement suggests … 
a change in American emphasis in favor of the Arab side of the argument.’465 Harshest of all was 
The Wall Street Journal, which labelled the statement an ‘extraordinarily mischievous document’ 
and accused the administration of ‘sheer carelessness.’466 
The bitter response surprised Vance.467 Brzezinski conceded that they had ‘erred in not 
consulting our domestic political advisers about its likely internal impact.’468 Neither Jordan, 
Carter’s top political advisor, nor Mark Siegel, his Jewish community liaison, knew about the 
communiqué until after it came out. ‘After that – people like me, Hamilton Jordan, Stu Eizenstat 
and others in the domestic political operation … were more directly involved in the (Middle East 
policymaking) process. It was much easier to gain access after’ the fallout from the communiqué, 
Siegel said.469 
According to Quandt, Mondale, so often the administration’s bellwether on domestic 
politics, also became more actively involved. ‘I think that he was appalled at the political handling 
of it, not the content of it. You didn’t brief anybody in advance. It caught everybody by surprise. It 
dropped out of the sky. … I think it was a stupid thing to handle that way,’ Quandt said. ‘Mondale 
got a little more concerned after that and he generally worried that pushing Israel too hard would 
have domestic consequences and would be counterproductive.’470 
Spiegel argues that the administration’s central failure in this period was not 
communicative, or because it failed to lay the political ‘groundwork’ before issuing the statement. 
Rather, the policy, not the communiqué’s sudden unveiling, was problematic. The White House 
subsequently involved more political advisors in policymaking, but according to Spiegel the 
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changes were procedural, not substantive, and the consultations ‘perfunctory rather than 
genuine.’471 
As domestic criticism over the joint statement grew, the White House attempted to exercise 
damage control. On 3 October, Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz expressed his government’s 
disappointment to a contingent of Carter’s political advisors. Dinitz stressed that the joint 
communiqué ‘undercuts’ and ‘neutralizes’ Dayan’s diplomatic efforts, particularly the contacts with 
Egypt, according to handwritten notes taken by Carter advisor Stuart Eizenstat. Dinitz told the 
Americans that Israel’s ‘best chance is to sit down with Egyptians and we can be forthcoming with 
them. Get them out of (the) game.’ Nothing would be accomplished if all states were pressured into 
meeting together, Dinitz said. Washington should not be ‘trying (to) settle all and get nothing. We 
should be trying (to) cut (a) deal with Egypt,’ he said, adding no agreement would be reached if all 
parties had to sign at once.472 
 Later that day, members of the communications, NSC and political staffs gathered in the 
White House’s Roosevelt Room to coordinate the administration’s message. Again according to 
Eizenstat’s notes, Brzezinski emphasised that Egypt needed ‘cover’ on the Palestinian issue to make 
a deal with Israel. The national security advisor also stressed that the term ‘legitimate Palestinian 
rights’ should not be so controversial because it ‘backs off … “entity” or “homeland.”’ Meanwhile, 
Hamilton Jordan expressed concern over the possibility of a ‘breach with (the) Jewish 
community.’473 The administration’s taking points on the communiqué stated that it did not 
constitute a full statement of U.S. policy, did not foreshadow a U.S.-Soviet effort to force a 
settlement and did not violate previous American commitments to Israel.474 
 Siegel complained about the communiqué in a forceful three and-a-half-page memo. ‘I’m 
used to the role of loyal soldier, and will continue to speak out in support of the President in the 
American Jewish community, despite what it has done, and will continue to do, to my personal 
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reputation,’ he wrote to his boss, Jordan. ‘At the very least, a good soldier can expect to see the 
battle plan before he is sent out as cannon fodder.’ Siegel informed Jordan that the ‘talk in the 
American Jewish community is getting very ugly. The word “betrayal” is being used more and 
more.’ Siegel said he was ‘confused by the policy, and certainly think we can do better in selling it 
to the American people.’475 
 
U.S.-Israeli Working Paper 
 As criticism grew, Carter spent several hours on 4 October meeting with Moshe Dayan to 
allay Israel’s concerns. Brzezinski has written that Dayan ‘in effect blackmailed’ Carter by warning 
him that unless he had assurances on Israeli concerns, the Israeli foreign minister would take his 
case to the American people through public statements.476 The American notes of the meeting 
confirm that Dayan threatened to make the disagreement public. ‘[I]f we say anything about the 
PLO or about the Palestinian state, and that this is bad for Israel, there will be screaming here and in 
Israel,’ Dayan said. ‘We need to have some agreed formula, but I can go to Israel and to the 
American Jews. I have to say that there is an agreement and not a confrontation.’ Carter sought to 
avoid any confrontation. ‘… [A] confrontation would be very damaging to Israel and to the support 
of the American public for Israel. If we proceed in good faith, we can avoid a confrontation,’ he 
said.477 
According to Carter’s handwritten notes, Dayan insisted that any public statement on 
reconvening Geneva omit references to Palestinian ‘national rights,’ the PLO and the pre-1967 war 
borders. Moreover, peace would not be the ‘mere termination of war.’478 Ultimately, the United 
States and Israel agreed to issue a public statement that reiterated their friendship, the centrality of 
242 and 338 to the peace process, and that parties need not accept the U.S.-Soviet communiqué as a 
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precondition for participating in Geneva.479 Israel and the United States also agreed on a Working 
Paper, which was issued publicly. It said nothing about the PLO, but stated that ‘Palestinian Arabs’ 
would take part in Geneva as part of a ‘unified Arab delegation,’ and that the negotiations would be 
broken into a series of bilateral sessions between Israel and its neighbours. It also referred explicitly 
to 242 and 338 and addressed Jewish refugees from Arab states.480  
The United States felt Dayan had shown flexibility by agreeing for Palestinians to be part of 
a unified Arab delegation rather than ‘buried’ in national delegations. Quandt believed it constituted 
‘a significant step’ toward reconvening Geneva.481 Indeed, Dayan faced criticism upon his return to 
Israel for that concession.482 Nevertheless, the PLO felt the U.S.-Israeli Working Paper ‘exerts 
massive pressure on the Arabs to accept and submit to it.’ The group announced it ‘rejects’ the 
working paper ‘part and parcel.’483 
While the U.S.-Israel Working Paper mitigated some domestic criticism, it also helped paint 
a picture of a U.S. administration susceptible to pressure, a president willing to retreat publicly from 
his position and a White House prepared to sacrifice its often-stated diplomatic goals partly for 
political expediency. Sam Donaldson, ABC’s White House correspondent, ended his 5 October 
report with an acerbic bit of commentary, casting doubt on Carter’s motives. His diplomacy on 
SALT II and the Middle East was conducted for personal political reasons, Donaldson opined, so 
                                                
479 U.S.-Israel Joint Statement, 5 October 1977, ISA/RG 130/MFA/6862/5. Retrieved 18 September 2013, 
http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1A4B0050-7EF8-403E-AAEA-2F538CD99C4E/0/Egypt08APP1.pdf. The 
best account of these talks is in Quandt, Camp David, 125-31. Also see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 108-10; 
Carter, Keeping Faith, 301-02; Dayan, Breakthrough, 70-71; Vance, Hard Choices, 192-94. 
480 ‘Working Paper on Suggestions for the Resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference,’ 5 October 1977, ISA/RG 130/ 
MFA/6911/2. Retrieved 18 September 2013, http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F97B44C2-363A-4410-B08C-
D0EACB97B7CC/0/Egypt08APP2.pdf. 
481 Memo from Quandt to Brzezinski, ‘Significance of U.S.-Israeli Agreement on Procedures for Geneva,’ 5 October 
1977, Folder: ‘Middle East—Negotiations: 10/77–12/77,’ Brzezinski Donated, Box 13, JCL. 
482 Document 54, Israel radio interview with Dayan, 15 October 1977, IFRSD: 1977-1979. Retrieved 18 September 
2013, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/57%20Interview%20with%20Foreign%20Mi
nister%20Dayan%20on%20Israel.aspx.  
483 ‘The U.S.-Israeli Working Paper,’ (editorial), Palestine PLO Information Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 15 (15 October 1977), 
3, IPS. 
                 
117 
that the ‘disappointments for Mr. Carter’s first year in office won’t stand out so much. … Blessed 
are the peacemakers is a hard line to criticize.’484 
In a meeting with Jewish lawmakers the following day, the embattled Carter said he was 
‘willing to take heat’ on his Middle East policy. He stressed that the parties could not got to Geneva 
without the Soviet Union ‘at the end of it.’ Carter said he would ‘commit (political) suicide before 
abandon[ing] Israel.’ Additionally, the president emphasised that he had never advocated a 
‘separate P[alestinian] state’ and conceded that he should have briefed Congress about the U.S.-
Soviet communiqué beforehand.485 
The U.S.-Israeli Working Paper did not completely silence the American Jewish 
community’s criticism. On 26 October, Vance sat down with a group of Jewish leaders, led by 
Schindler, to discuss Middle East policy. However, Schindler later boasted that he steered the 
gathering toward the issues he wanted discussed by organising a pre-meeting to enable attendees to 
coordinate their positions. ‘I took that meeting away from Vance, in a sense, because we had 
everything planned in advance – every conceivable point of view that we would take,’ he said. To 
Vance, that coordination was ‘fairly obvious.’ ‘It was naïve of me to think it could happen – that I 
could bring together a large number of Jewish leaders and talk over our policies.’486 
In his report back to Carter, Vance wrote, ‘The questioning was vigorous to say the least,’ 
and admitted, ‘I don’t know how many people I was able to persuade.’ The president responded: 
‘I’m grateful for your patience.’487 Schindler said the attendees had ‘read that (meeting) as an 
attempt to break the hold of the Presidents’ Conference and to divide the community … and we 
countered that to the best of our ability. … I think we succeeded.’488 
The administration continued its on-again, off-again courtship of the American Jewish 
community. In autumn 1977, the White House Press Office initiated mass mailings targeted 
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specifically at Jewish publications. The material consisted of administration statements, press 
releases and policy positions on Jewish and Arab-Israeli issues.489 
Still, by late October Hamilton Jordan believed the administration’s largest domestic 
challenge on the Middle East was not the American Jewish community, but rather Congress. The 
United States faced a dilemma over a new U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Israeli 
settlement activity.490 Washington typically abstained or voted against such resolutions despite its 
official view that Israel’s post-1967 settlements were illegal. The administration wanted to be tough 
on Israel, but did not wish to disrupt the negotiations. 
 Jordan felt controversy over the U.N. vote could ‘precipitate a political confrontation in the 
Congress that could be unfavorable to the Administration’ and divert attention from Carter’s energy 
bill. ‘I am no longer concerned with the support of American Jews – that is lost until we show some 
tangible results from our peace efforts,’ Jordan wrote. ‘I continue to be concerned that our efforts at 
peace in the Middle East will be undermined by a Congressional resolution or letter. This vote on 
the upcoming UN resolution could be the catalyst for such an effort.’491 In the end, the United 
States abstained on the resolution, which passed 131-1-7.492 
 The White House also continued its targeted polling on the Middle East in a bid to 
determine Carter’s base of support for diplomacy. However, the results of a survey conducted by 
Patrick Caddell for the White House in late August and early September found that little had 
changed since April, despite administration efforts at explaining its policy. Carter’s performance on 
the Middle East earned him a 34 percent positive and 52 percent negative rating, which was about 
the same as the spring survey. Only 48 percent of respondents believed his principles for a Middle 
East settlement represented a fair basis for a deal. Among Jewish voters, that figure dropped to 20 
percent, with 57 percent opposed to Carter’s terms. Caddell noted that among those who opposed 
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Carter’s plan, most did so on an “instinctual” basis rather than because of any ‘reasoned’ judgment. 
That pointed to a deep-rooted problem for Carter. Most Americans based their positions on their 
pre-existing beliefs, rather than through a fresh engagement with the issues.493 
 Still, the overall political aspects of the diplomacy exasperated Carter. ‘It was very difficult 
for people to realize that, if successful, our efforts would bring significant results,’ he wrote later.494 
Carter’s choice of language hints at his impatience for critics who he believed obstructed the course 
he thought best in the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué episode tapped into three emerging, and politically 
damaging, narratives in Carter’s foreign policy: that he was naïve about the Soviet Union, that he 
was anti-Israel and that his policymaking process was confused. It severely undermined Carter’s 
credibility at home and abroad. Quandt believes domestic criticism impacted the development of 
U.S. policy after the joint communiqué because Carter for the first time realised his Arab-Israeli 
policy was causing him domestic problems: ‘From then on, I think his own views began to move in 
the direction of the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, if that is all we could get.’495 
Although Carter’s approval rating average for his first seven months reached 66 percent – 
higher than Nixon and Ford, but lower than Johnson, Kennedy and Eisenhower – results suggested 
that was mostly based on Carter’s personality, not performance, and the downward trend had 
already commenced.496 A survey taken the week before the joint communiqué found the public’s 
rating of Carter on ‘inspiring confidence in the White House’ had plunged from 75 percent in 
March to just 50 percent in September. Carter’s handling of foreign policy matters, which enjoyed a 
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narrow 43 to 40 percent positive rating in July, had already dropped to a 52 to 34 percent negative 
rating.497 
Nevertheless, Carter continued for a time to cling to the notion of achieving a 
comprehensive settlement. Yet the backlash over the U.S.-Soviet statement suggested that he could 
not afford the political cost of working toward that goal. Even absent Carter’s domestic political 
constraints, Arab and Israeli disagreements may still have precluded a Geneva Conference. Yet it 
was the administration’s political ineptitude at home that brought the U.S.-spearheaded effort to an 
early halt. 
Carter later said that he had been warned by U.S. lawmakers about the ‘adverse 
consequences’ of applying pressure on Israel or otherwise ‘negotiating in a way that might result in 
Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories. I understood that, and I just finally said to hell 
with it.’498 However, if that were so, Carter’s willingness to buck convention had disastrous 
consequences for his own policy preferences. His style – publicly confronting tough issues – 
undermined the chances of achieving his goals. 
The political plans developed by the administration showed that it was aware of the political 
liabilities, but its tactical execution was dismal. It erred in believing that explication alone could 
ease domestic concerns about its policy. Carter devoted scant attention to covering himself 
politically on such controversial issues as involving the PLO and the Soviets in Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking. This failure came despite warnings that both could undermine his best efforts at 
peacemaking and his position at home.  
The resultant weakness of the American diplomatic position helped compel Sadat to seize 
the initiative and travel to Jerusalem. Consequently, the communiqué led indirectly to a diplomatic 
breakthrough that was consummated a year and a half later with the formal signing of the Egypt-
Israel Peace Treaty. In the near term, however, it sidelined the president from the peace process. 
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Chapter Four: Tuned out – “Cronkite Diplomacy,” 
Sadat’s Jerusalem Initiative and U.S. Policy Response 
 
Introduction 
As Anwar Sadat prepared to make history by travelling from Egypt to Israel on 19 
November 1977, Jimmy Carter climbed to the pulpit at Washington’s First Baptist Church, 
delivered a prayer in support of the Egyptian president’s trip, ‘and then the congregation adjourned 
so we could return to our homes in time to watch the arrival ceremonies on television.’499 
Accustomed to the central role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, the American president joined millions 
of spectators as the leader of the largest and most powerful Arab state offered the Jewish state 
effective recognition as a permanent feature of the Middle East. 
The White House conceded it had little part to play in Sadat’s initiative. National Security 
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski betrayed a sense of jealousy in a wistful diary entry: ‘My only regret 
is that Carter is not doing it. My guess is that until he decides not to follow cautious advice he will 
not play the preeminent role which he could be playing, given his intelligence and the position of 
America in the world.’500 In Israel, the White House delegation consisted of one: Mark Siegel, 
Carter’s American Jewish community liaison.501 
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem took the lead in peacemaking away from the United States and 
placed it in the hands of regional actors. The Egyptian president engaged in masterful ‘media 
diplomacy.’502 He leveraged the global interest in his initiative into a media spectacle that forced the 
Carter administration to shift its aims away from a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement and 
toward a U.S.-mediated bilateral agreement. However, Sadat’s decision to talk to the Israelis in 
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Jerusalem threatened to render useless Carter’s personal effort to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement and play into a growing public perception of his ineffectiveness. 
This chapter argues that the U.S. media’s role in Sadat’s initiative highlighted Carter’s 
weakness as both a diplomat and politician. The press stepped into a diplomatic void left by the 
president after the failure of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué. As Sadat seized on his role as a 
darling of the American news media, Carter became a casualty of the open diplomacy that he had in 
fact initiated and advocated, but over which he no longer had control.503 
Despite the contemporaneous American popular perception, the U.S. media was not 
responsible for Sadat’s Jerusalem trip. However, the narrative that it had indeed spurred the trip 
gained traction among elite opinion because of its consonance with the growing U.S. political 
narrative that Carter was an ineffective leader. Moreover, saturation media coverage of the initiative 
highlighted the absence of an American role in Jerusalem. This episode again demonstrates that 
central presidential involvement in diplomacy activates domestic political actors that interpret 
policy fluctuations as political losses. 
Carter found himself in the delicate position of reorienting and justifying his Arab-Israeli 
policy in public. Recently released American documents detail how the Carter team attempted to 
develop a fresh approach by capitalising on the enthusiasm generated by Sadat’s initiative and 
perceptions of American public scepticism toward Menachem Begin’s government. That 
culminated in a short-lived effort to forge a ‘secret strategy’ of U.S.-Egyptian collusion to pressure 
Israel. 
This section examines U.S. reaction to the events in the Middle East. As such, it does not 
purport to offer a complete history of Sadat’s initiative.504 Nor does this chapter seek to provide a 
history of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations during Sadat’s nearly two days in Israel.505 
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The standard argument about Sadat’s initiative in relation to the American role contends that 
Sadat intended to divert U.S. diplomacy from its Geneva in favour of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli 
negotiations under American auspices.506 According to Stein, Sadat’s trip was of extraordinary 
significance, but ultimately it ‘proved again that in order to resolve problems for the next step, 
American intervention was necessary.’507 At Carter’s White House, Quandt described a ‘twinge of 
jealousy’ over its being relegated to the role of spectator. Carter subsequently sought to renew his 
push toward Geneva while reasserting American primacy in the negotiations.508 
However, others criticise the scholarship of Sadat’s initiative on the ground that it is 
American-centric and lacks understanding of the Egyptian system and the inter-Arab context.509 
Fahmy, who resigned as Egyptian foreign minister over the initiative, contends Sadat decreased the 
chances for peace by undermining the drive toward Geneva, reveled in Western adulation and was 
too naïve to avoid being ‘in the end a facilitator of Israeli policies.’510 Heikal insists Sadat never 
seriously intended to visit Israel but only followed through once he realised the U.S. media’s 
interest.511 Shemesh points out that Sadat’s trip was the conclusion of an initiative he had begun 
with proposals made to Israel in 1971, but which the latter had rejected.512  
The present account is unique in the literature by analysing Sadat’s initiative in terms of the 
interaction of U.S. media, public opinion and diplomacy. Domestic factors did not determine 
American policy following Sadat’s trip. Yet the cumulative impact of decisions made partly on the 
basis of domestic considerations significantly influenced the policy reorientation. 
 
Geneva preparations stall 
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The political fallout from the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué, followed by the issuing of the 
U.S.-Israeli Working Paper, suggested pressure could make Carter back down. The drive toward 
Geneva had stalled. However, Sadat credited a letter from Carter, in which he pleaded, ‘I need your 
help’ to maintain momentum in negotiations, for inspiring his decision to visit Israel.513 Sadat felt 
political pressures hamstrung Carter. ‘President Carter’s capacity for movement was governed by 
the current international situation,’ he wrote. ‘Furthermore, the extent of U.S. assistance in this 
connection was determined by the special relationship between the United States and Israel.’514 
 The Americans dismissed Sadat’s first proposal – a multiparty summit in East Jerusalem as 
a precursor to Geneva515 – as ‘farfetched,’516 ‘doomed to failure’517 and ‘crazy’518: ‘We worried 
about Sadat and wondered whether he was not losing his sense of reality.’519 The prospect of 
bringing together the leaders of the Soviet Union, China and the PLO, among others, was also not 
something to which Israel would have acceded. 
Despite his frustrations with Israel, Carter had positive words for Jerusalem in his address to 
the World Jewish Congress to mark the Balfour Declaration’s 60th anniversary. He continued to 
insist on the multilateral conference. ‘For serious peace talks to begin, a reconvening of the Geneva 
conference has become essential,’ Carter said.520  
Yet the speech’s early drafts suggest the president had sought to criticise Israel more sharply 
and emphasise his commitment to the Palestinians. The NSC’s Quandt sent two different drafts to 
Brzezinski on 31 October. His first option featured a strongly worded paragraph condemning Israeli 
settlements and another on the need for a Palestinian ‘entity.’ The alternate draft featured toned 
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down language, removing the Palestinian ‘entity’ reference and only including one sentence 
criticising Israeli settlements.521 
Quandt believed Carter’s speech should be delicately crafted because it could affect the 
negotiating climate. He also raised ‘the question of domestic opinion. I can see little but trouble 
from the Jewish community if the President gives a speech along the lines’ of the first version. 
‘There may be a time when it makes sense to lay our policy on the line and to point the finger at 
intransigent parties, but I fail to see why that should be done now,’ Quandt wrote. He suggested 
Brzezinski ‘urge the President to reconsider his approach’ and deliver the second, milder version.522 
Quandt’s recommendation that Carter should ‘reconsider his approach’ suggests the president had 
been leaning toward the more critical speech. 
In a revised draft sent the following day, Quandt omitted the Palestinian reference – leaving 
that as a ‘trump card’ to be played later, he wrote – and left only a single sentence on settlements.523 
Carter’s final speech came together after receiving further input from domestic policy advisor Stuart 
Eizenstat and White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz. It offered a generally muscular affirmation of 
the U.S.-Israeli relationship.524 
The same month, Vance met with Nahum Goldmann, the head of the World Jewish 
Congress. During a discussion of the Arab-Israeli negotiations, Goldmann urged the secretary of 
state ‘not to pay too much attention to criticisms from the American Jewish community for whom 
[Goldmann] expressed great disapprobation.’ Israel, Goldmann believed, needed to be pressured 
into concessions.525 However, Vance later said he felt the administration would have been unable to 
neutralise domestic pressure from pro-Israel factions through confrontation. ‘Rather, we had to 
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recognize that it would continue to exist, that you could contain it so it didn’t thwart what was good 
for our country,’ he said.526 This basic thinking contributed to later attempts to pressure Israel. 
 
Sadat expresses willingness to visit Jerusalem 
Shortly afterward, however, Sadat surprised his audience in the Egyptian parliament when 
he went off-script and said he was willing to travel ‘to the ends of the Earth,’ even to speak before 
Israel’s Knesset, for the sake of peace.527 Egypt’s foreign policy bureaucracy was shocked.528 U.S. 
Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts did not think Sadat meant his words literally. ‘Sadat’s offer to 
go to Knesset is a first for an Arab leader and should be seen as his way of dramatizing [the] lengths 
to which he [is] prepared to go to achieve peace, not as [a] serious possibility,’ he wrote back to 
Washington.529 
From the beginning, the media, especially the television news corps, featured prominently in 
Sadat’s initiative. Sadat’s trip also boosted the U.S. public’s image of Egypt, a land it had 
previously known mostly through stereotypes and images of war. For example, Bagnied and 
Schneider’s analysis highlights the favourable American television coverage of Sadat’s initiative. 
They conclude that ‘Sadat emerged in American television as the first Arab leader able to validate 
as worthy of discussion most of the key Arab complaints about the state of Israel.’530 This, in turn, 
affected Carter’s role in the peace process. 
Several days passed after Sadat’s speech to Egyptian lawmakers with vague statements on 
the prospect of a visit to Israel. Nothing concrete was established.531 Finally, on 14 November CBS 
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News anchor Walter Cronkite extracted separate, on-camera promises from both Begin and Sadat: 
Begin would issue an official invitation through the United States, and Sadat would accept. 
ABC, CBS and NBC all carried interviews with both Begin and Sadat on their 14 November 
newscasts. However, only CBS edited and broadcasted the interviews in such a way as to suggest 
the developments unfolded on air. CBS achieved this effect by dramatically presenting Cronkite’s 
interviews, via satellite, with Begin and Sadat back-to-back, implying they had actually been 
conducted within moments of each other on live television. However, in reality Cronkite conducted 
his conversations with the two leaders hours apart earlier in the day. This episode injected the news 
media into a central role in foreign policy and suggested the ineptitude of the Carter 
administration’s diplomacy. 
In opening his broadcast, Cronkite immediately heightened the sense of drama, telling 
viewers: 
Not since the founding of the modern state of Israel … has a leader of Israel met with a 
leader of Egypt. But now, all obstacles appear to have been removed for peace discussions 
in Jerusalem between Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin. It 
happened this way, earlier today, in CBS News interviews with the two leaders.532 
 
In his interview with Sadat, Cronkite got the Egyptian leader to establish the seriousness of his 
intent to travel to Israel and a timeframe for his visit. Sadat initially outlined familiar Arab 
demands, but Cronkite probed for a breakthrough. Asked if he had any preconditions, Sadat said he 
had none.533 
Armed with what appeared to be a scoop in the making, CBS quickly arranged an interview 
with Begin. He then similarly went further publicly than he had before, saying he was prepared to 
issue the invitation to Sadat through the United States. 
Cronkite sensed that the two leaders were on the verge of a breakthrough and pushed until 
he got it. His interviews accomplished what Carter’s foreign-policy team could not: extract public 
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promises from both leaders to move the peace process forward. This was the positive side of open 
negotiations. Although in drawn-out sessions, public statements can create a rhetorical straitjacket 
for leaders who then feel they cannot back away from positions for fear of looking weak, public 
negotiations can have firmer short-term goals. 
According to Cronkite, ‘the important point is that television journalism … speeded up the 
process, brought it into the open, removed a lot of possibly obstructionist middlemen, and made it 
difficult for the principals to renege on their very public agreement.’534 Cronkite demurred on his 
role of diplomatic catalyst. ‘As for Cronkite diplomacy, I’m sure that it initiated nothing the two 
principals were not already prepared to undertake. If I dropped the strategic handkerchief, they 
chose the time and manner of picking it up,’ he wrote.535 
Although Washington had been in touch with both the Egyptians and Israelis privately about 
a possible Sadat trip, the State Department only learned the visit would become a reality after CBS 
called to notify it that it was about to air Cronkite’s scoop.536 ‘We were all sitting in Washington 
playing catch up ball. It took a while for us to accept that the whole ball game had changed,’ 
Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton recalled.537 Still, Washington’s role remained 
significant. For instance, Israel delivered its invitation to Sadat through the U.S. Embassies in Cairo 
and Tel Aviv.538 
To be clear, Cronkite neither bore responsibility for Sadat’s initiative nor Begin’s invitation. 
Egyptian-Israeli contacts had already been initiated. Egyptians and Israelis had both discussed with 
the Americans the possibility of a high-level, bilateral meeting for months.539 However, the 
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significance of ‘Cronkite diplomacy’ for this study is that it underscored the administration’s 
diplomatic weakness. By obtaining on-camera commitments from both sides, Cronkite’s interviews 
likely accelerated Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem.540 It also provoked U.S. critics who felt it showed 
decisiveness that Carter himself lacked. 
Conservative columnist William Safire praised Sadat’s initiative and criticised the Carter 
administration for having ‘fretted and dithered’ rather than facilitated Sadat’s desire to visit Israel. 
It took Walter Cronkite of CBS, placing an electronic hand on the backs of Israel and Egypt, 
to bring them together. … When it comes to accepting the good offices of an inexperienced 
President or an experienced journalist, [Arab leaders are] better off with Cronkite 
diplomacy.541 
 
Liberal columnist Mary McGrory concurred.542 On its editorial page, the conservative Wall Street 
Journal opined, ‘Mr. Sadat’s independent initiative has shown how seriously the Carter 
administration has eroded our reputation in the Mideast …’543 In relegating the United States to the 
sidelines, Sadat’s initiative had thrown its role into question, The New York Times diplomatic 
correspondent wrote in an analysis.544 
Editorial cartoonists also took shots at the White House. For example, a Washington Star 
cartoon portrays Sadat on the telephone with Begin next to him; Carter and Vance loom in the 
background, looking on expectantly. Sadat says into the mouthpiece, ‘Ok, Walter Cronkite … What 
should we do next?’545 
The public aspects of the diplomatic process careened out of the Carter administration’s 
control. The White House did not oppose Sadat’s initiative, but nor did it enthusiastically embrace 
it. The administration fretted that a bilateral peace would be ‘inherently unstable.’546  
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Washington hoped Israel would meet Sadat’s initiative with something in return. A memo 
from Quandt to Brzezinski provides an indication of what the Americans felt would be a 
commensurate gesture for Begin to offer Sadat. The NSC analyst devised a proposed statement that 
Begin could deliver at the end of Sadat’s visit. The Americans felt that ‘Sadat’s reputation would be 
enhanced’ if Begin said publicly that Israel was ‘not afraid of confronting’ the Palestinian issue in 
negotiations and would ‘not inspect the credentials of any Palestinians that come to Geneva.’547 
Carter prodded Begin in a telephone conversation the same day. ‘There is the need for some 
tangible contribution for Sadat to take home. He has run high risks. There should be something 
tangible that he can take as a success,’ Carter said. The prime minister, however, provided little 
detail about what he was prepared to offer.548 
American news people flooded into Israel for Sadat’s visit, constituting one-third of 
international journalists and the largest single national contingent.549 From 9 November, when Sadat 
announced his willingness to visit Israel, to his presence there from 19-21 November, and for a 
considerable period afterward, print and television outlets gave his initiative saturation coverage. 
 Skilfully using his moment in the limelight, Sadat lavished attention on journalists. 
Beginning with his 28-minute flight to Israel, during which he granted interviews to all three 
American network news programmes, the Egyptian president played not just to the Israelis in 
person but through the media to the world beyond. Sadat attempted to present the Arab point of 
view – or, at least, the Egyptian one – to the Western public more forcefully than he believed it had 
been. However, it also isolated him from other Arab leaders, who felt that for the most powerful 
Arab state to negotiate directly with Israel betrayed the Palestinian and pan-Arab causes.550 
 
Sadat in Jerusalem   
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Sadat’s visit centred on his speech to Israel’s Knesset. In his address, he emphasised that 
‘there can be no peace without the Palestinians,’ whose cause was ‘the crux of the entire problem.’ 
Sadat declared his trip was intended to break down the ‘psychological barrier’ that represented ‘70 
percent’ of the problem, but he had no desire to forge a separate peace.551 
Watching from the gallery that day was Siegel, Carter’s Jewish community liaison, who had 
happened to be in the region. Although Brzezinski had asked that Siegel be recalled because Sadat’s 
visit seemed to be at cross purposes to U.S. policy, Carter and Hamilton Jordan allowed him to stay. 
Having a deputy assistant to the president would be a way for the White House to avoid ‘snubbing’ 
the initiative, while ensuring it ‘didn’t look like too much of an endorsement of the process.’552 
U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that Sadat’s speech contained ‘no departures’ from 
known positions, but his ‘boldest statements’ affirmed Arab demands for a Palestinian homeland.553 
Nevertheless, the fact of the Egyptian president standing in front of Israeli lawmakers was 
groundbreaking in itself. 
Begin’s speech in response disappointed the Americans, who felt it did not offer 
concessions commensurate with the risk taken by Sadat. U.S. analysts posited that ‘the immediate 
impact of Begin’s speech may be to dampen expectations that a dramatic breakthrough on the 
negotiating front’ would occur during Sadat’s visit. The premier pointedly did not mention the 
Palestinians.554 
The PLO called Sadat’s speech ‘senseless’ and declared ‘there shall be no peace at the 
expense of the Palestinian people.’555 In a statement to the U.N. General Assembly, the PLO’s 
Farouk Kaddoumi denounced Sadat’s initiative as a betrayal. ‘That visit was accompanied by a 
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wide press campaign orchestrated by the Zionists in order to make it appear as something of great 
importance for peace,’ he claimed.556 
Begin and Sadat’s end-of-visit communiqué stated the two parties’ desire to use bilateral 
contacts to lead to ‘the signing of peace treaties in Geneva with all the neighbouring Arab states’ 
and Israel.557 However, the regional fissures that Sadat’s initiative deepened made it unlikely that an 
Arab consensus could be reached before sitting down with Israel in Geneva. When Iraq, Libya and 
Syria froze ties with Egypt over Sadat’s initiative, the Egyptian president angrily responded by 
breaking off relations entirely. 
 The United States had no direct role in the events unfolding in Israel, but virtually every 
step Sadat took was beamed into American living rooms through remarkable television coverage. 
U.S. networks broadcast nearly 17 hours of live, satellite-dependent reporting and two hours-worth 
of special reports during the roughly 48 hours that Sadat spent in Israel.558 As ABC News 
correspondent Ted Koppel reported, the Begin and Sadat’s ‘television images alone created a new 
diplomatic reality and what was said is of far less importance at the moment than what was seen.’559 
Indeed, in the eyes of many observers, the television cameras played a role that extended 
beyond the reportorial. ‘At times it was hard to decide whether the networks were reporting history 
or shaping it,’ The Washington Post’s ombudsman wrote.560 The media’s insertion into the 
diplomatic process, which began with Cronkite’s scoop, blurred the line between observer and 
participant. ABC News’ diplomatic correspondent Barbara Walters, who flew from Cairo to Tel 
Aviv with Sadat, neatly captures the fluid movement between observer and participant. ‘I felt I was 
part of history. Realize that mine was the first flight from Israel in thirty years to land in Egypt.’561 
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A New York Times analysis labelled Sadat’s ‘mass diplomacy’ an ‘innovation’ that ensured 
‘the American people had become engaged’ in the process.’562 The intense coverage served to focus 
the American public’s attention on the Middle East, highlight the absence of a direct Carter 
administration role in the dramatic events in Israel and helped affect a shift in public attitudes. 
It is impossible to establish a causal relationship between the media coverage and public 
opinion, but some correlative observations can be inferred. The images of Sadat and the glowing 
words the U.S. press had for the Egyptian leader put a new face for Americans on the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. One columnist wrote that Sadat had transformed Americans’ perceptions of Arabs and their 
cause: ‘Unlike the set pieces to which we have become accustomed – the oil-rich sheik, the terrorist, 
the undulating crowd – Sadat was neither alarming nor strange. He was politically plausible and 
humanly familiar.’563 
Indeed, Asi argues that Sadat’s trip served as a ‘pivot point’ for American coverage of the 
Middle East; it helped usher in a new era of news treatment of Egypt, Israel and the PLO. Asi’s 
analysis finds that American television news’ pro-Israel coverage decreased significantly during the 
1970s, while coverage of the Arab side of the conflict became less negative.564 
American opinion overwhelmingly supported Sadat. Caddell, Carter’s pollster, found that 80 
percent of U.S. respondents believed Sadat’s visit to Israel was good for peace. The drama of Sadat 
in Israel, played out on television screens and splashed across front pages, constituted visible 
evidence of progress on the seemingly intractable dispute. Nearly as many people (26 percent to 29 
percent) felt the Arabs had matched Israel’s willingness to make concessions.565 
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The American Jewish community showed even stronger support for Sadat’s initiative than 
the general population.566 Additionally, publications such as Commentary Magazine, published by 
the American Jewish Congress, extolled the virtues of bilateral negotiations.567 AIPAC was 
cautiously optimistic, but chided the administration that it ‘must not remain doctrinaire in its 
insistence on a comprehensive settlement at Geneva. … Washington should keep all options 
open.’568 
American public opinion toward Israel remained positive, but throughout the 1970s it 
became increasingly nuanced and receptive to Egypt, the Arabs and the Palestinians.569 For 
example, a Gallup survey in June 1976 found 46 percent of Americans were favourable toward 
Egypt, with 39 percent unfavourable. By January 1980, however, 71 percent of Americans polled 
said they had a favourable view of Egypt, with 23 percent reporting a negative view. In addition, 
Gallup polls showed that the number of Americans who held a ‘highly favourable’ view toward 
Egypt had more than doubled between 1976 and 1980, from 14 percent to 34 percent.570 Moreover, 
a 9 February 1978 Gallup poll found that 32 percent of respondents believed Egypt was doing all ‘it 
should to bring about peace in the Middle East.’ By comparison, only 25 percent felt Israel was 
doing all it could.571 
The year 1977 appears crucial in this evolution. For example, Gallup in 1977 began polling 
on whether Americans supported the establishment of a Palestinian ‘nation.’ Less than a week 
before Sadat touched down in Israel, Gallup found that 47 percent of American respondents 
favoured the establishment of a Palestinian ‘nation,’ with only 29 percent believing they should 
continue living as they were at the time, scattered among Arab states and Israel.572 Sadat was also a 
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popular figure with Americans. A 1 January 1978, poll found that Americans listed Sadat as the 
second-most admired man alive. Only Carter notched a higher ranking.573 
Caddell’s poll concluded that Carter’s improved rating on the Middle East was one of the 
survey’s ‘few bright spots.’ However, in his analysis Caddell argued ‘events have to be shaped in 
such a way that the American people come to feel secure in the idea that Jimmy Carter can do the 
job as President.’ Overall, the percentage of people who judged Carter’s job performance as 
‘excellent’ or ‘good’ had slid from a high of 69 percent (and 84 percent of Democrats) in the 
honeymoon period of February 1977 to 50 percent (and 62 percent of Democrats) in December 
1977.574 In this context, the prospect of Carter backing away from his primary foreign-policy 
initiative unsettled his advisors. 
 
U.S. recalibrates 
The opening of the bilateral Egypt-Israel channel forced Washington to contend with a 
shifting diplomatic landscape. Although Jordan and Saudi Arabia eventually offered tepid support 
for Sadat’s initiative, the other Arab actors as well as Moscow remained implacably opposed. For 
leaders such as Syria’s Hafiz al-Assad and the PLO’s Yasser Arafat, Sadat’s decision to deal 
directly with the Israelis betrayed the Arab cause and, they feared, dealt a blow to Palestinian 
aspirations.575 
Following Sadat’s trip, Washington began to recalibrate its strategy. The next steps, 
however, were less than clear. ‘There’s general confusion in the Middle East about specifically 
what we should do next; the same confusion exists in the White House,’ Carter confided to his 
diary.576 
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Initially, that meant acknowledging a shift in the U.S. role to that of supporting actor. In a 
telephone conversation, Begin gave Carter credit for facilitating Sadat’s visit. ‘I want to thank you 
for all that you have done. This is your achievement,’ Begin flattered the president. Begin told 
Carter that he and Sadat ‘agreed to negotiate and we want to go to Geneva. Sadat was not interested 
in such matters as a unified delegation or any other procedural questions.’ Carter praised the 
leaders’ ‘courage and sensitivity.’ He added: ‘We are very interested in helping in whatever way we 
can.’577 Meanwhile, Sadat told U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts that he felt his initiative 
helped create a new dynamic, one that would ‘not require the type of US “pressure process” that he 
had once thought necessary. US pressure on Israel no longer requires a US-Israeli confrontation.’578 
Carter opened his 30 November press conference with a statement intended to assuage 
critics who felt he had been lukewarm toward Sadat’s initiative. 
 
The road toward peace has already led through Jerusalem, will now go to Cairo and 
ultimately, we believe, to a comprehensive consultation at Geneva. … When there has been 
no progress being made, the United States has taken the initiative. Now that progress is 
being made, a proper role for the United States is to support that progress …579 
 
The White House still favoured a multilateral deal negotiated through Geneva, but signs suggested 
that a bilateral agreement might be a precursor to any broader peace. After meeting with Begin, 
U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis commented: ‘… [I]t looks as though our Geneva scenario 
has been considerably modified and the new track has, obviously, a heady odor of Israeli-Egyptian 
bilaterals.’580 
Sadat’s initiative led to a change in American tactics, but not (initially) in goals. Washington 
continued to work toward a comprehensive settlement, but now it would use Egypt to anchor the 
negotiations and provide the basis for developing a common Arab front, regardless of objections 
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from Syria, the PLO and others.581 Progress toward an Egypt-Israel deal would come on a parallel 
track as movement on the status of the Palestinians.582 Carter poured increasing effort into working 
with Sadat rather than trying to achieve agreement with other Arabs. 
In late November, Brzezinski urged Carter to retake the initiative.583 Meanwhile, Cyrus 
Vance sent a memo to Carter in which he acknowledged that the U.S. role as mediator had become 
less central, a Geneva conference was unlikely to be convened soon and continued Egyptian-Israeli 
bilateral contacts should be encouraged.  
I believe strongly that it would be wrong at this particular moment to try any high-level 
shuttle in the Middle East. There is no way in which that could serve either our basic 
interests, influence the situation constructively, or bring the negotiation track under our 
control. It would look as if we were trying too hard to control a situation which has 
developed a momentum of its own without any necessity to do so or any assurance of 
succeeding. Such a political involvement without useful results would not reflect well on the 
Administration.584 
 
Still, in the margins Carter suggested sending a U.S. envoy to the region ‘to keep together what 
seems to be coming apart.’585 
The State Department was also wary of the impact of Sadat’s trip. ‘By seizing the initiative 
in the peace process, Sadat has created very serious problems for all of the states involved,’ officials 
argued. They worried Egypt would be isolated in the region, the ‘moderate’ Arabs such as Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and moderate Palestinians would be unable or unwilling to join the broader peace 
effort, and Moscow would use the divisions to tighten its links with Iraq, Syria and the PLO.586 
In a December trip, Vance met with leaders in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia, but little was said that altered the American line.587 First, the United States would try 
to play a constructive role in forging an Egyptian-Israeli agreement on bilateral issues. Second, 
Washington would attempt to help devise an interim solution dealing with a Palestinian homeland 
in the West Bank and Gaza. Achieving success on these two paths was an ‘indispensable 
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precondition,’ Vance believed, to attain U.S. goals.588 ‘Our objective remains a comprehensive 
settlement. … The Geneva meetings will be the ultimate meeting at which that could be arrived …’ 
he said.589 
A slight ambivalence in aims thus influenced U.S. policy over the succeeding few months. 
On the diplomatic side stood the pragmatic processes pursued by Vance, who sought to adjust to the 
new dynamic forged by Sadat’s trip. However, on the strategic side, the White House felt a need to 
re-establish American primacy to a peace process to which it now seemed peripheral. For 
Brzezinski, this meant Carter needed to reassert American power and, not incidentally, for the 
president to demonstrate strong leadership. Still, what began to emerge was that although limited 
progress could be made in bilateral talks, any breakthrough would need U.S. involvement. 
The only parties to accept Sadat’s invitation to attend a December conference in Cairo were 
Israel and the United States, along with a U.N. representative. The White House delayed 72 hours to 
respond to Sadat’s proposal.590 The conference achieved little, however, with Israel failing to set 
forth any proposals that the Americans believed commensurate with Sadat’s initiative. Although the 
conference enabled Egyptian and Israeli officials to get to know each other better, it was ‘more of a 
PR event,’ recalled Atherton, the U.S. delegate to the parley. 
The opening of the conference was one of the most spectacular photo opportunities I have 
ever witnessed. There were so many photographers that they couldn’t all get in the great big 
plenary room at one time. The photo opportunity went on for more than an hour, because 
they brought in one group and took them out, then brought in another group.591 
 
At the time of the conference, Begin abruptly travelled to Washington to present his ideas to 
Carter. The Israeli premier outlined his vision for a phased Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and 
limited autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.592 
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Begin’s vision of autonomy applied to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, but not 
the territories themselves. ‘The proposal deals with human beings,’ he told Carter. Israel would 
retain control of security issues in case the PLO ‘tries to take over,’ he said, but the local inhabitants 
would be in charge of their daily life through administrative councils, which would offer a sort of 
cultural autonomy. Because of competing claims of sovereignty, that question would be left 
unaddressed for the moment. ‘If we say that we demand sovereignty over the land, the Arabs will 
not agree. And we don’t agree if they claim sovereignty. … We will leave the question of 
sovereignty open, undecided,’ he said. In his presentation to the White House, Begin insisted that 
his proposals offered ‘a humane solution’ for the Palestinians.593 
Nevertheless, Vance believed Begin’s plan was ‘far short’ of what he envisioned.594 
Brzezinski was less critical, although he feared it would create a Palestinian ‘Basutoland’ that had 
little power and authority. Advocating a robust carrot-and-stick approach toward Begin, Brzezinski 
told Carter that he sensed a ‘real opportunity’ that should be ‘exploited with as much personal force 
and drama as possible.’ Presidential-level involvement in the negotiations remained imperative, he 
believed. ‘… [M]ovement is more likely as long as the grand decisions are made by people like 
yourself, Sadat, and Begin – individuals more likely to be interested in the big picture than in 
nitpicking details,’ Brzezinski advised. ‘Once negotiations are handed over to negotiators, progress 
will be tortured and slow.’595 However, Brzezinski’s advice failed to anticipate the political drag 
and domestic controversy caused by Carter’s involvement. 
Sadat also sought to bring Carter more intensively into the negotiations. During his February 
visit to the United States, the Egyptian leader said for the first time that the United States was ‘a full 
partner in the establishment of peace.’596 By September’s Camp David Summit, Carter had also 
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begun using the phrase ‘full partner,’ although Israel pointedly never used that formulation. 
However, such a phrase again demonstrated the nebulousness of Carter’s role in the negotiations as 
both mediator and participant. 
Meanwhile, a Begin-Sadat meeting in Ismailia, Egypt, on Christmas Day, achieved little. No 
American representative attended. Still, the two sides agreed to continue talking, with bilateral 
committees to discuss military and political issues. Expectations began to dampen. Carter expressed 
frustration over Arab opposition to Sadat. In the margin of a memo from Vance, he wrote, ‘It’s time 
for (Jordan’s King) Hussein to get off his a--.’597 
By this time, the negotiations had dominated news coverage for months. Columnist James 
Reston suggested that the world was ‘now seeing a strange kind of airport and television diplomacy 
in which personalities dominate policies and compete with one another for the attention of the 
President of the United States.’598 Conservative commentators Evans and Novak lamented how 
Carter’s style had impacted Arab-Israeli peacemaking. ‘Even if “spontaneity” and the drive to be 
different from Nixon – not sheer clumsiness – truly explain the President’s verbal pratfalls, that 
does not mitigate the consternation his repeated mistakes have caused in Mideast capitals,’ they 
opined.599 A Wall Street Journal columnist similarly criticised Carter’s approach, writing, ‘… 
[T]here are times when open covenants are best secretly arrived at.’600 If Sadat seemed to be 
scoffing at the traditional channels of negotiation, Carter’s style alone aroused criticism from the 
American elite who felt he disregarded diplomatic protocol. 
 The day before departing on a seven-country trip in late December, the president 
acknowledged that the U.S. position had changed. ‘We are now in a role of supporter. We 
encourage them to continue with their fruitful negotiations,’ he said. ‘This is a better role for us.’ 
Additionally, despite his initial tepid response to Begin’s self-rule plan, Carter called the proposals 
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‘a long step forward.’601 Still, subsequent events indicated that Carter’s views were more in line 
with Sadat’s than Begin’s. 
 Carter met with Sadat in Aswan, Egypt, in January.602 Carter publicly reiterated his views: a 
‘true peace’ based on ‘normal relations’; withdrawal of Israel to ‘secure and recognized borders’ 
based on 242 and 338; and, finally, a resolution of the ‘Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The 
solution must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to 
participate in the determination of their own future.’603 
This statement showed the closeness of Carter and Sadat’s positions. Moreover, by 
including the phrase ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians, Carter’s Aswan declaration used 
language that only months before, in the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué, had caused controversy. 
In the new context provided by Sadat’s initiative, however, this formulation had become less 
objectionable to Israel. 
 
Year-end reviews 
Meanwhile, in an end-of-year summary, Stuart Eizenstat again demonstrated an 
overestimation of the administration’s power to rally public support for its policies through talking 
at, rather than consulting with, it. Invoking Theodore Roosevelt’s description of the presidency as a 
‘bully pulpit,’ Eizenstat wrote: ‘The President should tell the public what it must know and 
condition it to accept the views that the President is putting forward.’ Eizenstat advocated a robust 
strategy of ‘public education’ whereby the president would deliver at least one speech per month on 
a major topic.604 However, this approach ensured the influence flowed only one way. Eizenstat did 
not address modes of persuasion or how to capitalise on existing opinion. As was often the case, 
                                                
601 ‘Conversation With the President,’ 28 December 1977, PPP: Carter, 1977, II, 2187-2202. 
602 For a U.S. summary of these talks, see Document 185, Telegram from Vance to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, ‘President 
Carter’s Meeting With President Sadat,’ 5 January 1978, FRUS, 1977-1980, VIII, 916-18. 
603 ‘Remarks of the President and President Anwar el-Sadat Following Their Meeting,’ 4 January 1978, PPP: Carter, 
1978, I, 19-20. 
604 Carter wrote ‘excellent’ on the memo and ordered it distributed to Jordan, Mondale and Powell. Memo from 
Eizenstat to Carter, ‘Year-End Summary,’ 27 December 1977, Folder 28, Box 4, SEP. 
                 
142 
Carter did not strike the balance of listening to the public while also trying to lead it in his preferred 
direction. 
In early 1978, the NSC sent Carter a review of the administration’s first year performance. 
In summarising its accomplishments, the report, written predominantly by Brzezinski aide David 
Aaron, included ‘generation of genuine momentum for comprehensive peace in the Middle East,’ 
and among its shortcomings listed ‘underestimation of domestic reaction to some aspects of our 
Middle Eastern policy.’ It noted that the idea of a Palestinian homeland proved to be the most 
controversial point in Carter’s approach. Indeed, Aaron acknowledged the ‘very intense domestic 
reaction’ provoked by Carter’s stance toward the Palestinians. ‘Part of the fault was of our own 
making, and part of the media and the American Jewish community. Nonetheless, it seems fair to 
conclude that the Palestinian issue was introduced too early and without adequate care to keep it in 
perspective,’ the report noted.605 
 Moreover, the report argued, the Joint Communiqué served as the administration’s second 
major difficulty. The statement ‘compounded our problems on the domestic front’ by ‘bringing 
together traditional anti-Soviet forces and supporters of Israel.’ Developments at the end of 1977 
were more encouraging, though. Sadat’s Jerusalem trip brought the negotiations ‘into a new phase,’ 
Aaron noted, and allowed all parties to embark on a course that ‘enjoyed much wider support 
among the American public and which seemed once again to hold good promise of moving the 
parties toward a peace settlement.’ Among the priorities for 1978, Aaron listed ‘progress in Middle 
East negotiations’ as one of three ‘must win issues.’606 
 
Toward a “secret strategy” 
 Frustrated by the lack of progress in bilateral talks in early 1978, Carter contemplated 
inviting Begin and Sadat for a joint meeting.607 The Americans recognised that for any deals to be 
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made, they would likely have to come at the highest levels. Yet the dynamic between Begin and 
Sadat had become unworkable. Washington needed to assert a forceful role in the peace process. 
Although Carter and Brzezinski initially liked the idea of a tripartite summit, Vance opposed 
it. Its most vocal advocate was Hamilton Jordan. ‘I don’t think anyone made a very convincing 
argument against the joint summit,’ Jordan wrote. ‘By just having Sadat over, you help him. But 
Sadat is not the problem. Begin is the problem, and a frank talk with him before the crunch is also 
needed.’608 However, Carter decided against the three-country summit and instead only invited 
Sadat to Camp David in February 1978. 
 The White House began to formulate a ‘secret strategy’ by which Carter and Sadat would 
coordinate policy moves in order to pressure Begin for concessions.609 The goodwill in the West 
generated by Sadat’s Jerusalem trip helped make this strategy possible. At the NSC, Brzezinski and 
Quandt were its most forceful proponents. Although stopping short of a full confrontation with the 
Begin government, Washington would take a tougher line toward perceived Israeli intransigence. 
The plan was later shelved, but the thinking had an important impact on American policy. 
The evolving strategy neutralised two political irritants for Carter. As the emphasis shifted 
to Egyptian-Israeli bilateral contacts, the need to reach an accommodation with the PLO 
diminished.610 Similarly, with neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis desirous of a Soviet role in the 
peace process, Washington had little reason to coordinate policy with Moscow. 
In place of these irritants, the administration focused on two issues it believed would 
encounter less domestic opposition: the Begin government’s support for Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank, Gaza and Sinai, and its interpretation of territorial withdrawal in 242.611 Begin’s 
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settlements policy was unpopular among American supporters of Israel, as was the prime minister’s 
belief that 242 did not require Israel to withdraw from the West Bank.612 
As part of this effort, Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) sent, with Carter’s 
encouragement, a letter to Begin urging him to alter policy on those issues.613 Later in the month, 
Carter pushed a plan to send prominent Jewish Americans to Israel to help persuade the government 
to moderate its stance. ‘We must act on the Israeli settlements,’ Vance advised Carter. ‘My 
suggestion is that – at the highest level – we get a group of American Jews to help us … to the point 
of sending them to Israel as emissaries.” In the margins, Carter wrote, ‘Let’s plan a strategy.’614 
 Ahead of Sadat’s February visit, an NSC-State working group wanted Carter to tell the 
Egyptian leader that he was working under tight political constraints and needed help pressuring 
Begin. The NSC wanted Sadat to put forward a proposal that would address issues of transition for 
the West Bank and Gaza, but which would also contain elements that were considered unacceptable 
to both Israel and the United States. By doing so, Sadat would enable the United States to confront 
both Egypt and Israel publicly over their competing proposals without appearing too one-sided 
against Israel. However, as part of the collusion, Washington would at some point make its own 
suggestions, which Sadat would accept. At this point, Carter would turn ‘the full burden of 
American influence’ on Begin to extract a compromise.615 ‘Brzezinski liked the idea; Vance was 
embarrassed by it … Carter didn’t like it,’ according to Quandt.616 Whatever the reservations, they 
proceeded with the plan.617 
 Carter and Sadat took steps in February to devise a way to pressure Begin on settlements 
and the West Bank. Although it was questionable how clearly either Egypt or the United States 
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understood the agreements that were made, it led to a period of increased pressure on Israel. The 
intention was to ‘hammer away at the Israelis and put them in a corner on things that we thought 
were important,’ Quandt said.618 
In February, the State Department released to the media a chronology of recent American 
objections to Israeli settlement activity, including three direct messages from the president to Begin 
that January.619 Closely mirroring these points, a Washington Post editorial commented: ‘A policy 
of sneaking new settlements in between the lines of assurances to the United States is offensive to 
the United States, and to Jimmy Carter personally.’620 
By late 1977, Carter’s relationship with the American Jewish community was parlous.621 
The open disagreements with Begin on the contours of an agreement and about Jewish settlements 
had frayed relations between the White House and American Jewry. The Carter administration was 
thus forced to expend time and energy alternately wooing and confronting Israel’s supporters. 
In an effort to avoid the kind of political fallout that followed the Joint Communiqué, the 
White House by early 1978 had taken a proactive approach toward cultivating support for its 
Middle East policies among the American Jewish community. Domestic and foreign policy staff 
held consultations with Jewish groups and other pro-Israel constituencies that had ‘at times become 
heated’ to explain policy.622 
Eager to head off potential problems, in January the administration’s Jewish community 
liaison, Mark Siegel, proposed bringing a group of Jewish leaders to the White House to meet with 
members of the NSC and the administration’s political staff. Siegel endorsed an ‘offensive in the 
Jewish community to give the President his proper credit for the positive developments’ in the 
Middle East. A White House meeting ‘would be a logical kick-off for this kind of endeavor, and 
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might also serve to [defuse] negative comments based on ignorance of the current situation,’ Siegel 
suggested.623 
 The subsequent ‘offensive’ had mixed success. On 8 February, Carter dined with nine 
Jewish leaders, for whom he ‘spelled out the relative flexibility of Sadat’s position and the 
intransigence of Israel.’ He focused on Israel’s settlements, the urgency of negotiations and ‘the 
need for Israel to recognize that UN 242 applied to the West Bank/Gaza Strip.’ The president said 
his guests were ‘constructive,’ with the exception of Alexander Schindler, ‘who always acts like an 
ass.’624 
  Vance angered Israel on 10 February by saying that the Sinai settlements were ‘contrary to 
international law and … therefore, they should not exist.’625 He also told reporters that briefings had 
been held so that members of Congress and American Jewish leaders ‘can understand the actual 
condition of the negotiations at this point and the obstacles and problems that remain, in order to 
make continuing progress in the talks.’626 A meeting later that month between White House 
officials and the Presidents’ Conference broke down in acrimony, according to Siegel.627 
 Sadat also believed in the importance of winning the support of the American Jewish 
community. Shortly before his February trip, Sadat wrote an ‘open letter to American Jews’ at the 
invitation of the Miami Herald. ‘We need your understanding,’ he wrote. Many Jewish leaders, 
however, felt Sadat’s efforts at currying their favour were misguided and that he should direct his 
energies toward negotiating with Israel.628 
After meeting with Carter at Camp David, Sadat met with prominent Jewish Americans at 
Blair House. However, the Presidents’ Conference spurned Sadat’s invitation, insisting it did not 
want to interfere with the negotiations.629 Vance informed Carter that the meeting seemed to have 
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gone ‘well,’ that Sadat had ‘downplayed the Palestinian problem’ and the Egyptian president urged 
the Jewish leaders to transmit their impressions of his sincere desire for peace to Begin.630 
About his trip to Jerusalem, Sadat told Carter he had done so to surprise Israel by acceding 
to its demands and also because he recognised ‘that there are strong lobby groups in the United 
States and that this makes it difficult for an American President to act. He thought he might be able 
to build strong support among Americans for the Arab position in favor of peace.’ In their meetings, 
Carter also spoke plainly of his view that American public opinion would be important to any 
progress. ‘I won’t mislead you, but without you and your support in American public opinion, I 
can’t force Israel to change. With your support, I can put pressure on Israel to change. This is a new 
thing,’ he told Sadat. ‘My hope has been that some key Congressional leaders and American Jewish 
leaders could join me to press Begin on a settlement.’631 
Regardless, Carter’s 7 February diary entry suggests he was satisfied with Sadat’s public 
relations offensive in the United States after the decision to pursue a joint strategy.632 That 
sentiment was not universally shared. ‘The news from the United States of Sadat’s success in his 
public appearances, followed by official statements of Carter and Vance, and, in particular, reports 
of Carter’s meeting with the Jewish leaders, provoked widespread anger in Israel,’ Moshe Dayan 
later wrote.633 
Israel also recognised the importance of winning the support of American constituencies. On 
8 February, the day of Sadat’s departure from the United States, Dayan arrived for a nationwide 
speaking tour. In an analysis, The Washington Post’s diplomatic correspondent described Dayan’s 
visit as part of a ‘battle for American public opinion.’ The effort was necessary because as a result 
of Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem, ‘an Arab competitor for the first time is seriously challenging Israel for 
the favor and support of the U.S. public.’634  
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Yet when Dayan arrived, he ‘was immediately made to feel the cold wind in the wake of the 
“Sadat festival.” The Israeli Government had been placed in the dock both by the American press 
and by some of the Jewish leaders.’ Despite his best efforts, Dayan felt he ‘made no converts’635 
The New York Times wrote that ‘Egypt and Israel are … asking the American people and 
Government to throw the weight of their opinion against the terms of one side or the other.’636 
Carter was not immune to pressures from Arab-American groups. ‘I met with the Arab 
American leaders, who have given all my advisors a hard time. … I was fair and staunch with them, 
gave the same responses as to the Middle East heads of state,’ Carter confided to his diary in 
December.637 Arab-Americans were mostly sceptical of the abandonment of the multilateral track in 
favour of an Egypt-Israel negotiating channel.638 
 
Conclusion 
The U.S. media’s role in facilitating the peace process during and after Sadat’s Jerusalem 
initiative served to highlight the Carter administration’s shortcomings. Open diplomacy, much 
heralded and practiced by Carter, came to characterise the entire peace process, not solely the 
American side. Yet the American media opinion’s disdain for Carter’s methods of open diplomacy 
ran counter to its appreciation of Sadat’s initiative. These factors combined to paint a picture of an 
amateurish president who did more harm than good to the peace process – and American prestige. 
The administration for too long held out hope that ultimately it would be in a position to 
reinsert itself into the peace process to steer negotiation back toward a comprehensive settlement. 
By the time the White House crept toward a ‘secret strategy’ with Egypt, it had become bogged 
down in other sensitive foreign-policy issues such as fighter-jet sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia and 
the Panama Canal treaties. 
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The aftermath of Sadat’s trip represented the opening of a narrow window in which the 
Carter administration had political leverage to pressure Israel. Yet Carter’s preoccupation with 
convening Geneva prevented him from recognising that such a moment had arrived. Begin and 
Sadat continued to pay lip service to Geneva, but Carter, as the power broker, should have realised 
sooner that procedural obstacles were prohibitive. 
American public opinion had grown more sympathetic to the Arab cause, but the White 
House failed in its attempt to use this advantage to pressure Israel. The administration still felt the 
effects of the fallout from the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué. Thus, it was wary of alienating 
further parts of Carter’s domestic base. In the end, that wariness curtailed what was achievable in 
American policy. 
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Chapter Five: Jimmy and the Jets – Capitol Hill Fight Over 
Carter’s Airplane Sales to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia 
 
Introduction 
For Israel and its American supporters, 14 February 1978, proved to be a bitter Valentine’s 
Day. It was then that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced the administration’s intention to 
sell 200 advanced warplanes to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia in a ‘package,’ whereby 
congressional rejection of sales to any country meant a veto of the entire deal. ‘Any new aircraft 
sales to this region must be seen in the context of both the negotiating process and our objective of a 
peace settlement,’ he said.639 
The sales to Egypt and Israel were relatively uncontroversial, but the decision to sell F-15s 
to Saudi Arabia aroused intense opposition from Israel and its friends in the United States. ‘This 
was to be the first occasion in my administration when members of both the House and Senate had 
to withstand [AIPAC’s] political pressure, and I was determined not to lose,’ President Carter 
recalled.640 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said the ‘package’ was ‘designed to 
paralyze the powerful Israel lobby on the Hill.’641 Carter shepherded it to approval, relying on 
Republican support to defeat an effort to quash the sales, but at significant political cost to his 
vision for a peace settlement. 
This chapter argues that Carter was so eager to demonstrate he had the strength to overcome 
domestic opposition to pursue his international agenda that the means used to gain support for the 
package virtually eclipsed the end itself. The White House based its decision to pursue the sales on 
strategic imperatives. However, the tactics employed to push the package through Congress 
stemmed as much from Carter’s domestic political imperatives as from the need to meet the Saudis’ 
request. 
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The fight was undertaken for diplomatic purposes: to show Israel, in particular, that Carter 
could withstand domestic pressure to pursue his international goals. ‘Had we lost this vote, my 
ability to make progress in Mideast peace would have been almost terminated because it would 
have proven that Begin’s intransigence was what the Senate preferred, and moderate Arabs 
rebuffed,’ Carter believed.642 It was also done for domestic political purposes: it partly stemmed 
from the administration’s preoccupation with answering critics who charged it was insufficiently 
‘tough.’643 
After the sales were announced, Brzezinski invoked Machiavelli when he advised Carter to 
demonstrate toughness to foreign leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin: 
A President must not only be loved and respected; he must also be feared. … I think the 
time may be right for you to pick some controversial subject on which you will deliberately 
choose to act with a degree of anger and even roughness. … The central point is to 
demonstrate clearly that … obstructing the United States means picking a fight … in which 
the President is prepared … to hit the opponent squarely on the head and to knock him down 
decisively.644 
 
This pugilistic spirit pervaded Carter’s approach to generating support for sales. When, the 
following day, Vance informed Carter of congressional opposition, the president counselled 
fortitude: ‘Good – Stick with it – We’ll fight it out.’645 
On the surface, the debate centred on how the sales would affect regional security, but its 
essence was how they reflected U.S. interests in the post-oil embargo Middle East.646 The episode 
underscored the domestic repercussions of the reorientation of American strategic interests in the 
Middle East away from the Arab-Israeli dispute and toward the Persian Gulf.647 
The involvement of lobbyists and congressional hearings ensured the debate generated 
maximum media visibility. The lobbying worked on three levels: administration members urged 
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lawmakers to back the sales, members of pro-Israel factions sought to defeat the Saudi portion of 
the package, and pro-Arab forces worked to clear the way for sales to Riyadh. Lobbying was fierce: 
Senators cumulatively received around 40,000 letters and telegrams both in favour of and against 
the sale.648 ‘There were literally days when you could not walk in the halls (of Congress) because of 
people and groups clamoring for one side or the other on the F-15 thing,’ a congressional aide 
recalled.649 
The debate garnered significant attention at the time, but subsequent studies of Carter’s 
foreign policy have largely ignored it. Most accounts of this affair have focused on congressional 
relations and lobbying.650 The most detailed analysis of the episode, written without access to 
archives, argues that Washington pursued the F-15 sales to cement its new ‘special relationship’ 
with Saudi Arabia at the expense of its relationship with Israel.651 However, these studies have 
failed to contextualise the debate within Carter’s foreign policy and the trajectory of his personal 
involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy.652 The present account is unique in using archival sources 
from Carter’s domestic and foreign policy staffs, congressional materials, and media and public 
opinion reports.  
The omission of this episode from the literature on the peace process has implications for 
the understanding of American policy. The bitterness engendered by the F-15 debate neither 
determined the outcome of the Camp David peace process, nor explains the subsequent strains 
between Carter and Begin. Yet further exploration of the resultant dynamic lends nuanced 
understanding to the state of Carter’s political capital at home and how it narrowed his political 
options on a range of issues, including pressuring Israel on settlements. The reasons for the package 
                                                
648 David Ottaway, The King’s Messenger  (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), 36. 
649 Hoag Levins, Arab Reach: The Secret War Against Israel  (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1983), 
12-13. 
650 Bard, Arab Lobby, 108-36; Ghassan Bishara, 'The Middle East Arms Package: A Survey of the Congressional 
Debates,' Journal of Palestine Studies 7, no. 4 (1978): 126-28; Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy 
By Congress  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 106-11 and 84-85; David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy 
and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian Jews Lobby for Israel  (London: Greenwood Press, 1990), 64-70; 
Daniel Price, 'Presidential Power as a Domestic Constraint on Foreign Policy: Case Studies Examining Arms Sales to 
Saudi Arabia,' Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1996); Tivnan, The Lobby, 98-134. 
651 Rehavia Uami Yakovee, 'Arms for Oil -- Oil for Arms: An Analysis of President Carter's 1978 Planes 'Package Deal' 
Sale to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia' (PhD dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 1983). 
652 An exception is Tillman, United States and the Middle East, 98-106. He did not, however, have access to archives 
and therefore was unable to link Carter’s domestic and foreign policy advice. 
                 
153 
– and the tactics pursued to get it through Congress – cannot be separated from the domestic 
context. 
 
Confidence boosted 
The debate overlapped with the bruising ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. That 
episode provided the first opportunity for the administration to put into practice Hamilton Jordan’s 
strategy for cultivating domestic support – based largely on face-to-face contact with lawmakers 
and opinion leaders – for foreign policy initiatives.653 The victory left Brzezinski bristling with 
confidence. Success on the treaties ‘shows [Carter] takes on the hard issues, sticks to it, and 
prevails. … Others should take note – we’re going to deal with other issues the same way,’ he 
said.654 The White House applied lessons learned on Panama to push the airplane sales through 
Congress.655 
The sales to Saudi Arabia, promised by Ford and reaffirmed by Carter,656 had been 
continually pressed on visiting U.S. delegations of lawmakers.657 The airplanes for Egypt and Israel 
were tied to the negotiations. Washington wanted to reward Sadat for the risks he had taken, and to 
buttress him against regional isolation. Israel had a longstanding request for airplanes, which 
Washington wanted to satisfy without widening its regional military superiority to such an extent as 
to anger Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
The administration proposed to sell Israel 15 F-15s, in addition to 25 previously sold, and 75 
F-16s, totalling around $1.98 billion; to Egypt, 50 F-5Es, amounting to $400 million; and to Saudi 
Arabia, 60 F-15s, which together carried a $2.5 billion price tag. The F-15s, capable of flying up to 
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2,000 mph in combat, were considered the world’s most advanced long-range fighter aircraft.658 
The F-16s lacked the same radar technology as the F-15s, and thus were slightly less sophisticated. 
The United States developed the F-5E short-range fighter-bombers for export to allies.659 
The arms package came at a time when members of Congress perceived the administration 
to be ‘uninspiring, indecisive, disorganized, and undisciplined.’660 Carter sent the sale to lawmakers 
in April. Congress then had 30 days to reject the $4.8 billion package by passing a resolution of 
disapproval.661 The ‘package’ tactic meant that Israel’s supporters could not approve the sales 
without simultaneously making the less popular decision of arming Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
Those who favoured the sales stressed three themes.662 First, Saudi Arabia needed the 
airplanes to protect its oil fields against attack from surrounding Soviet-linked ‘radical’ states. 
Second, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged for their ‘moderation’ on the Arab-
Israeli dispute. Finally, Riyadh deserved a reward for its role in maintaining stable oil prices. 
Opponents similarly emphasised three issues.663 First, the sales would hinder peace talks by 
boosting the Arab side’s confidence that it could resort to force if talks failed or increasing Israel’s 
insecurity to the extent that it would become less willing to compromise in negotiations. Second, 
the package approach infringed on Congress’ right to review arms deals and could set a precedent 
whereby future transfers to Israel were tied to sales to Arab states. Third, the balance of airplanes 
favoured the Arab states collectively, potentially endangering Israel. 
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The administration responded to the first point by insisting that the goal of the deal was to 
grant the ‘security and confidence’ necessary to make concessions in peace talks.664 Next, the White 
House maintained that the sales were packaged together with an eye toward regional balance: they 
would help modernise the Egyptian and Saudi fleets while simultaneously allow Israel to retain its 
military superiority.665 Finally, the administration distributed to Congress a paper reflecting the 
intelligence community’s assessment that the proposed deliveries would ‘not reduce Israel’s 
military superiority over its Arab adversaries,’ but rather that ‘Israel’s air superiority may even be 
enhanced.’666 This conclusion stemmed from the timing of the deliveries, how the new warplanes fit 
into existing arsenals and U.S. restrictions on the aircrafts’ use.667 
Unlike with the Panama Canal Treaties, the administration did not engage in a public 
education campaign. Nor did it make the direct appeals to the public characteristic of Carter’s first 
year. Instead, the White House espoused a disciplined, unified message to woo Congress and 
opinion leaders. Between December 1977 and May 1978, the administration deployed Cabinet 
officials to meet with members of Congress, invited lawmakers to the Oval Office for consultations, 
and the president sent letters or telephoned every senator to explain the White House’s position. 
Vance took the lead in rallying members of Congress. In consultations with small groups of 
congressmen, he outlined the administration’s case: the Saudis had ‘carried the day’ on containing 
oil prices, Saudi support for Sadat’s regime was critical for peacemaking and Riyadh was ‘getting 
very impatient’ about the F-15s.668 The administration also called in big names to support it 
publicly, including: Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger, Ronald Reagan, former New York Governor 
Averell Harriman, President of DuPont Irving Shapiro and President of Chase Manhattan Bank 
David Rockefeller.669 
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 Despite those efforts, however, House lawmakers caustically criticised the sales. In March, 
Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) gained majority support of the HIRC for a letter of 
disapproval of the sales.670 The opposition encountered in the House convinced the administration 
thenceforth to focus on the Senate. 
There, too, the White House met resistance. Senator Frank Church (D-Id.) sent the 
administration a strident letter signed by seven members of the SFRC opposing the sales even prior 
to their announcement.671 In April, a letter from three other senators urged Carter to delay the 
proposal until mediating an Egypt-Israel treaty.672 
 
AIPAC leads opposition 
AIPAC led the opposition to the sales on Capitol Hill, but it also mobilised the grass-roots 
American Jewish community for support. The airplane sales deepened the split between the Carter 
administration and American Jewry. ‘During this period all of us were under severe attack from the 
Jewish lobby, and much time was consumed in meetings and explanations. These were rarely 
pleasant …,’ Brzezinski recalled.673  
In early 1978, the White House renewed its push to win over American Jewish leaders to its 
position on Israel’s settlements in the hope they could apply pressure on Begin’s government.674 
However, Carter denied allegations that his package approach was meant to punish Israel for its 
settlement activity. ‘The two were not interrelated in my decision-making process,’ he insisted.675 
On 8 February, Carter hosted nine Jewish leaders for a dinner in which he pushed the case 
against Israel’s settlements and the applicability of 242 to the Palestinian territories. Philip 
Klutznick, the president of the American Jewish Congress who later became Carter’s commerce 
secretary, suggested that Jewish leaders pressure Begin to restart negotiations with Sadat; the others 
                                                
670 Memo from Vance to Carter, 11 March 1978, NLC-128-13-6-9-0. 
671 Letter from Biden, Case, Church, Clark, Pell, Sarbanes and Stone to Carter, 24 January 1978, Folder: ‘F-15 bomber, 
1978,’ Box 32, JJP. 
672 Letter from Jackson, Nunn and Moynihan to Carter, 25 April 1978, WHCF, Jackson Name File, JCL. 
673 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 249. 
674 Memo, Lipshutz to Carter, ‘Your Dinner this Evening,’ 8 February 1978, Folder: ‘Jewish Leaders [CF, O/A 414],’ 
Jordan Files, Box 48, JCL. 
675 ‘President’s News Conference,’ 17 February 1978, PPP: Carter, 1978, I, 331-39. 
                 
157 
rejected that.676 Underscoring the personal enmity, Carter described Alexander Schindler, head of 
the Presidents’ Conference, as having acted ‘like an ass’ but otherwise thought the meeting was 
‘constructive.’677 
Dozens of American Jewish leaders visited the White House two weeks later for further 
consultations. According to Schindler, who leaked his version of the meeting to journalists, and 
Siegel, who had invited the leaders, the gathering ended in acrimony because of Brzezinski’s 
‘antagonistic, blustering, threatening’ manner.678 
However, other accounts did not the paint the meeting in such a negative light. According to 
one summary, Brzezinski took a tough line on settlements and was described as ‘very upset’ as he 
responded to the leaders’ questions. Yet the notes indicate that Brzezinski consistently reiterated 
that he believed ‘Israel’s security needs were of the utmost importance’ and that the meeting was 
not as tough ‘as some of the participants’ believed.679  
Moreover, after Schindler’s version surfaced, Jerold Hoffberger, who had chaired the 
gathering, distributed his own minutes to 200 Jewish groups. He wrote to the national security 
advisor that he disagreed with Schindler and would denounce any suggestion that Brzezinski 
displayed any anti-Semitism. Hoffberger’s version did not include the incendiary language 
suggested by Schindler, but did note the administration’s ‘unequivocal opposition to the Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and Sinai.’680 
Nevertheless, the Israeli government recruited American Jews to campaign against the 
linkage of the aircraft sales.681 The Israeli Embassy in Washington regularly briefed prominent 
members of the American Jewish community on policy. Likewise, Jewish leaders informed Israeli 
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officials of the content of their discussions with the White House.682 Israeli officials made their 
preferences abundantly clear in their public statements, but left their official position slightly 
ambiguous. According to the Carter administration, Israeli officials had told it that the most 
important thing for them was to get their planes, even if that meant Egypt and Saudi Arabia would 
receive their aircraft.683 
However, Begin told the Knesset that the sales to Egypt would harm peace negotiations, 
while those to Saudi Arabia would make that country ‘an absolute and immediate confrontation 
state.’ He asked the administration to reconsider the proposal but stopped short of advocating that 
Congress reject the package.684 In a meeting with Vance, Weizman ‘strongly criticized’ the 
administration’s approach and suggested adding 25 more plans for Israel.685 Later, when Dayan 
indicated Israel would prefer that Congress defeat the package the package so that neither Arab 
country would receive any jets, even if that meant Israel would not get its request, the Israeli 
Embassy in Washington disavowed the statement.686 
Both Brzezinski and Vance warned Dayan in April that Israeli lobbying against the package 
would be construed as interference in U.S. affairs.687 Still, Dayan hosted a ‘private rump session’ of 
the SFRC in which he outlined Israeli policy.688 Upon encountering Amitay on Capitol Hill, the 
NSC’s Quandt described him as ‘very jumpy’ when Quandt reminded him that Weizman had said 
he would ‘rather have the package than nothing if that was what it took to get his planes.’689 
Israel’s embassy attempted to clarify matters shortly before the vote. It called on 
Washington to fulfil ‘commitments’ made to Israel and said the package did not meet Israel’s needs. 
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‘We continue to reject the linkage of commitments made to Israel with arms sales to any other 
country,’ it said. ‘Under these circumstances, we continue to oppose the supply of aircraft as 
submitted in the proposed package.’690 
Israeli officials parsed their words in an attempt to retain flexibility. This was likely because 
if Congress voted the package down, then Israel could resubmit its request for airplanes without 
accusations of hypocrisy. With the sales no longer linked, passage would have been almost 
certain.691 
AIPAC lobbied members of Congress and sent Amitay to testify before committees. In 
addition, AIPAC ‘participated in the congressional caucus organised to oppose the sale, drafted the 
sale disapproval resolution, and prepared questions for committee hearings.’692 Pro-Israel groups 
also mobilised allies from the civil rights movement, such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored Peoples, the largest U.S. federation of unions, and interfaith groups to 
support their position.693 
AIPAC began notifying contacts of the dangers of U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia in at least 
September 1977, when it warned that ‘the presence of the F-15s in Saudi Arabia will tilt the military 
balance against Israel.’694 Early in 1978, AIPAC contacted members of Congress to voice further 
opposition to the sales as ‘contrary to a rational arms control policy’ and U.S. objectives.695 
AIPAC also distributed a memorandum on the Saudi sales to the media, members of 
Congress and the White House. It warned that the F-15 ‘would enable Saudi Arabia to strike deep 
inside Israel’ and suggested that a coup in Riyadh would allow the planes to fall into ‘radical 
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hands.’696 It garnered significant attention in Congress: Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) entered the 
memo into the Congressional Record, eliciting a point-by-point State Department rebuttal.697 
AIPAC distributed a similar memorandum on the sales to Egypt, although the organisation focused 
most of its activities on the Saudi portion.698 
AIPAC railed against the sales – and administration policy – for its ‘pro-Arab tilt’ and 
attempts to bring ‘evenhandedness’ to the Middle East.699 AIPAC called the package a ‘crude 
tactic’700 that was ‘extremely disturbing’ and added an implicit threat: ‘The bitter disappointment of 
Israel’s friends in the United States will undoubtedly be translated into action in the coming weeks 
as Congress considers its course of action – and responsibility.’701 
AIPAC also invoked a widely watched miniseries about Hitler’s death camps that aired in 
April to help its lobbying effort.702 ‘The television drama and book by Gerald Green furnished 6 
million reasons why the Jewish state’s leaders insist upon defensible borders. The message of 
Holocaust is contemporary as well as historical,’ it wrote.703 AIPAC sent complimentary copies of 
the associated book to members of Congress, administration officials and journalists.704 
AIPAC derived its power from its ability to translate its positions on Israel into ‘explicit’ 
and ‘implicit’ democratic action: political and financial support to receptive candidates and 
politicians.705 Many of the members of Congress who were especially sensitive to the concerns of 
Israel’s supporters represented New York, the state with the largest Jewish population in the 
country. It was not merely a question of ethnic identity, however. Senators Frank Church (D-Idaho) 
and Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) were two of Israel’s strongest supporters, yet neither was Jewish nor 
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did they hail from states with large Jewish populations. Instead, they backed Israel on moral and 
strategic grounds. 
 
The “oil weapon” 
Publicly, the White House cited Riyadh’s willingness to support U.S. policy in the region, 
resist Soviet penetration and back a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute as the chief 
reasons for the sales to Saudi Arabia. However, as sales critics pointed out, Saudi oil reserves 
underpinned the F-15 offer. Oil and energy preoccupied Carter like no other previous president, and 
he considered Saudi Arabia the lynchpin to a stable policy. Conventional wisdom believed the Gulf 
states could blackmail Western countries by deploying the ‘oil weapon.’706 
By 1978, Saudi Arabia was fast becoming the dominant member of OPEC, which accounted 
for 62 percent of ‘free world’ oil production.707 Saudi production rose from 2.2 million barrels per 
day (bpd) in 1965 to 8.6 million bpd in 1974, when the embargo was lifted. Until late 1978 the 
Saudis kept to a self-imposed cap of 8.5 million bpd. American oil consumption, meanwhile, rose 
from 11.5 million bpd in 1965 to 18.7 million in 1978 and 18.4 million the following year.708 By 
May 1978, Saudi Arabia provided 23 percent of American crude imports and eight percent of total 
consumption.709 
The incoming administration was advised to show support for Saudi oil policy by 
demonstrating ‘movement toward a Middle East peace settlement’ and giving a ‘favorable response 
to further requests for arms.’710 ‘The Saudi role in oil prices and supply is crucial in both the short 
and long term,’ a State Department paper noted. ‘It alone has the capacity to ensure that sufficient 
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oil supply is available to meet essential world demand in the 1980s.’711 Carter frequently argued 
that a resolution to the Arab-Israeli dispute provided the best opportunity to prevent another war 
that could disrupt oil supplies.712 
The Saudis were willing to keep down oil prices, expand production and help protect the 
dollar against inflation. In return, they expected security guarantees, including weapons. Materially, 
the Saudis wanted aircraft to protect their oil fields from Soviet aggression. As Saudi oil profits 
rose, so did the desire for American arms.713 The intangible benefit was to cement U.S.-Saudi ties. 
The Saudi government officially denied a link between oil and weapons. Yet ministers 
remained vague and sometimes sent contradictory signals. As the debate hit its peak, Saudi Oil 
Minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani told a newspaper that refusal to sell Riyadh the F-15s would 
adversely affect Saudi oil policy and support for the American dollar.714 Although the Saudis later 
denied that assertion, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal nevertheless intimated a connection when he 
told the same publication that the U.S.-Saudi relationship was based on interrelated issues such a 
security, oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict.715  
In February, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia John West notified Carter of Saudi delight 
over the F-15 proposals. An attached memo said that the ‘Saudis have, unilaterally, put us on 
warning that they will expect “helpful” American policies in a number of areas’ in exchange for 
increasing oil production. These included, foremost, ‘the Middle East peace effort’ and ‘U.S. 
readiness to transfer arms and technology.’ ‘We cannot evade responsibility in those fields …’ the 
memo cautioned.716 
Publicly, however, the administration put it differently. Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher said Washington had been ‘assured’ by Saudi policymakers that there was ‘no direct 
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linkage’ between the F-15 sales and petroleum policy.717 Nevertheless, the Saudis left sufficient 
ambiguity to suggest that even if there were no direct quid pro quo, the outcome of the debate 
would impact U.S.-Saudi cooperation in other areas. 
The Saudis – and the Arabs – did not have a large ethnic constituency inside the United 
States. However, they cultivated influence through professional lobbyists and contacts by Saudi 
dignitaries, especially Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, a former military pilot and son of the Saudi 
defence minister; Prince Turki Faisal, the country’s chief intelligence officer; Ambassador to the 
United States Ali Alireza; Minister of Industry and Electricity Ghazi al Gosaibi; and Commerce 
Minister Sulayman Sulaym. Their presence caused a stir in Washington’s media and political 
fishbowl.718 
Saudi Arabia enlisted American advisors to help create a new ‘political-corporate 
counterforce coalition’ to offset the traditional advantage enjoyed by pro-Israel forces in 
Washington.719 This coalition consisted of the Arab embassies, which were served by American 
lawyers, consultants and former government officials; aeronautics and oil companies; pro-Arab 
intellectuals; and groups representing the estimated 2 million Arab-Americans. The Saudis 
employed 25 agents to lobby on Capitol Hill. Frederick Dutton, a former Kennedy administration 
aide headed the Washington operation. West returned temporarily to Washington in 1978 to help 
gain approval for the sales. The Saudis also cultivated contacts with State Department officials, who 
provided advice on politics and deal making.720 
Riyadh hired the consulting firm of Cook, Reuf, Span and Weiser to pursue its 
congressional strategy, while also putting a down payment for the firm to implement a long-term 
strategy to bolster Saudi Arabia’s image in the United States. As a reward for the success on the F-
15s, the firm was granted an increase in the size of its contract to $470,000 annually.721 
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Arab-American groups also emerged as a prominent lobbying bloc on Capitol Hill for the 
first time. The debate represented a sort of coming out for the National Association of Arab 
Americans and other groups.722 NAAA officials arranged for pro-Arab witnesses to appear at 
Congressional hearings, provided information to journalists, and met with members of Congress 
and the administration to convey their perspectives.723 
Nevertheless, the Saudi government had primacy in the fight.724 The Carter administration 
fully expected Riyadh’s assistance. Vance ‘encouraged (Ambassador) Alireza to continue his 
contacts with Senators interested in the F-15 issue.’ Carter concurred. ‘The Saudis and their friends 
will have to go all-out to help us in the Senate,’ he wrote on Vance’s memo.725 
In March, Alireza sent to all members of Congress a letter and statement to appeal on behalf 
of the F-15s. ‘…[P]ostponement of the decision on the sale would be extremely harmful because it 
would be taken as a sign by Communists and radicals that the U.S. was reconsidering its support for 
Saudi Arabia,’ he wrote. Alireza reminded lawmakers of the importance of Saudi oil to the 
American economy.726 Later, Riyadh bought full-page advertisements in newspapers boasting of 
Saudi financing of U.S. solar-power projects to mark Sun Day on 3 May.727 
Saudi lobbyists created a constituency inside the United States to mitigate AIPAC’s 
advantage. In addition to making himself available to the media and Congress, Bandar contacted F-
15 manufacturer McDonnell Douglas and other contractors, sub-contractors, and unions that had a 
stake in the airplanes. Bandar mobilised union members’ relatives to flood Congress with telegrams 
and telephone calls in support of the deal,728 and lobbied Reagan to back the package.729 
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Shortly before the Senate vote, Dutton sent senators a booklet in defence of the sales. The 
material is less forcefully argued but just as carefully researched as AIPAC’s anti-package memos. 
‘It is dangerous and self deluding for Americans to look at the Saudis’ need for F-15s mainly in 
terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict … rather than in the context of the overall strategic realities’ of 
the region, the memo stated. The material emphasised that Saudi Arabia did not pose a threat to 
Israel and that U.S. policy should reflect the strategic situation in the Middle East to include the 
Gulf.730 
 
Resignation in the White House 
The divisions over the airplane sales policy were most dramatically illustrated by the 
resignation of Jewish community liaison Mark Siegel. Siegel complained to Jordan that his role – 
defending policies with which he disagreed – had turned him into a ‘political whore.’731 In his letter 
of resignation, Siegel wrote that his decision was ‘an action of personal conscience’ and was driven 
by the package proposal. He also complained that Jordan, the NSC and the State Department had 
not given him ‘accurate information’ on policy.732 
The primary policy aspect to which Siegel objected was the sale to Saudi Arabia, which he 
called ‘dysfunctional’ and an ‘unnecessary irritant.’ ‘If that arms sale was necessary they could 
have waited a year until there was real progress in the peace process,’ he insisted.733 
Siegel’s resignation prompted a flurry of critical coverage on White House decision-making 
and its Arab-Israeli policy.734 His decision also prompted Schindler to call the president a ‘question 
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mark’ on Middle East policy. Those accusations provoked a stern denial from Brzezinski, who 
decried suggestions that he was ‘an anti-Semite.’735 
Tensions between the administration and American Jewry became especially acute in the 
days before Begin travelled to Washington in March. Edward Sanders, a White House consultant 
who later became Carter’s Jewish community liaison, warned that a ‘pronounced drift’ in policy 
could lead to a ‘potentially irreversible confrontation with the Jewish community.’ He added that 
the airplane package spurred a conviction that the White House was ‘deliberately provoking an 
open conflict with the American Jewish community.’736 
 AIPAC believed the NSC, especially Brzezinski and Quandt, was the ‘source of all that they 
dislike[d]’ about Carter’s policy.737 Israel’s supporters felt that the ‘confrontation’ strategy 
originated in the NSC as a way of demonstrating to Israel that it did not have the support inside the 
United States that it once had. After leaving the administration, Siegel charged that the 
administration had wanted ‘to provoke … and win’ a showdown with Begin.738 Faced with fresh 
criticism after Siegel’s resignation, Carter remained undeterred. ‘I have no apology at all to make 
for this (airplane) proposal,’ he said.739 
The notes from a March meeting between AIPAC’s Amitay and Begin aide Eliyahu Ben-
Elissar underscore Israel’s supporters’ concerns about Brzezinski. Amitay insisted that Brzezinski 
had made the F-15 issue a ‘plebiscite’ between the White House on the one side, and the American 
people and Congress on the other. Amitay also asserted that Brzezinski had said the administration 
believed it needed ‘an outright crisis’ with Israel and that the F-15 sales were ‘a test between the 
Jewish lobby and Carter.’ Ben-Elissar also raised the possibility that Begin cancel his forthcoming 
U.S. trip to defuse ‘the attack being planned’ by the White House.740 
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Still, attempts were made to find a compromise. Whatever his public comments, Schindler 
privately informed Begin that the settlements issue had undermined ‘our support’ in the United 
States. Shortly before Begin’s Washington visit, Schindler asked the premier to consider halting 
settlement activity ‘on tactical grounds and without any alteration of fundamental policy.’ ‘I cannot 
sufficiently underscore how this matter has impaired our ability to fight the more substantive issues 
confronting us – such as the arms sale,’ he wrote.741 Begin rejected his advice.742 
In any event, a PLO-linked attack on an Israeli civilian bus and Israel’s response briefly 
delayed Begin’s visit. The PLO praised the attack as ‘historic’ and ‘daring.’743 In retaliation, Israel 
launched Operation Litani, a massive offensive in southern Lebanon. Around 1,100 Lebanese and 
Palestinians, most of whom were civilians, perished in the Israeli invasion. Carter condemned the 
attack on the bus, which killed dozens,744 but viewed Israel’s assault as an overreaction.745 Vance 
felt the bus attack shifted the focus of Israel’s supporters from the peace process to concern for 
Israel’s security.746 
Begin and Carter’s 21-22 March talks focused on Begin’s autonomy plan, not the package, 
but achieved little. On the first day, Carter confessed feeling stymied by failed attempts to find 
linguistic compromises between Egypt and Israel. ‘I can tell you that all this is very frustrating to 
us,’ he admitted. Later, Begin objected to Brzezinski’s suggestion that his plan sought to create 
politically meaningless Palestinian ‘Basutolands.’747 
The talks grew testier the following day. Carter admitted he was discouraged over the lack 
of movement, though he was not prepared to quit. Later, Begin and Dayan objected to what they 
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perceived as the president’s ‘negative’ characterisation of their autonomy proposal. They repeatedly 
urged Carter to use ‘positive’ terms when describing Israel’s plan.748 
According to Brzezinski, the tensions over the F-15 sales disrupted the administration’s plan 
to pressure Israel on settlements and territorial withdrawal.749 Moreover, the perception that Begin 
and Carter’s talks went poorly, and that the White House appeared to be pressuring Israel unevenly, 
likely hardened congressional opposition to the package.750 
Before returning to Israel, Begin appealed to the American public, especially Jewish 
Americans, to support Israel’s policies. ‘The last three days in Washington were the most difficult 
of my life,’ Begin, a former prisoner in the Soviet gulag, said.751 Begin and Carter both indicated 
willingness to engage in public diplomacy in order to gain the support of the citizens of each other’s 
countries.752 
Begin was not entirely successful in rallying American support, however. A poll taken 
during his visit found that Sadat’s approval rating was about twice as high as Begin’s. Nearly the 
same number of Americans (38 percent) favoured Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories as 
were opposed to it (39 percent). Similarly, 42 percent favoured (with 46 percent opposed) cutting 
off U.S. aid to Israel unless it signed a peace agreement.753 
A few weeks later, another survey noted growth in support for Sadat and the Arabs, and a 
slight fall for Begin and Israel. Additionally, a greater percentage of Americans (50 percent) felt 
that Israel should make more concessions to bring about a lasting peace than Egypt (43 percent).754 
Shortly afterward, dozens of prominent Jewish Americans signed a letter expressing support for 
Israel’s peace movement, implicitly dissenting from Begin’s policies.755 
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U.S. publications noted the strains between American Jewry and Begin’s government.756 
Schindler said that American Jews could criticise Israel’s government as long as they kept it among 
themselves. ‘Because, to a large extent, the strength of Israel depends on the strength of the 
American Jewish community, on its perceived strength and its unity in support of Israel,’ he said.757 
Whether or not that was valid, it was a common American perception: in an editorial, The New York 
Times argued that Israel needed to court Jewish Americans’ support, ‘on which Israeli security 
depends.’758 
In April, attorney Max Kampelman floated a compromise: If the administration would agree 
not to send the sales to Congress until an Egypt-Israel peace deal was ‘at hand,’ the organised 
American Jewish community would support the whole package. Domestic advisor Stuart Eizenstat 
offered support for the ‘potentially attractive compromise’ that would ‘avoid a divisive and 
debilitating Congressional fight.’759 Carter ignored the proposal.760 
 Three interrelated themes dominated the media narrative at this time. First, Carter looked to 
test his mettle – with pro-Israel groups, Israel and Congress.761 Second, the debate reflected the new 
climate of American opinion following Sadat’s Jerusalem trip and his growing esteem in the United 
States.762 Third, outlets covered the role of entrenched pro-Israel forces versus the emerging 
potency of Saudi petrodollars and pro-Arab voices in Washington.763 This discourse helped frame 
the debate as a zero-sum-game. 
Many outlets ran side-by-side features on both the ‘Arab lobby’ and the ‘Israel lobby’ in an 
attempt to shed light on Capitol Hill machinations.764 Journalists and officials contrasted the 
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‘Western-educated, sophisticated, low-key’ approach taken by the Saudi royal family765 with the 
more aggressive stance of, in particular, AIPAC’s Amitay.766 This coverage highlighted the 
confluence of oil and corporate influences, ethnic and religious allegiances, and different concepts 
of national interests. 
The editorial boards of major newspapers supported the sales, although they expressed 
reservations about their timing and the administration’s willingness to wage war on their behalf.767 
Conversely, surveys showed that the public opposed the deal. Public opposition to the package sale 
to all three countries consistently ran to about two-thirds. The polls found that opposition to the 
sales to Israel was slightly weaker than to Egypt or Saudi Arabia, but nevertheless a majority 
opposed the sales individually to any of the three countries.768 
Carter was well aware of the doubts. Brzezinski noted broad opposition to the sales when he 
forwarded the president the results of a Harris poll. He highlighted that support was slightly 
stronger among those with higher salaries and a university education than the rest of the public. Yet 
a majority in those brackets still opposed the package (61 percent opposed; 58 percent in favour) 
and also each of the sales to individual countries (to Israel, 58 percent opposed; to Egypt, 69 percent 
opposed; to Saudi Arabia, 71 percent opposed).769 
 This is significant because it demonstrates that Carter was content to calibrate his pitch to 
Congress and the elite, regardless of the general public’s attitude. Moreover, these surveys showed 
that opponents of the sales held views more in line with the American public than did the 
administration. Carter’s desire to earn a tough political victory thus made him willing to swim 
against the current of popular opinion. 
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 On 1 May Carter hosted Begin for celebrations marking Israel’s 30th anniversary and 
announced the formation of the President’s Commission on the Holocaust, which led to the creation 
of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.770 Nevertheless, Carter noted that he ‘still had serious 
political problems among American Jews, and a few days later we had to postpone two major 
Democratic fund-raising banquets in New York and Los Angeles because so many members had 
canceled their reservations …’771 
Shortly afterward, around 800 AIPAC members gathered for what an NSC staffer described 
as a ‘truly vitriolic’ annual policy conference dinner.772 The audience booed and heckled White 
House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, who had come to explain administration policy. Senator Lowell 
Weicker (R-Conn.) charged that Brzezinski had ‘singled out American Jews as an impediment’ to 
U.S. policies, intimated that the national security advisor had found it ‘convenient’ to blame the 
administration’s problems ‘on the Jews,’ and hinted that it echoed ‘historical proclivities’ toward 
anti-Semitism. Newspapers reported that the audience applauded Weicker’s remarks.773 Senator 
Moynihan, who later voted against the package, nevertheless ascended to the podium and defended 
Brzezinski. By this time, Saudi officials were in a ‘near panic’ over the possibility the sales would 
be rejected.774 
Still, most members of Congress wanted to avoid a ‘bloody battle.’775 The administration 
offered concessions on two points. First, it softened its language on the ‘package.’ In a letter to 
Church, Vance said the White House no longer insisted that the sales be treated as a whole.776 It 
amounted to a rhetorical shift with no substantive change, but the move mitigated some 
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opposition.777 Carter then sent letters to HIRC Chairman Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.) and SFRC 
Chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala.) to give a ‘firm assurance’ that he would send Congress in 1979 
a request to sell Israel 20 more F-15s, separate from the 1978 deal.778 
However, these concessions failed to defeat a motion of disapproval in the SFRC, where an 
8-8 deadlock led to the Senate debate. The Friday before the floor vote, Carter personally spoke to 
at least 18 senators.779 He also pleaded his case to senators in a letter, in which he insisted the sales 
to Egypt and Saudi Arabia were necessary to serve the cause ‘of moderation and peace’ in the 
region. Carter did not directly reference oil, but noted that Riyadh was a ‘moderating and 
conciliatory force’ on many issues.780 On 10 May the Presidents’ Conference sent telegrams to 
every senator and representative ‘expressing … unremitting opposition’ to the package.781 
That weekend the administration also laid the groundwork for a strategy to recoup political 
losses. Jordan recommended that Carter offer U.S. reassurances to Israel and that it was 
important that we make a gesture toward both the American Jewish community and those 
friends of Israel in Congress who opposed the sale. If we win, it will be the first time the 
Israeli lobby has been defeated in the Congress. The press will be looking for signs that the 
White House is gloating over the victory and will be reading subtle signs of anti-Semitism 
into our reactions.782 
 
 
Emotional debate 
The 15 May Senate debate featured stark emotional pleas from all sides. Virtually every 
speaker stressed two themes: U.S. commitment to Israel’s security and the American national 
                                                
777 However, shortly afterward a note from Carter to Vance suggested that he still treated the sales as a unit: ‘Hold firm 
– No changes in our “package.”’ Note in margins, Memo from Vance to Carter, 2 May 1978, NLC-128-13-8-2-5. 
Emphasis in original. 
778 Letter from Carter to Zablocki, 9 May 1978, Folder 4, Box 4, Clement Zablocki Papers, Marquette University, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Letter from Carter to Sparkman, 9 May 1978, Congressional Record, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 
124, pt. 10, 13628. 
779 ‘President’s Daily Diary,’ 12 May 1978, JCL. Retrieved 21 September 2013, 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1978/d051278t.pdf.  
780 ‘Letter to Members of Congress,’ 12 May 1978, PPP: Carter, 1978, I, 896-897. In turn, anti-sales senators tried to 
rally colleagues: Letter with attachments from Case and Sarbanes to Senators, 15 May 1978, Folder: ‘Saudi Arabia—F-
15 Sales 1978,’ Box 15, HBP. 
781 Report of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations for the Year Ending March 31, 
1979, 5-6, LOC. 
782 Memo from Jordan to Carter, n.d. [circa May 1978], Folder: ‘Arms Sale Package (Israel-Egypt-Saudi Arabia) [CF, 
O/A 646],’ Jordan Files, Box 39, JCL. 
                 
173 
interest. On the first point, lawmakers were unanimous that the United States must remain firmly 
supportive of Israel, but were divided over what that alliance meant for Americans relations with 
Arab states. On the second point, senators debated the respective roles of the Executive Branch, 
Congress and lobbyists in determining foreign policy.783 
 When the vote finally came, the resolution to disapprove the sales failed. The vote, a 54-44 
victory for the administration, cut across party and ideological lines, with no obvious constituency 
for or against the package. Ultimately, the White House relied on the support of Republicans, a 
majority of whom (26-11) backed the sales. Conversely, only 28 Democrats supported the deal, 
with 33 opposed to it. Carter believed his personal lobbying changed 10-12 votes.784 
 Key supporters of the sales included Baker, Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), Abraham Ribicoff (D-
Con.), John Glenn (D-Ohio) and John Sparkman (D-Ala.). Both senators – Democrat Lloyd Bentsen 
and Republican John Tower – from Texas, the state with largest energy industry, voted for the sales. 
Aides to George McGovern (D-S.D.) blamed his 1980 defeat partly on AIPAC, which launched a 
campaign against him over his favourable vote on the sales.785 Typically, Republicans had been 
more receptive to the argument that the Soviets posed an expansionist threat, which helps explain 
their support for Riyadh’s F-15s. 
 The most prominent opponents included Joseph Biden (D-Del.), Clifford Case (R-N.J.), 
Church, Jackson, Javits, Moynihan, and Richard Stone (D-Fla.). Most of the leading opponents to 
the sale either represented states with large Jewish populations or held presidential ambitions. Nine 
of the 12 Democratic senators facing 1978 re-election voted against the package. 
 Carter did not have to face voters until 1980, but many fellow Democrats on the ballot that 
autumn did not appreciate the president’s willingness to alienate an important party constituency. 
Pro-Israel lobbyists emerged from the F-15 defeat stronger and better organised.786 Carter’s blunt 
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advocacy for the package may have paid dividends in the near term, but by deepening rifts among 
his supporters and identifying the president with an ‘even-handed’ Middle East policy, it 
undermined him in the long term. 
 The administration moved quickly to repair relations with lawmakers and other U.S. backers 
of Israel.787 However, the following week, policymakers ‘heard the anger and sense of betrayal’ 
from Jewish Democratic lawmakers who ‘came to the White House to tell us off concerning our 
Middle East policy,’ Quandt reported. The administration’s explanations did not ease their anger.788 
Begin also expressed distress. ‘Every friend and every citizen of Israel must understand that 
the conditions of peace are trying to be dictated to us,’ he said.789 In a 22 May letter to Carter, Begin 
insisted that ‘in order to offset the possible danger to Israel in the future, a substantial increase of 
supply of arms to Israel is essential.’790 Elsewhere, more than 1,000 Jewish students protested the 
sales outside the White house, where one demonstrator said the vote would ‘be written in the annals 
of history in blood.’791 However, West reported back to Washington on Riyadh’s ‘euphoric 
reaction’ to the package’s approval.792 
The bitter nature of the debate led some pro-Israel groups to reconsider their tactics.793 Not 
AIPAC, however. It defended Israel’s supporters and their attempts to block the sales, argued that a 
wide cross-section of U.S. opinion had opposed the package anyway and noted disapprovingly that 
some administration members ‘seemed to welcome a confrontation with Congress and the 
American Jewish community.’794 
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Media commentators also noted the bitterness. James Reston believed that that airplane sales 
left deeper scars than ratification of Panama Canal Treaties.795 Fellow pundit Megan Greenfield 
opined that the sales had generated the greatest polarisation in Washington since the ‘the most 
ragged days of the Vietnam debate.’796 Still, journalists praised the Carter team’s political acumen 
in overcoming opposition.797 
An official with the largest pro-Arab U.S. group felt that the ‘political conclusion to be 
drawn from the vote is that the Israeli lobby lost its major fight and its apparently veto over 
American policy toward the Arab world. The vote confirmed that the Israeli lobby is subject to 
political limits.’798 
 Underscoring the fraught atmosphere, several outlets reported that a Carter aide made ‘anti-
Semitic’ comments and boasted that the administration’s success had ‘broken the back’ of the 
‘Jewish lobby.’ The administration vigorously denied that any such remark was made.799 Whatever 
their merit, the reports further damaged the administration’s standing in Israel and among the 
American Jewish community. 
 
Conclusion 
Brzezinski believed the sales were ‘a costly diversion, yet winning the battle was absolutely 
necessary to retain American credibility with … Egypt and Saudi Arabia.’800 Quandt and Vance 
concurred.801 Yet at a time when the administration could have been building domestic support for 
its strategy of pressuring Israel on settlements and territorial withdrawal, instead it became 
embroiled in a vituperative public debate. That debate inspired Israel’s U.S. supporters to close 
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ranks in support of Begin. After the sales, ‘we were a little more reluctant to wade into Arab-Israeli 
issues,’ Quandt conceded.802 
 Despite the success, advisors increasingly advised Carter to limit his Middle East 
involvement. The following month, Brzezinski argued that failing progress, Carter should consider 
disengaging from the negotiations and indicating to Israel that Washington would no longer support 
it in U.N. votes.803 The following week, several Democratic ‘wise men’ urged Carter ‘to stay as 
aloof as possible from direct involvement in the Mideast negotiation’ because ‘it was a losing 
proposition.’804 
By aiming his political pitch at Congress and the elite, not the general public, Carter 
achieved success by using tactics counter to his political instincts. Yet by provoking battles he also 
burned bridges and lost intra-party support. For a president struggling with an image of weakness 
and indecision, the temptation to take on domestic and international opponents had proven 
irresistible. 
The bitterness over the airplane debate also bled into other areas. In 1978, Carter 
simultaneously worked on the F-15 sales, Panama Canal Treaties, SALT II and normalisation of 
relations with China. These controversial foreign policy issues all required congressional 
consultation and approval. Carter’s F-15 battle further eroded support from his party and among a 
traditional Democratic constituency. ‘Still a serious problem with the American Jewish 
community,’ Carter noted in June. ‘We’re having to reach out for new contributors …’805 These 
dynamics added to the angry debate about Carter’s foreign policy, weakened his Democratic 
support, and fed the distrust between Begin’s government and the administration. 
The airplane affair did not determine U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli dispute during this 
period. Ultimately, Carter never developed a strategy to overcome Begin’s ideological commitment 
to retaining the West Bank and limiting Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. Yet the F-15 
                                                
802 Quandt, SHAFR. 
803 NSC Weekly Report #64 from Brzezinski to Carter, 23 June 1978, Folder: ‘Weekly Report [to the President], 61-71: 
[6/78-9/78],’ Brzezinski Donated, Box 41, JCL. 
804 28 June 1978, Carter, Diary, 203. 
805 15 June 1978, ibid., 201. 
                 
177 
fight elucidates an instance in which Carter coupled domestic and international political strategies, 
ultimately coming up short in both. 
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Chapter Six: “Getting Control” – Message management 
and the domestic politics of the Camp David Summit 
 
Introduction 
Jimmy Carter, soon to immerse himself in the Egypt-Israel summit at the presidential retreat 
of Camp David, Maryland, paused to deliver remarks to reporters as he crossed the White House 
South Lawn on 4 September 1978. He would act as ‘a full partner’ in the talks, the president said, 
‘not trying to impose the will of the United States on others, but searching for common ground.’ 
Carter, Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin and would be ‘almost uniquely isolated from the press 
and from the outside world. My hope is that this degree of personal interchange, without the 
necessity for political posturing or defense of a transient stand or belief, will be constructive.’806 
With that, Carter climbed into presidential helicopter Marine One, barely to be seen or heard from 
publicly for nearly two weeks as the U.S. commander-in-chief devoted himself full-time toward 
resolving one of the world’s most intractable disputes. 
Carter’s unprecedented personal involvement in the 13 days of ensuing negotiations, which 
culminated in the Camp David Accords, forced him to navigate the space between politician and 
mediator, president and peacemaker, as never before. The accords, signed by Sadat and Begin with 
Carter as a witness on 17 September 1978, represented at that moment the most significant Middle 
Eastern diplomatic development since the foundation of the modern state of Israel. The agreements 
paved the way toward the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and outlined a step-by-step approach for 
offering Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza a degree of autonomy. Often described as the high 
point of Carter’s presidency, the summit served as an unprecedented demonstration of presidential 
authority, leadership and secrecy in international negotiation. 
U.S. officials maintained strict controls on the flow of information to the media. ‘We had 
seen too often the damaging effects of press leaks on negotiations. We were determined to prevent 
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this from happening at Camp David,’ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote.807 According to Carter, 
his aides ‘complained bitterly’ about his decision to exclude the press, and repeatedly offered 
alternate plans that would provide greater contact between the media and delegations: ‘I rejected 
them all, in what became an unpleasant confrontation.’808 
The present account focuses on an often mentioned, but little studied aspect of the meeting – 
the summiteers’ relationship with the news media – to draw out the American domestic politics of 
the Camp David Summit. It argues that Carter had both a diplomatic and political need to establish 
‘control’ over the proceedings. Unquestionably, Carter saw a Middle East agreement as his primary 
objective. Yet to the president and his advisors the summit also offered an ancillary benefit: a 
positive outcome could deliver a boost to the president’s political fortunes at home. This study 
contributes to the literature by devoting greater attention to the influence of domestic politics, 
especially the media and public opinion, on Carter at Camp David. It again reveals the confluence 
of advice from Carter’s domestic, foreign policy and media advisors. 
This account does not intend to offer a blow-by-blow analysis of the Camp David 
Summit.809 Much of the literature on the accords broadly praises Carter’s role, especially for 
reducing the risk of another war in the Middle East and minimising the chances of a U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation.810 
The verdict on the Palestinian dimension of the accords is more complicated, however. 
Dumbrell, Hargrove and Tessler broadly praise Carter for achieving the most that was possible at 
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the time.811 Yet an increasingly large coterie of scholars assails the accords for sacrificing the 
Palestinians’ future for the sake of an Egypt-Israel peace while legitimising Israeli occupation and 
expansion.812 However, in Pressman’s estimation, Carter ‘got what he could get’ at Camp David: he 
set up the Egypt-Israel treaty and initiated a process on Palestinian autonomy that could outlast 
Begin’s government.813  
Quandt provides the most thorough treatment of the conference. Although focused on the 
Americans, he adeptly describes the intersection of domestic pressures and international diplomacy 
for all protagonists. However, Quandt’s concern is the policymaking process. As for American 
domestic politics, he confines himself to structural rather than specific constraints. Quandt is largely 
silent on the roles of the media and public opinion.814 
The news blackout and secrecy surrounding the summit represented a retreat from Carter’s 
attempts to engage in open diplomacy, vows to formulate foreign policy in the open and pledges to 
make the American people a consultative partner in the process. For Carter, diplomatic imperatives 
trumped his ideals of openness, but domestic politics were never far from the proceedings. 
  
Deciding to convene the summit 
By summer 1978 the peace process had reached an impasse. Following the airplane sales 
debate, the United States hosted high-level talks between Egypt and Israel at Leeds Castle, outside 
London, in July. Those negotiations ended without significant agreement.815 State Department 
officials partly blamed the failure to make progress on ‘the nonstop leaking of comments and 
positions from the negotiations’ by participants for their respective domestic imperatives.816 
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The Egyptians and Israelis recognised the need for secrecy. In July, Israeli Foreign Minister 
Moshe Dayan put forward to the U.S. negotiators ‘three keys to movement’ in the peace process, 
the first of which was that ‘the negotiations must become private rather than public.’ 
Simultaneously, Sadat told Washington that ‘he was concerned about the publicity that now was so 
much a part of the diplomacy of the peace process. … He wondered how we could negotiate in a 
more private way, how a less public approach could be developed.’817 
Meanwhile, the administration was concerned that it had failed to communicate effectively 
to Congress, the media and the public. In summer 1978, the administration brought Gerald 
Rafshoon formally into the White House to help formulate the ‘themes’ of the presidency, including 
what he termed ‘media events.’818 The administration began for the first time to set a ‘line-of-the-
day’ for cabinet members and develop effective long-range communications. Thus, Rafshoon’s role 
was the centrepiece of a fresh effort to create a coherent image and message.819 Many of these 
issues came together at Camp David. 
Nevertheless, in the days before the summit, Press Secretary Jody Powell was ‘damn close’ 
to clinical ‘despondency’ over the media’s coverage of Carter and of his declining poll numbers.820 
In June, a survey conducted for the Democratic National Committee found that Americans liked 
Carter personally, but prospective voters 
find the President weak and wishy-washy, vague and indecisive. They criticize his record 
and blame him increasingly for not keeping his campaign promises. … By a 42% to 32% 
margin voters say “not in control” describes Carter better than “in control.” … (The) biggest 
reasons for disappointment were a feeling that the President had failed to keep campaign 
promises and a feeling that he has been ineffective as a leader.821 
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By August, Carter’s Gallup approval rating had fallen to 40 percent (with 43 percent 
disapproval),822 while Roper found that those who identified themselves as ‘strong’ Carter 
supporters had dropped to 11 percent.823 In yet another survey, 66 percent of respondents said 
Carter was ‘not tough enough’ for the job.824 
After Leeds Castle, Brzezinski advised Carter to consider how to manage potential strains in 
the U.S.-Israeli relationship caused by the president’s position in negotiations: ‘Do we have the 
political strength to manage prolonged strain in U.S.-Israeli relations? What kind of forces can we 
marshal and in what manner in order to prevail?’ To achieve a desirable result, the White House 
would need to expend ‘major’ domestic and international efforts, Brzezinski believed. He also 
asked Carter whether he was prepared to ‘see this matter through to the very end?’825 
On 20 July, Carter told his advisors he was reconsidering hosting a summit with Begin and 
Sadat, which had been shelved in early 1978.826 Talks at the level of foreign ministers had been 
insufficient. ‘We basically went into [Camp David] as an act of desperation,’ the NSC’s Quandt 
said. ‘The thing was falling apart.’827 
Carter said ‘for political reasons he would like to have a rather dramatic meeting, perhaps 
somewhere abroad,’ according to Brzezinski. The president sought a ‘historically proper setting.’ 
Recalling the 1943 Churchill-Roosevelt Casablanca meeting, Brzezinski floated the idea of 
Morocco. Nevertheless, Carter decided by 30 July that Camp David would be the ideal location 
‘because he thought that we could have more effective control over the flow of information.’828 
Camp David sits 110 kilometres northwest of Washington. Situated on a wooded 
mountaintop, the fenced-in compound of 11 cabins is controlled completely by the military, 
including 200 sailors and Marines. In the late 1970s, all phone calls went through a central 
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switchboard, run by the Army Signal Corps. Marines guard the perimeter of the grounds, which are 
dotted with lakes and ponds. Equipped with a landing pad, the 134-acre compound in the Catoctin 
Mountains is a 30-minute helicopter ride from the White House.829 The director of the White House 
Military Office described it as ‘a retreat for the President and is … an extension of his Oval Office 
at the White House.’830 It served as an ideal setting in which to isolate two antagonists hoping for a 
breakthrough. 
 
Preparing to manage the message 
 By summer 1978, the administration’s relations with the media had become ‘frayed and 
tattered.’831 U.S. officials decided to not just restrict access to the summit principals, but also to 
speak through one spokesperson – a decision to which both the Egyptians and Israelis ultimately 
acceded.832 Vance suggested, and Carter approved, the single-spokesman strategy as ‘a specific 
reaction to the problems that had developed at Leeds Castle when all three governments briefed 
reporters in one fashion or another almost every day.’833 
However, the administration only decided to exclude the media from the proceedings shortly 
before the summit began. A memo concluded that, ‘Politically, of course, we need a good shot of 
the President and the two leaders in deep discussion. But statesmanship wise, this meeting is much 
too important for world peace to interrupt the atmosphere’ with cameras.834 Less than a week before 
the conference, the Press Office noted that interest in the summit was ‘at a zenith.’ It continued to 
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propose broader access to photo opportunities and other press contacts during the meeting, the 
duration of which at that time remained unclear.835 
The Press Office felt strongly about making provisions for picture coverage partly as a 
function of domestic politics, with an eye toward Carter’s 1980 campaign: ‘If we get lucky … and a 
settlement is reached we want to be in a position to visually remind a quickly-forgetful American 
public when the President runs again.’836 
Similarly, Rafshoon insisted Carter use the summit not only to achieve substantive 
diplomatic results, but also to fortify his image: 
[T]he theme that we should project at the meeting is that of GETTING CONTROL. In 
control of the meeting … in control of his staff … in control of the coverage. … I agree with 
your wishes to keep the expectations as low as possible and to handle the publicity in a low 
key manner, but at the same time we must get our story out and not allow Begin and/or 
Sadat steal the media initiative from you.837 
 
The president’s advisors sought a way to capitalise on the media and public interest, without 
jeopardising the negotiations. Nevertheless, Carter overruled Rafshoon and personally made the 
decision to keep the summit principals out of the public eye.838 
Ultimately, the administration decided to corral hundreds of journalists at an American 
Legion post about 10 kilometres from the summit site.839 ‘From a journalist’s standpoint it was a 
bad situation, in the sense that … you could get no access. … Jody Powell was a very savvy guy – 
savvy in his relations with the media, how to control the situation,’ The New York Times’ Hedrick 
Smith said.840 
 An example of how reporting could have diplomatic reverberations occurred shortly before 
the meeting. Powell lambasted the affair as a story ‘virtually created out of whole cloth’ that took 
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away from the business of the summit.841 Yet a closer look reveals greater nuance and is instructive 
on the difficulty of controlling the message once it enters the public domain. 
 Powell criticised a 30 August ABC report about the possibility that Carter would offer to 
station American forces in the Middle East to guarantee any agreements made at Camp David. 
Carter’s response to the question – which was shouted to him as he boarded Air Force One while on 
vacation – was noncommittal: ‘I’d be reluctant to do that. We’ll just have to wait and see.’ Carter, 
by refraining from saying anything conclusive or of substance, was already trying to play his role as 
a mediator and ‘full partner’ in the talks.842 However, ABC played the comments sensationally. The 
correspondent claimed Carter had ‘confirmed, in effect, that he may offer American forces for use 
in the Mideast at the summit at Camp David.’ He also opined that such considerations showed how 
grim Carter felt the chances for success were.843 In fact, Carter’s comments had offered no such 
confirmation. 
 Subsequently the topic began to dominate other outlets’ coverage. The following night, 
ABC led its broadcast with a follow-up to the story. Its diplomatic correspondent reported Israel had 
‘shot down’ a ‘trial balloon’ that was ‘leaked’ by the White House: Israeli officials had publicly 
opposed the idea.844 By 31 August, CBS and NBC both led their broadcasts with the story, ensuring 
it had maximum exposure at the moment the White House had hoped to focus on how best to 
achieve diplomatic success.845 By 2 September, The Associated Press reported that ‘among the 
scores of proposals Carter is taking with him to Camp David is one that would establish an 
American air base in Sinai and post U.S. troops on the West Bank.’846 On 11 September, Newsweek 
commented that summit preparations had been ‘sidetracked somewhat’ by the troops story. ABC 
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revisited the story that evening. Its correspondent reported that Carter was setting out his own 
proposals in the summit, and added ‘perhaps offering the use of U.S. forces – we don’t know.’847 
 However, ABC’s story on the prospect of U.S. troops in the Middle East did have some, 
albeit weak, foundation. Powell had sought to make the issue about media irresponsibility, but it 
actually stemmed from an administration that had trouble managing its own message. 
In fact, the information appears to have trickled out from various sources. On 21 August – 
nine days before the ABC story that Powell criticised – a prominent newspaper column reported 
‘the United States will act as Israel’s guarantor for West Bank security safeguards.’848 On 28 
August, the Chicago Tribune ran an item on the possibility of U.S. forces being deployed in the 
region.849 Similarly, U.S. News & World Report ran a 70-word blurb on 28 August that said that 
Brzezinski had been ‘floating’ the idea of American troops as security guarantors. On 30 August, 
both The New York Times – citing the State Department – and The Washington Post ran stories on 
the subject.850 The ABC story may have been the first to gain traction, but the issue had surfaced 
earlier. 
 Earlier in August, two SFRC members had queried Vance in a closed-door briefing about 
U.S. forces being involved in Middle East security arrangements. Vance replied that Washington 
was ‘prepared to consider various security arrangements, if necessary, in the course of negotiations’ 
but did not anticipate a major U.S. presence on the ground. Informed about this exchange, Carter 
wrote, ‘Do not close any options.’851 Then, in a final pre-summit NSC meeting, Defense Secretary 
Harold Brown, Brzezinski and Carter all concurred that they did not favour an ‘American military 
presence in the area’ on strictly military grounds, but that such an offer could have political value in 
                                                
847 ‘Mideast Summit,’ ABC ‘World News Tonight,’ 11 September 1978, VTNA 55627; Powell, Other Side, 79. 
848 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak column, ‘Last-Minute Maneuvers For the Mideast Summit,’ WP, 21 August 
1978. 
849 ‘Carter prepared to suggest U.S. presence on West Bank,’ CT, 28 August 1978. 
850 Jim Hoagland, ‘U.S. Air Base is One Proposal for Mideast Talks,’ WP, 30 August 1978. 
851 Memo from Christopher to Carter, 14 August 1978, Folder: ‘State Department Evening Reports, 8/78,’ Plains File, 
Box 39, JCL. 
                 
187 
the negotiations.852 These exchanges indicate that the president, though perhaps reluctant, had not 
entirely foreclosed the possibility of such an arrangement. 
  No evidence exists that U.S. troops were ever offered as a guarantor during the summit. Yet 
this incident demonstrates how tensions in the government-press relationship could distort news 
coverage, which could have diplomatic consequences. The White House’s failure to handle the 
story allowed it to fester: Initial denials came through unnamed officials off camera. Not until the 
summit had already begun did Powell vigorously rebut the story, calling it ‘hogwash.’853 
The administration’s inability to quash the story allowed it to become a distraction at the 
summit, as well as an issue with the American public, which opposed the idea. In a two-week 
period beginning 26 August, 95 percent of the 431 letters received by the White House on the issue 
opposed the use of American forces for peacekeeping.854 Separately, a poll found that 65 percent of 
respondents opposed (as opposed to 21 percent who favoured) the use of American forces even ‘if 
Arab forces invaded Israel.’855 
Regardless, from the beginning Carter faced a media suggesting a contradiction between his 
campaign promises and governing realities, and warning of the consequences of a failed summit.856 
Carter was aware of the perils involved in hosting the two leaders: ‘It is a very high-risk thing for 
me politically because now I think if we are unsuccessful at Camp David, I will certainly have to 
share part of the blame for that failure.’857 
Although Carter had already made the Middle East his top foreign policy priority, his 
intimate identification with the process only crystallised at Camp David. Regardless, in late summer 
1978, the public’s approval of Carter’s handling of issue was only marginally higher than his 
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overall job performance ratings.858 Americans felt pessimistic about the summit’s prospects: 
according to one poll, only 26 percent felt a ‘peace settlement’ was likely in the summit; 60 percent 
felt it was unlikely.859 
Americans continued to harbour pro-Israeli sympathies, but some nuance crept into poll 
results. For example, back-to-back Gallup surveys found that 37 percent of respondents reported 
their ‘sympathies were more with Israel’ than the ‘Arab nations,’ for whom no more than 11 percent 
reported sympathies. Yet in both cases, a plurality reported they did not favour either side or that 
they did not have an opinion. Moreover, in both cases, a strong plurality – 51 percent in August and 
49 percent in September – felt Israel was not doing all it should to achieve peace.860 A separate 
survey found that 36 percent disapproved (compared to 21 percent who approved) of Begin’s 
handling of ‘the Middle East situation,’ 62 percent felt Israel should permit a Palestinian homeland 
either right then or after five years and nearly one-fifth of respondents felt Israel had been 
‘unreasonably difficult’ in peace negotiations.861 Carter thus did not have a robust political mandate 
to push Israel for concessions, but nor did he face such one-sided pressure as to make his stance a 
foregone conclusion.862 
American Jewish organisations welcomed the decision to call the summit.863 Jewish 
community Edward Sanders provided Carter with a summary of attitudes of American Jewish 
leaders. ‘They were said to be more restrained than we had expected, and this encouraged me 
greatly in my later arguments with Begin,’ according to Carter.864 Even so, in Brzezinski’s account, 
Carter told Begin at one particularly tense moment during the summit, ‘My reelection is not nearly 
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as important to me as the resolution of the Middle East issue.’865 This example shows again Carter’s 
rare willingness to discuss openly his domestic political fortunes with foreign leaders.866 
Nevertheless, White House aides warned the president against applying too much pressure 
on Israel because it ‘would create nearly insurmountable political problems. In the Jewish 
community, the Administration will gain if the talks end successfully and it will not be hurt if Egypt 
is blamed for the breakdown.’ Whatever happens, the memo cautioned, the administration should 
avoid the appearance of ‘ganging up’ with Egypt against Israel at the summit.867 
The month before the summit, Carter’s Middle East experts decamped to Middleburg, 
Virginia, to compile the president’s briefing book. These policymakers believed that most of the 
hard work of the summit would be on the Palestinian issue. They deemed the negotiations on Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai to be relatively straightforward. At best, a framework for further talks 
would be established, after which the details could be handled at the foreign minister level. A broad 
agreement should not be expected. 
 Quandt details both the Middleburg meeting and the resultant briefing book.868 However, 
one section – an eight-and-a-half page ‘Public Affairs Strategy’ – is particularly germane to the 
present study. It reflects the inevitable intersection of diplomacy, politics and the press. Recognising 
that ‘these issues have already begun to emerge in the media and will be the center of the inevitable 
public debate,’ the authors attempt to define the administration’s strong points. ‘By pinpointing the 
issues, and translating our established assets into public themes for addressing them, we lay the 
groundwork now for undercutting the critics,’ they wrote.869 
The authors attempt to clarify the American role in the negotiations: 
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President Carter will be a “full partner” in the sense that that United States, like the parties 
themselves, as well as the whole international community, has a vital interest in achieving 
peace in the Middle East. … As a full partner, the President remains a middleman with the 
trust of both parties. In that role, he will help talk the parties through their problems to new 
solutions. 
 
Secondly, the memo attempts to highlight the ways in which the Americans could create a public 
perception of balance in its Camp David suggestions. ‘Whatever happens,’ the plan concludes, ‘the 
Administration should come away from Camp David prepared to go public with the themes listed 
above for spelling out the United States’ ideas for reaching a settlement.’870 This advice 
underscores the significance attached by the administration to public relations and its willingness to 
make the negotiations public in order to gain support for its positions. 
As with the Middleburg briefing book, Brzezinski’s pre-summit memo emphasised the West 
Bank rather than the Sinai. However, Brzezinski also echoed Rafshoon’s image memo. ‘For the 
talks at Camp David to succeed, you will have to control the proceedings from the outset and 
thereafter pursue a deliberate political strategy designed to bring about significant changes in both 
Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions,’ he advised Carter.871 
Brzezinski also strongly suggests Carter should be prepared to make disagreements public 
and not be afraid to cast blame for the breakdown of negotiations. He is especially insistent in 
regard to Israel. If Begin proved ‘responsible for blocking progress toward peace,’ Brzezinski 
wrote, Carter should make clear he would have to take the following steps: ‘Go to the American 
public with a full explanation of US national interests in the Middle East,’ explain the scale of U.S. 
aid to Israel, publicise American views on a fair settlement, and Washington would be unable to 
defend Israel’s position if the negotiations shifted to the United Nations or Geneva. ‘The 
consequences of a failure should be publicly explained by you, and Sadat and Begin should 
understand from the outset that this will be the case,’ Brzezinski emphasised.872 
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As a mediator, Carter employed tactical threats with greater frequency than his predecessors. 
Throughout the negotiations, the president made clear that if talks failed, Washington would blame 
Israel. Carter would go to Congress and explain Israel’s intransigence, thereby imperilling U.S. aid 
to Israel.873 Indeed, Dayan recalled that during the summit Carter threatened to tell Congress that 
Israel had blocked an agreement.874 This threat is significant because Israel’s power base resided in 
Congress; any diminishment of pro-Israel sentiment among lawmakers could threaten economic and 
military support for Israel. 
Regardless, the pre-summit briefing material dissatisfied Carter. His advisors ‘had set our 
expectations too low,’ he believed. He felt the summit needed to achieve more than a declaration of 
principles leading to further negotiations. ‘If we can’t resolve anything at this summit level, it’s 
highly unlikely that foreign ministers and others can do so later on,’ he believed.875 
The Middleburg meeting was held among foreign policy specialists, but ‘knowledgeable 
people,’ including AIPAC’s Morris Amitay, asked Jewish community liaison Edward Sanders why 
he did not attend. These people ‘drew negative conclusions from my absence,’ Sanders informed 
Hamilton Jordan. Jordan responded that only specialists attended Middleburg. ‘You, I, the V.P., the 
[President] and others will have our say when they come in. I don’t think we should be at all 
apologetic or defensive about you or I not being included in [Vance’s policy] group,’ Jordan wrote. 
‘… [T]hey do most of the initial work there (at the State Department) on substance. We review and 
comment on it [in the White House].’876 
 
At the summit 
                                                
873 Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 284-320. 
874 Dayan, Breakthrough, 173. 
875 31 August 1978, Carter, Diary, 215-16. 
876 Memo from Sanders to Jordan, 15 August 1978, Folder 13, Box 5, Sanders Papers. 
                 
192 
Once the summit began, Camp David’s claustrophobic confines affected all the participants. 
‘It’s hard to recreate the atmosphere,’ Quandt said. ‘After 13 days up there, people were really 
going crazy and wanted to get out.’877 
The negotiations inside Camp David have been covered in detail elsewhere. The press 
remained strictly on the outside, however. According to Powell, ‘the relationship between the White 
House and the press during the summit would be dominated by our attempts to prevent the 
unauthorized or premature disclosure of information.’878 As the summit progressed, the press 
operation faced ‘an increasingly frustrated media starving for some hard news.’879 The 
administration had to maintain a flow of information to prevent the development of a news vacuum, 
in which rumours and false stories might take hold. 
Powell spent considerable energy verbally jousting with reporters in an attempt to provide as 
little information as possible: 
Under the mutually agreed, but never written out, rules for the (daily) briefing, I was to 
describe the meetings that had taken place since the last briefing and provide a little “color” 
on the nonsubstantive activities of the participants. …  The goal was to avoid any step-by-
step, blow-by-blow analysis, to resist the pressure for daily temperature taking, and it was 
hoped, with only one briefer, to keep conflicts between the parties out of the news. … Any 
question as to the positions of either party on the issues under discussion simply could not 
be answered.880 
 
The only images the networks could use were the still photos handed out by the White House. They 
had to be cleared by all three sides in order to avoid publicising ‘pictures that showed more of 
Begin than Sadat or that placed one or the other in a more favorable perspective.’881 Consequently, 
the networks had little choice but to show Powell’s words on the screen and sometimes supply 
imagined dialogue for the official photos.882 
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Powell’s briefings delivered meeting rundowns – what people had been doing, what they 
had been wearing, where they had met and for how long. These details were intended to substitute 
for substance. Powell, for example, would describe Sadat’s daily walk and Begin’s morning 
paperwork as news, while adding bits of colour.883 Powell told reporters in a typical statement on 9 
September: ‘Progress does seem to have been made in some areas. However, substantial differences 
still remain on other important issues.’884 
Two photo opportunities were arranged to allow the press chances to report something 
beyond the briefings. On 7 September, journalists viewed from a distance as Begin, Carter and 
Sadat watched a Marine parade. This event allowed for photographs of the leaders together, but no 
questions were possible. On 10 September, the delegations toured the Civil War battlefield of 
Gettysburg, which again afforded journalists the chance to see the protagonists. Most of the reports 
focused on interpreting the body language and tone of voice of the members of the delegations for 
clues as to the state of the talks.885 
Deprived of the standard avenues for newsgathering, the press corps resorted to interviewing 
one another.886 Indeed, frustration at the blackout was a feature of nearly every report. One 
correspondent wrote that the summit resembled ‘a warmed-over version of the endless obscurity of 
“Waiting for Godot.”’887 Virtually all the major outlets ran at least one story specifically or mostly 
about the blackout. 
Many editorial cartoons also took aim at the news restrictions. One that caught Carter’s eye 
came from the Dallas Times-Herald. It features a drawing of Powell mulling over the saying that 
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‘no news is good news,’ before proudly announcing to journalists: ‘Gentlemen … there is nothing 
but good news coming out of Camp David!’888 
The sharpest questions at Powell’s briefings pertained to the relationship between Begin and 
Sadat. ‘I am not in a position to characterize or go into substance,’ he insisted in one typical 
exchange. ‘It is my impression that the personal relationships among all three of the principals are 
good.’889 However, because one of the core ways of communicating to the media was through 
posting a list of the meetings, the journalists attempted to gauge the relationship through how many 
face-to-face contacts the two leaders had with one another. The fact that the initial meeting between 
Begin and Sadat was so vituperative that they did not meet directly after the third day therefore was 
revealing. 
Nevertheless, frustration and confusion often reigned. On Thursday, 14 September, a 
journalist demanded of Powell whether he was offering another ‘non-news briefing.’ Powell 
responded, ‘That would be my assessment of it, yes.’890 That night, NBC reported that the summit 
would end Friday or over the weekend, while CBS said the meeting was foundering and would 
likely limp along until Monday.891 
The situation nearly came to a head on 15 September. Reporters asked Powell 13 questions 
on the Begin-Sadat relationship.892 ‘Don’t tell us this is normal; don’t give us the normal Camp 
David ----,’ one correspondent fumed.893 Although the spokesman was determined not to give a 
direct answer, he also ‘felt an obligation to give the press at least a hint that they might be on the 
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right track.’ Powell then attempted to give reporters ‘a clear indication that what I said in the past 
and was about to say now should be taken with a grain of salt.’894 
The summit probably generated more stories than any other event blanketed by a news 
blackout. A poll conducted after the summit found that more than three in four people had heard or 
read something about the summit.895 The hundreds of journalists from around the world filed 
innumerable stories based on Powell’s vague briefings, as well as features and analysis. U.S. 
newspapers and newsmagazines saturated their readers with coverage. 
Meanwhile, throughout September the three American broadcast networks each devoted 
around 25 percent of total news time to the summit.896 An analysis of the television reporting found 
that the ‘coverage was more substantive and analytical than it is usually given credit for being. 
Perhaps in part because of the news blackout, a number of solid background stories were 
broadcast.’897 
However, despite the multitude of stories filed, Powell succeeded in obfuscating and 
keeping substance mostly out of the briefings. Although the Press Office distributed more than 
100,000 pages of ‘transcripts, schedules, notices, and statements,’ only about five paragraphs of that 
contained ‘good hard news,’ according to Powell.898 
Even while at Camp David, Carter asked his staff collating his mail for a ‘selection of the 
Camp David ones’ to be forwarded to him.899 As the summit neared its crucial hour, Brzezinski sent 
Carter the results of a Gallup poll of American opinion. More than half of Israeli sympathisers 
wanted Israel to be more forthcoming, and about the same percentage of those expressing pro-Arab 
sentiments wanted Egypt to be more flexible, Brzezinski wrote. ‘It therefore appears that either side 
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could lose support by sticking rigidly to its pre-summit position,’ he noted.900 Such evidence 
suggests Carter and his aides sought to keep tabs on domestic opinion as a means to help fortify his 
negotiating position. 
 
Agreements reached 
The summit produced two agreements. The first, ‘The Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East,’ outlines a step-by-step approach for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
as well as broader principles for peace. The goal of this agreement was to set up a ‘self-governing 
authority’ in the territories, which would lead to ‘final status’ talks after a transitional period. The 
negotiations were to include Egypt, Israel, Jordan and ‘representatives of the Palestinian people.’ 
However, neither of the latter two was party to the agreements and never joined the process.901 
The second agreement, the ‘Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel,’ is a plan for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and outlines steps for working toward an 
Egypt-Israel treaty.902 This agreement is particularly noteworthy because it represented the first 
official recognition of Israel by an Arab state. In order to obtain these agreements, several issues – 
most notably the status of Jerusalem – were omitted from the frameworks and instead contained in a 
series of letters exchanged between Carter, Begin and Sadat from 17 to 22 September.903 
However, shortly after the signing of the accords, a major dispute broke out over differing 
interpretations over Israel’s agreement on a settlement freeze. Carter and Vance believed they had 
obtained Begin’s commitment not to construct any new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza 
during the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. Begin disagreed, however. He believed the 
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agreement was to freeze settlement building solely for the duration of the Egyptian-Israeli 
negotiations.904 
Carter later conceded that failing to clarify Begin’s promise on freezing settlements was the 
most serious omission in the accords.905 As Lenczowski argues, perhaps the major weakness of the 
American delegation was that, unlike Egypt and Israel’s delegations, it did not have an expert in 
international law. Thus, some ‘imprecisions or omissions’ crept into the final documents.906 
Regardless, the settlements dispute proved particularly corrosive. Arab states and the 
Palestinians considered the U.S. inability to stop Israeli building indicative of a lack of American 
seriousness. Conversely, Israel and its American supporters objected to subsequent American 
pressure on Israeli activity in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The outcome did not please the Palestinians, whose interests were at the centre of much of 
the conference but who lacked representation. ‘The results of the Camp David Summit represent the 
most dangerous conspiracy against the Arab Nation since 1948,’ the PLO said.907 In its bulletin, the 
group editorialised, ‘Whether Sadat will survive or not … the Middle East will remain a hot and 
explosive point in the world.’908 Non-PLO leaders in the occupied territories expressed similar 
sentiments and reaffirmed their support for the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people 
everywhere.909 
The news restrictions appeared to have had the intended effect. ‘We didn’t know anything,’ 
recalled diplomatic correspondent Bernard Gwertzman. ‘Even the Israeli press, which always got 
fed leaks, didn’t know anything.’910 Afterward, Rafshoon commended the president’s decision to 
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overrule his advice and bar the media from the summit as ‘the best way’ to conclude an agreement. 
‘I hate to say “you told me so” but you did,’ he wrote.911  
The U.S. ambassador to Israel called Carter’s decision to keep the press away from the 
negotiators one of the president’s ‘ingenious innovations’ because it minimised the domestic 
political pressure on both Begin and Sadat.912 ‘It was a smart press operation from the standpoint of 
the White House and it was a very difficult access problem for good reporters,’ according to The 
New York Times’ Smith.913 
The press was fairly docile under the circumstances, which underscored the relative lack of 
rancour on an issue where the stakes seemed so high.914 ‘I think there was a recognition that these 
were very high-level talks and that any leaks might damage the result,’ Gwertzman said.915 Based 
on his TV news analysis, Spragens argues that the ‘importance of the Summit and the perception of 
the stakes involved promoted the acceptance of the temporary news blackout.’916 The news leaks 
were few, mostly trivial, and had little impact on the negotiations.917 
After the agreement was reached, the signing ceremony was the first time, other than brief 
glimpses, the American, Egyptian and Israeli people saw their leaders in nearly two weeks. The 
three networks carried the event from next to the White House live from 10:30 p.m. to 11:03 p.m. 
local time, when it was watched by an estimated 43.6 million households.918 
The following night, Carter addressed a joint session of Congress, with Begin and Sadat 
both in attendance, on the accords. The speech attracted fewer viewers – an estimated 28.6 million 
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households – than the previous evening.919 Nevertheless, it was a triumphant moment for the 
president. ‘It’s been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish 
nation,’ he began. ‘If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace 
again.’920 
Yet Carter’s decision to deliver the speech on Capitol Hill, in front of lawmakers with 
whom he rarely had a close relationship, is intriguing. Congressional approval would be needed to 
meet the economic pledges made to both Egypt and Israel as part of the deal, but fundamentally the 
accords were, for the United States, a non-legislative matter. They did not constitute a treaty and 
therefore did not require ratification. Congress had little to do with the American side of the 
negotiations during the Carter administration, the vast majority of which was handled by the 
executive branch. 
In fact, Carter’s communications chief had counselled the president not to deliver the speech 
in Congress. ‘I believe that you would have more control of the situation, do a better job, and 
dominate the news more’ if the speech were delivered to a smaller audience in the White House, 
Rafshoon argued, because  
you are not going to Congress for approval of what you have done; … [and] you are 
basically reporting to the American people. You have made your decisions at Camp David 
and you have controlled the situation. You deserve to keep it (the results) as your own at 
Camp David.921 
 
Carter’s decision to overrule Rafshoon is a sign that Carter the politician saw political value in 
showcasing his success on Capitol Hill. It suggests that Carter sought to stamp his authority vis-à-
vis Congress on this success following a difficult six months in which his leadership in foreign 
policy had been questioned after the debates over the Panama Canal Treaties and the Middle East 
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airplane sales.922 To House and Senate Democrats, Carter’s speech also likely represented an 
attempt to showcase a Democratic success six weeks before the midterm elections. 
 
Praise for Carter 
 On the back of his performance at the summit, assessments of Carter soared.923 Rozell finds 
that the press broadly concluded that Carter’s presidency was ‘dramatically revived’ as a result of 
the summit, and that the media environment was ‘nearly euphoric.’924 ‘It was in truth Jimmy 
Carter’s conference. We salute him: He did a beautiful piece of work,’ one editorial gushed.925 Even 
the conservative Wall Street Journal offered cautious praise, opining ‘Carter did revive hopes for 
peace in an atmosphere from which those hopes had all but disappeared, and that is no small cause 
for gratitude.’926  
Polls measured a spike in Carter’s popularity.927 One survey conducted the day after the 
summit found that a plurality (43 percent) believed Carter was ‘most responsible’ for the accords, 
compared to 13 percent Sadat and 6 percent Begin.928 A separate poll found that 92 percent of 
respondents felt Carter’s role in achieving an agreement was either ‘very important’ or ‘fairly 
important,’ compared to just seven percent who felt it was ‘not too important.’929 A few days later, 
the White House registered that an astounding 95 percent of the 1,235 letters received over the 
previous week praised the president.930 
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To that end, Carter’s association with the peace process emerged as a feature of much of the 
coverage.931 As a result, it magnified Carter’s role in the negotiations. Subsequently, credit for each 
success, and blame for each setback, could increasingly be laid at the president’s feet. Carter was 
unable to sustain the initial post-Camp David glow, however, and his popularity soon began to slide 
down as ‘the unflattering press views of the Carter administration reemerged.’932 
Between the two Middle Eastern leaders, the American public gave Sadat more credit than 
Begin. A survey found that 40 percent (a plurality) of respondents felt the Egyptian leader had made 
more concessions toward a peace agreement at Camp David, compared to 27 percent for Begin.933 
For their efforts, Begin and Sadat were awarded the 1978 Nobel Peace Prize. 
Immediately upon the summit’s end, Carter complained in his diary that Begin ‘was making 
an ass of himself with his public statements.’ Carter believed the Israelis ‘should have left a 
nursemaid’ with Begin to prevent him making controversial remarks.934 In a speech on 20 
September, Begin insisted that he had not agreed to withdraw Israeli forces from the West Bank or 
Gaza within five years, as Washington claimed. He repeated that Israel claimed sovereignty over 
those territories, but that did not interfere with autonomy for Palestinians there. ‘Judea, Samaria and 
the Gaza Strip are integral parts of Eretz Yisrael,’ he declared to applause.935 The Carter 
administration felt such statements cast doubt on Israel’s commitment to the accords and would 
make it difficult for Sadat to carry through with his agreements, much less be joined by other Arab 
leaders. 
Following Begin’s speech, Sanders reported to Carter that he had received calls from Jewish 
leaders, ‘who uniformly expressed their displeasure and unhappiness with the Prime Minister’s 
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remarks. … I believe it is safe to say that the statements by Prime Minister Begin do not reflect the 
attitudes of the American Jewish community.’936 Still, it pointed to conflicts ahead. 
The Carter administration immediately went about trying to consolidate gains in the 
American Jewish community. The morning following his speech to Congress, the president met 
with seven Jewish leaders to discuss the summit outcome.937 Indeed, the American Jewish 
community roundly praised the accords.938 Even AIPAC expressed admiration for Carter’s 
achievement.939 
The Arab-American community displayed less enthusiasm. Although the American 
Lebanese League assured the administration of its support for the accords, the larger NAAA 
expressed dissatisfaction over the Palestinian dimensions.940 
 
Assessing the political outcome 
Carter officials differed as to whether Camp David offered a genuine boost to the 
administration. ‘There was something about how we had slipped in the eyes of the American people 
that prevented us from getting what should have been an enormous lift out of this incredible 
diplomatic feat,’ Vice President Walter Mondale said. ‘We thought, boy this shows that we can get 
things done, it does bring peace to a crucial area. (But) There was no movement at all. … It was 
very dispiriting.’941 
Brzezinski believed that Camp David constituted ‘almost the only’ Carter administration 
foreign policy success that was ‘a political benefit.’942 In Jordan’s recollection, however, internal 
polling indicated that Camp David only boosted Carter’s popularity by one percentage point.943 
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 Perhaps Powell assesses the problem best. Camp David ‘was a tremendous boost at the time 
when it happened, although the road to it had been somewhat painful politically,’ he said. ‘But the 
road beyond it was even more painful and more costly because of things that we felt we had to do to 
keep the thing moving along, and in fact keep it on the road and make some progress on the 
road.’944 
 
Conclusion 
The president’s ability to ‘control’ the situation rapidly diminished once he left Camp 
David. Carter hoped to secure an Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty ‘in a few days of negotiations – not a 
few weeks.’945 Instead, it took six months and almost fell apart several times. That achievement 
only came after another ‘high-risk’ diplomatic and political plunge by Carter – one in which he had 
none of the advantages of the ‘control’ conferred to him at Camp David. 
Consequently, the media and public impressions of Carter returned to one of a generally 
inept politician with poor leadership skills. Carter was able to achieve what he did in the Arab-
Israeli dispute because of his personal involvement. However, his diplomatic achievement sowed 
the seeds of his later political difficulties. Camp David raised expectations that Carter’s chief 
foreign policy initiative was on the verge of fruition. Yet the inability of all sides to fulfil the 
promise of the accords with alacrity allowed previous interpretations of the president as a nice and 
intelligence man, but one not tough enough for the job, to resurface. Carter’s greatest diplomatic 
achievement thus also became a source of political weakness.  
Carter made three major contributions to the summit that proved imperative to its success. 
First, he decided to exclude the media from the proceedings. Second, Carter insisted on a single 
negotiating text, whereby he maintained control of the document on which all alterations were made 
while shuttling between delegations. Third, he separated out the bilateral issues from the Palestinian 
ones. 
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U.S. domestic politics did not determine the outcome of the Camp David Summit, nor did it 
dictate Carter’s negotiating position. However, Carter’s domestic constraints influenced the 
development of the U.S. position and the tactics the president employed to reach agreement. 
American public opinion also featured in both Egypt’s and Israel’s strategies. Understanding 
Carter’s domestic political constraints sheds light on Carter’s performance at the negotiating table 
as a self-described ‘full partner.’ Moreover, Carter’s performance at Camp David was, for 13 days, 
the ultimate demonstration of presidential control. 
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Chapter Seven: Desperate Diplomacy – Carter’s Trip to the Middle East 
to Conclude the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, March 1979 
 
Introduction 
With millions of people watching on live television, thousands of officials and dignitaries 
gathered on the North Lawn of the White House on 26 March 1979 to mark the signing of the 
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In his speech, President Carter appeared to defend the tactics he had 
used to conclude the pact. He quoted a passage that hinged on the metaphor that peace, like war, is 
‘waged.’ ‘Peace is active, not passive; peace is doing, not waiting,’ he declared.946 During the lavish 
dinner afterward, Prime Minister Menachem Begin joked darkly about Carter’s re-election, 
indicating awareness of the link between the peace effort and the president’s electoral prospects.947 
The outward circumstances of Carter’s final deep-dive into Arab-Israeli diplomacy could 
not have been more different than his experience at Camp David. He was on foreign soil during his 
weeklong Cairo-Jerusalem-Cairo shuttle to negotiate the final treaty agreement. Consequently, 
Carter could not limit news leaks, control the message or exert maximum psychological pressure on 
Sadat and Begin. 
Yet underlying similarities remained. For political reasons, Carter needed the trip to turn out 
a success more than did either Begin or Sadat. The administration’s handling of the news media 
also became tightly intertwined with the outcome of the negotiations. And once again, the president 
bucked protocol to participate in high risk, open-ended diplomacy that, although successful, yielded 
little, if any, political benefits. 
Carter’s 7-13 March mission demonstrated the inherent conflict between the office of 
president and the role of peacemaker. Three factors collided in this episode to undermine the 
salutary political effects of Carter’s signature foreign-policy achievement: the president’s 
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determination to mediate Israel’s first-ever peace treaty with an Arab state, the administration’s 
poor relationship with the media, and the White House’s conflation of foreign policy and domestic 
politics. 
The six months of haggling over terms following the Camp David Accords drained the 
peace process of momentum, depleted Carter’s political capital and made the 26 March signing of 
the pact a relief rather than a triumph. ‘We have a problem with the U.S. public in not bringing this 
thing (treaty) to a conclusion,’ Carter noted before his trip. ‘It’s sapping away our strength.’948 
Carter described his journey as ‘an act of desperation.’949 To Hamilton Jordan, the ‘wild 
dash’ epitomised the president’s willingness – even eagerness – to achieve results by going against 
conventional wisdom. ‘If you had asked the hundred wise men of Washington what Carter should 
do … they would have advised him to do exactly the opposite,’ he said.950 The trip represented a 
remarkable episode in the annals of presidential diplomacy, as Carter negotiated directly with the 
Israeli cabinet on behalf of Egypt during his mission.  
Many first-hand accounts exist of the negotiations leading up to, and during, Carter’s time in 
Egypt and Israel.951 However, these works reflect the authors’ proximity to the talks and thus lack 
critical distance. Scholarly accounts tend to depict Carter’s decision to risk his prestige as an act of 
political recklessness, boldness, or both, made by a president desperate for a success on the issue 
that had consumed more of his time than any other.952 
The present analysis differs from those views in at least three ways. It compares recently 
released documents with previously published accounts, demonstrates how Carter’s poor press 
relations helped undermine his best efforts at achieving political gains from his diplomatic success, 
and reveals the interaction between advice offered by his domestic and foreign policy aides. 
 
                                                
948 2 March 1979, Carter, Diary, 298. 
949 ———, Keeping Faith, 425. 
950 Jordan interview, CPP, 12. 
951 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 281-87; Carter, Keeping Faith, 424-35; 8-14 March 1978, ———, Diary, 300-04; 
Dayan, Breakthrough, 268-78; Powell, Other Side, 91-102; Quandt, Camp David, 302-11; Vance, Hard Choices, 245-
52; Weizman, Battle for Peace. 
952 The best scholarly accounts are Quandt, Camp David, 302-11; Strong, Working in the World, 189-207; Spiegel, 
Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 370-72. 
                 
207 
Camp David to Blair House and beyond 
The Carter administration struggled with a confluence of strains in early 1979. First, it was 
confronted with numerous major foreign policy issues: Iran’s revolution; normalisation of relations 
with China; SALT II ratification; and the Egypt-Israeli negotiations. Second, Carter faced 
challenges from both within and without his own party as his re-election campaign loomed. Finally, 
executive branch—media relations had plummeted, and the administration had become fixated on 
preventing leaks.953 
The Camp David Accords stipulated that Egypt and Israel finalise their peace treaty by the 
end of 1978. Yet conclusion of the pact took twice that three-month time frame. The accords did not 
constitute final agreement, but rather described general principles. Afterward, the national leaders 
stepped back from direct involvement in the negotiations, letting their subordinates haggle over 
details. U.S.-Israel relations worsened again after Begin’s government announced immediately after 
Camp David that Israel would build new settlements and ‘thicken’ existing ones in the West Bank 
and Gaza during negotiations; Washington and Jerusalem disagreed over whether that violated the 
accords.954 
Egyptian and Israeli delegations – without Sadat and Begin – met at Blair House on 12 
October to discuss the nature of Palestinian autonomy and finalise treaty details. As Egypt and 
Israel pressed for a bilateral agreement in subsequent months, Palestinian issues gradually receded 
from view. During this period, U.S. officials demonstrated little patience over the two sides’ 
‘quibbling.’955 
The administration sought to balance the diplomatic and political imperatives driving 
presidential involvement. Carter’s advisors recommended that he personally open the negotiations. 
‘Win or lose you are identified with this effort,’ Powell argued. ‘An appearance by you would serve 
                                                
953 26 January, 6, 7 February, 14 March 1979, Carter, Diary, 283, 88-89, 89 and 304; Powell, Other Side, 55. 
954 Document 200, Begin statement to the Knesset, 25 September 1978, IFRSD: 1977-1979. Retrieved 21 September 
2013, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/TABLE%20OF%20CONTENTS.aspx. 
For an examination of the opposition Begin faced from his colleagues on the right following the Camp David Accords, 
see Colin Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream: Power, Politics and Ideology from Begin to Netanyahu  
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 96-108. 
955 Carter, Keeping Faith, 422; Vance, Hard Choices, 236. 
                 
208 
to underscore your determination to see it through for the domestic audience. Diplomatically it 
would seem to re-affirm your commitment to “full partnership” for the U.S. to the Arab world.’956 
Carter delivered remarks at the opening of the negotiations and, shortly afterward, conferred 
with Egyptian and Israeli delegations to break a deadlock. In those meetings, both sides enumerated 
the issues that bedevilled negotiations over the next six months. The first sticking point was over 
the Egypt-Israel treaty and Cairo’s pacts with Arab states, which called on Egypt to join them in the 
event of war with Israel. Egypt preferred a general formula, but Israel wanted a specific clause 
stating that it had priority over earlier obligations. Secondly, Egypt sought, but Israel resisted, 
linkage between normalisation of relations and Palestinian autonomy negotiations. Also, Israel 
wanted immediate normalisation, while Egypt sought to do it gradually. Finally, each side wanted 
to negotiate with Washington the nature of U.S. economic, political and security guarantees 
following the treaty.957 
Administration hopes were dashed when both sides failed to agree on a treaty in time for the 
Arab League Summit or the U.S. midterm elections. In the meeting, the League threatened to expel 
Egypt if it made a separate peace with Israel and confirmed the designation of the PLO as the ‘sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.’958 
Camp David also failed to give Carter’s party a boost in the midterms. Democrats retained a 
large congressional majority, but they lost three seats in the Senate and 15 in the House. Contrary to 
Carter’s hopes, the Arab-Israeli dispute had failed to gain public traction. A Caddell survey 
conducted between Camp David and the midterms found that among foreign-policy issues 
Americans believed that ‘the Middle East problem’ should rank fourth on Carter’s list of priorities, 
after human rights, relations with allies and U.S.-Soviet ties.959 
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Meanwhile, Camp David did not mitigate high-profile opposition to Carter’s foreign policy. 
Although the CPD’s Eugene Rostow praised Camp David as ‘the most important event so far’ in 
the Carter administration’s foreign policy, he doubted the president could achieve the ‘full-scale 
revival of American foreign and defense policy’ he believed was needed to counter Moscow’s 
policy in the Middle East.960 Similarly, Moynihan, a Democrat, believed the accords were 
encouraging, but that overall Carter had enabled Soviet influence to re-enter the Middle East.961 
However, the only lawmakers to criticise the accords, and subsequent treaty, because they did not 
address adequately the Palestinian question were Abourezk and Rep. Paul Findley (R-Ill.).962 
 
Arguments for bolder action 
Most of Carter’s aides voiced concern about his continued intimate involvement in the 
negotiations for fear of domestic backlash. However, in November two of the president’s top 
advisors – Brzezinski and Jordan – argued for bolder action. 
‘The Middle Eastern issue can be devastating to you politically if it drags out throughout 
your first term,’ Brzezinski warned following the party’s poor election performance. He suggested 
Carter consider phasing out U.S. efforts after the signing of the treaty before handing the Palestinian 
issue to the United Nations. Brzezinski urged the president ‘to do whatever has to be done very 
early in 1979’ so Carter could reap the benefits in the 1980 election.963 
Hamilton Jordan had grown convinced that only Carter’s ‘personal and dramatic 
intervention’ could resolve the outstanding issues. He lamented that leaks and all sides’ engagement 
in open diplomacy – dynamics that were impossible at Camp David – had undermined subsequent 
talks. He believed the administration’s failure to fulfil Camp David’s promise had created a 
‘psychological logjam’ for Carter’s foreign policy. As a remedy, Jordan floated the idea of a Middle 
                                                
960 Transcript, Eugene Rostow’s remarks at CPD annual dinner, 9 November 1978, Folder: ‘Third Annual Meeting,’ 
Box 163, CPDP. 
961 Transcript, Moynihan’s address at the Labor Zionist Alliance’s National Convention, 19 February 1979, Folder 1, 
Box 2828, DPMP. 
962 Terry, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 120. 
963 NSC Weekly Report #79 from Brzezinski to Carter, 9 November 1978, Folder: ‘NSC Weekly Reports, 6-12/78,’ 
Plains File, Box 29, JCL. 
                 
210 
East trip to resolve differences. ‘It would be a risky, risky business,’ he admitted. ‘… [Y]ou should 
be prepared to play all of your cards. I had rather go on and have the showdown than to be bled 
slowly over the weeks and months ahead.’964 
Still, Carter was not ready to attempt such a journey. On 9 December, he sent Vance to the 
region. The president instructed him to pressure Israel, even at the consequence of losing the 
support of the Jewish community and the 1980 election.965 However, Israel did not accept Egypt’s 
new proposals on the timing for the exchange of ambassadors, priority of obligations and the nature 
of self-government in Gaza.966 Adding to the strain, the United States for the first time endorsed 
Egypt’s proposals in front of the Israelis, stoking Jerusalem’s fear that Cairo and Washington were 
colluding against it.967 
During his return journey, Vance received the response from the Israeli cabinet, which said 
it rejected ‘the attitudes and interpretation of the U.S. Government with regard to the Egyptian 
proposals.’968 The normally unflappable Vance grew, in Carter’s words, ‘extremely bitter.’969 A 
‘senior official’ on the secretary’s plane told reporters that Israeli intransigence was blocking an 
agreement and accused the Israeli cabinet of mischaracterising the rejected proposals.970 In turn, 
Israel’s Foreign Ministry took the rare step of formally and publicly protesting the U.S. 
accusation.971 Begin told the Knesset that Egypt, not Israel, had prevented conclusion of the treaty 
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by 17 December. ‘Not only our own people throughout the world are behind us, but enlightened 
public opinion says that … in vain … Israel been accused, in vain it has been blamed …’972 
A domestic backlash against the administration ensued. Pro-Israel factions alleged that 
Vance had pressured Israel to accept Egypt’s demands, and thus Washington had forfeited its role 
as an ‘honest broker.’ In statements, articles and letters, Israel’s friends moved quickly to counter 
Carter administration criticisms of Israel.973 
AIPAC complained that the administration’s recent ‘remarks cap a period of one-sided 
pressure on Israel and are extremely disturbing …’974 The American Jewish Committee’s Hyman 
Bookbinder expressed ‘outrage’ over what he felt were unfair accusations that Israel had prevented 
agreement. ‘I urge the immediate review of the present stance of the White House and a 
modification of this anti-Israeli campaign,’ Bookbinder concluded in a note to Ed Sanders, Carter’s 
liaison to the American Jewish community.975 On 15 December, Ted Mann, chairman of the 
Presidents’ Conference argued that the United States should push for a bilateral treaty, and resist 
attempts to link the Egypt-Israel pact with Palestinian autonomy or a comprehensive settlement. 
The following week, Mann and other Jewish leaders met with Vance as the administration tried 
anew to allay concerns. Mann also wrote to Carter behalf of his organisation, complaining about 
Washington’s position.976 The criticism did not alter administration policy, but clearly irritated 
Carter.977 
 
Full agenda 
The 17 December deadline passed without agreement. In a year-end review Vance and 
Carter judged that the Arab-Israeli issue was ‘the heaviest political burden’ and that the 
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administration would have been relieved to end its role in the ‘thankless’ talks. However, they 
decided to ‘continue to move aggressively’ and ‘not postpone the difficult decisions, even though 
they were costly to us in domestic politics’ by alienating the Jewish community and contributing to 
an image of an administration unable to achieve results.978 
Brzezinski suggested that Carter’s ‘direct and deep involvement’ would be necessary to 
fulfil Camp David. He also argued that the ‘deep suspicion’ felt by American Jewry toward the 
administration could only be overcome by conclusion of the treaty. Brzezinski believed that the 
wisest move would be to phase out Carter’s involvement after the treaty was signed and Palestinian 
autonomy talks initiated.979 
 In a separate memo, Brzezinski stressed that little time was left for movement on the 
Palestinian issue: 
… [F]or the good of the Democratic Party we must avoid a situation where we continue 
agitating the most neuralgic issue with the American Jewish community (the West Bank, the 
Palestinians, the PLO) without a breakthrough to a solution. I do not believe that in the 
approaching election year we will be able to convince the Israelis that we have significant 
leverage over them, particularly on those issues.980 
 
Mondale also viewed any discussion of U.S. contacts with the Palestinians – not necessarily the 
PLO – ‘with abhorrence,’ according to Carter.981 
 According to the vice president’s midterm prescription, the administration needed to 
improve its presentation of its interpretations of foreign events and its own polices. He stressed that 
Camp David was insufficient for domestic advantage. Conclusion of the peace treaty was 
imperative. Mondale also urged the president to weigh the need for progress on Palestinian 
autonomy against the potential domestic fallout of appearing to pressure Israel unevenly.982 
Of all the foreign policy challenges faced by the administration in early 1979, the overthrow 
of Shah Reza Pahlavi’s pro-American regime in Iran had the most direct impact on Arab-Israeli 
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policy. The shah had been Sadat’s closest regional ally and his ouster did not bode well for other 
U.S.-friendly regimes in the region.983 Sadat saw an opportunity for Egypt to fill the security void 
left by Iran in the Gulf. However, in order to do that, Cairo needed to retain good relations with the 
oil-producing Gulf states – and that meant insisting on linking the treaty with Palestinian issues. 
Second, Israel would no longer receive oil shipments from Iran, which under the shah had been its 
chief supplier. Consequently, Israel grew more insistent on compensation for giving up its Sinai oil 
wells, and sought oil supply guarantees from Egypt and the United States. Finally, U.S. analysts 
were concerned that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism could spill into Egypt, stiffening Sadat’s 
resolve against making concessions.984 
Meanwhile, American officials were sceptical that Saudi Arabia could replace Iran as 
Washington’s main Gulf ally. In February 1979, Adm. David Jones, the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, suggested for the first time the need for a ‘Carter Doctrine’ that would facilitate 
American projection of power into the Gulf as necessary.985 With the fall of the shah’s regime, 
Washington feared it could not ward off Soviet encroachment. This concern added to Carter’s 
desire to cement ties with Sadat, even if the peace treaty might fall short of what he had originally 
envisioned.986 Politically, Carter needed a success to rebut criticism that under his watch, the United 
States had fallen into decline. 
Brzezinski warned Carter that the United States was, ‘at home and abroad,’ seen as 
‘indecisive, vacillating and pursuing a policy of acquiescence.’ Due to what Brzezinski felt to be 
unfair press coverage, Carter was now seen as being buffeted by the philosophical differences 
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within his administration, rather than orchestrating them. He recommended Carter move quickly to 
combat the perception that he lacked control of his agenda.987 
Against this backdrop, public pessimism over the peace process grew. In January, a poll 
found that less than a quarter of Americans believed Camp David would lead to a lasting treaty.988 
Later that month, a separate survey found that a plurality – 47 percent – of Americans disapproved 
of the way Carter was handling foreign policy and a majority – 53 percent – did not believe he 
displayed strong leadership.989 
The White House decided ministerial-level talks would not suffice; the president needed to 
deal directly with the leaders. Sadat, insisting that Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil had full 
authority to negotiate on his behalf, refused an invitation of another Begin-Carter-Sadat summit. 
Begin, however, came to Washington on 1 March. 
In their meetings, Begin made a significant concession on the priority of obligations issue. 
Compromises were also made on language indicating linkage between the peace treaty and the 
Palestinian autonomy negotiations – wording that Israel felt was sufficiently ambiguous to 
accept.990 Major disagreements lingered, however, over future Egyptian oil sales to Israel and the 
timing for the exchange of ambassadors after signing of the treaty. 
 
Carter decides 
 Carter recalled that the trip provoked ‘the biggest argument’ of his presidency between him 
and his advisors because of the perils involved in travelling to the Middle East with the successful 
conclusion of a treaty in doubt.991 Only Brzezinski and Jordan believed the president should take the 
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risk.992 Carter realised that ‘a nonproductive trip by the President of the United States to the Middle 
East would greatly dramatize the failure,’ but proceeded anyway.993  
 Carter’s decision appears to have had at least two immediate triggers. According to 
Brzezinski, Carter made his final decision 5 March after Sadat informed him that he wanted to 
come to the United States to denounce Israel’s positions in front of Congress, the media and 
American public.994 Moreover, Begin’s comments to the press while in the United States that talks 
were near collapse also likely influenced Carter’s final decision.995 In his diary, Carter expressed 
frustration with Begin. ‘I’ve not been able to penetrate past him to other members of the cabinet, the 
Knesset, or the Israeli people. He deliberately distorts our position and spreads lies through the 
news media.’996 
In both cases, the president was concerned that public recriminations would destroy what 
goodwill remained between the parties. Rather, Carter sought to increase pressure on both sides by 
intensifying his involvement and trying to speak directly to the (Israeli) public, whose support he 
believed would lead Begin’s government toward agreement. Thus, despite Brzezinski’s periodic 
advice for Carter to limit his personal role in the negotiations, the president again decided to risk 
political embarrassment by negotiating directly with both leaders. 
Regardless, before returning to Israel, Begin again appealed to Jewish leaders to support his 
aims. In New York, he told an audience of members of Jewish organisations that the American 
Jewish community wielded great influence. ‘When the time comes don’t hesitate to use that 
influence,’ he urged.997 Begin’s words served as a reminder to the White House of the connection 
between the negotiations and Carter’s own political fortunes. 
Indeed, Carter’s domestic position had become increasingly difficult. He had grown acutely 
concerned about attacks on him by members of his own party, especially Sen. Edward Kennedy 
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(Mass.), who was preparing for a campaign to challenge Carter for the Democratic nomination in 
1980, as well as Church, who was trying to use Carter’s strains with Israel for his own domestic 
advantage.998 In January, the president’s brother drew unwanted attention for allegedly making an 
anti-Semitic remark while hosting a Libyan delegation.999 
Ahead of his own departure, Carter sent Brzezinski to Cairo to lay the groundwork with 
Sadat. Carter asked Brzezinski to present Sadat with a strategic review of the situation, outline the 
new proposals and to inform the Egyptian leader ‘very privately that the President’s domestic 
political situation was becoming more difficult and that Begin might even wish to see the President 
defeated.’1000 Brzezinski cabled back to Washington that Sadat was ‘extraordinarily eager’ to make 
Carter’s visit a ‘massive success.’1001 
 Only days before Carter’s departure, a new poll found that a plurality – 48 percent – of 
respondents disapproved of the way Carter was handling his job as president.1002 Although the 
mission to Cairo and Jerusalem involved political perils, if successful, it would provide an 
opportunity for Carter to look presidential and generate political capital at home. 
 Carter planned his trip to be open-ended, with the hope that agreement could be reached and 
the treaty signed while he was in the region.1003 Most news outlets shared the assumption that Carter 
sought a media spectacle to boost his sagging political performance.1004 Most of the reporting and 
editorials prior to Carter’s arrival in Cairo noted that the president was staking not only his prestige, 
but also that of the entire United States, on the outcome of his trip. Moreover, reporters and 
commentators saw a threefold urgency for Carter: to conclude bilateral negotiations, to reverse the 
tide of U.S. foreign policy setbacks in the region, and to help revive the president’s political 
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fortunes at home.1005 AIPAC similarly supported Carter’s trip, but noted his trip was not merely to 
conclude the treaty, ‘but because of his need for a foreign policy success.’1006 Still, The New York 
Times’ editorial board wrote disapprovingly, ‘This is not our idea of model diplomacy.’1007 
The news media, which had acquiesced to the Camp David restrictions, were less 
accommodating six months later. Some journalists accused the White House of releasing 
information on the status of the talks in such a way as to present a dramatic victory for the president 
or to apply pressure on Israel. Subsequently, several outlets appeared to temper their coverage of 
the diplomatic achievement, which administration officials claimed dampened its political 
benefits.1008 
 
Lingering issues 
 In Egypt and Israel, Carter sought to address three issues. First, Egypt was reluctant to grant 
Israel preferential access to Sinai oil, as sought (along with U.S. guarantees) by Jerusalem. Second, 
Egypt wanted Israel to grant self-government first to Gaza and to permit an Egyptian political-
consular presence there. Finally, Israel wanted a prompt exchange of ambassadors upon the signing 
of the peace treaty, but Egypt wanted to defer that until Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai. 
 Carter’s first stop was Egypt, where most of the time was devoted to showcasing the 
intimacy of U.S.-Egyptian relations. ‘I hope we will never let you down. You are probably the most 
admired statesman in the United States,’ Carter told Sadat. Sadat’s advisors, however, pressed 
Carter and Vance to persuade Israel to allow for greater linkage between the treaty and autonomy, 
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especially in Gaza. As Carter departed on 10 March for Israel, Sadat took the unusual step of 
granting him authority to negotiate on Egypt’s behalf.1009 
In Jerusalem, the first Begin-Carter meeting was tense and unproductive. The prime minister 
informed the president that he would not sign an agreement until proposals had been submitted to 
the cabinet for approval, followed by an eight-to-10 day Knesset debate. Carter ‘couldn’t believe it. 
I stood up and asked him if he thought it was necessary for me to stay any longer.’ Carter was 
convinced that Begin would risk failure on an Egyptian-Israeli deal in order to block progress on 
autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza.1010 
 The following day, Sunday, featured three meetings between the American delegation and 
the Israeli cabinet. Carter restated that he would like to ‘conclude the negotiations and all of the 
terms of the peace treaty today.’ If agreement was not reached during his visit, Carter added, it 
likely never would be. Begin again deflated the president’s hopes: any proposals would need to be 
approved by the cabinet and presented to the Knesset.1011 Further discussions centred on specifics of 
language, leading U.S. officials to suspect that Begin was merely stalling to gain the upper hand. 
When Begin remarked that it might take a couple of days for negotiators to agree on suitable 
language, Carter interjected: ‘But I don’t have two days.’1012 
 For the president, the situation only worsened. During a state dinner that evening, Begin 
announced that Israel remained unhappy. ‘It’s my duty to say that we have serious problems to 
solve until we can sign the peace treaty with Egypt,’ he said.1013 Carter visibly blanched.1014 
‘There’s been some discussion about whether to send [Carter] back to Washington or back to 
Atlanta,’ an Israeli official said.1015 
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The tensions between Begin and Carter openly erupted during Monday’s meetings. Carter, 
frustrated by Begin’s interruptions while discussing access to Palestinians in the territories, at one 
stage said testily to the premier: ‘Let me finish.’ This issue was ‘crucial,’ the president believed, for 
the success of the talks and for maintaining the integrity of the United States. Begin, feeling 
pressured by the president, responded: ‘Mr. President, we shall sign only what we agree to and we 
shall not sign anything to which we do not agree.’1016 Carter lamented: ‘It was a fruitless 
session.’1017 
On Monday afternoon, Carter went to the Knesset for a live, televised speech. Here was his 
opportunity to speak directly to the people of Israel – but one turn of phrase nearly torpedoed 
Carter’s entire mission. ‘The people of the two nations are ready now for peace. The people of the 
two nations are ready now for peace,’ Carter repeated with careful emphasis. ‘The leaders have not 
yet proven that we are also ready for peace, enough to take a chance.’1018 According to Ambassador 
Lewis, White House speechwriters and the embassy’s political officer collaborated on the speech, 
but Carter personally added that phrase about ‘the people.’1019 It offended Begin. In his diary, Carter 
defended the comment, which he insisted was ‘accurate and needed to be said.’1020 
Shortly afterward, Begin told Vance that after discussion, the government stood by its 
position. Begin also complained that Washington showed sympathy for Egypt’s positions, but never 
for Israel’s. Desperate for movement, Vance proposed that two issues holding up negotiations – 
Israeli access to Egyptian oil from Sinai and the presence of an Egyptian consular officer in Gaza 
during autonomy talks – ‘that were not rooted’ in Camp David be dropped from the treaty. Begin 
then handed Vance a copy of a draft joint communiqué, which stated that ‘further important 
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progress’ had been achieved and that all sides agreed to keep talking.1021 Israel appeared ready to 
end the talks without agreement, but Vance’s proposal planted a seed. 
After the meeting, Carter ordered preparations to depart the following day. He scheduled a 
final breakfast meeting with Begin but his trip had apparently failed. Still, although it had not 
reproduced the claustrophobic pressure of Camp David, Carter’s visit created a fresh imperative. By 
co-opting both countries into his initiative, failure would have damaged all involved, as well as their 
alliances with Washington. This dynamic raised the stakes for all sides. 
 Unbeknownst to the Americans, a number of Israeli ministers remained dissatisfied with the 
outcome. Following the last meeting involving Begin and Vance, Dayan convened a rump session 
of the cabinet, without the prime minister, to find a way around the impasse. 
  
Breaking the news 
Powell had the task of briefing reporters on the status of the talks. Begin’s spokesman had 
just characterised the negotiations in generally positive terms, further irritating the Americans, who 
felt Israel did not understand the depth of disagreement between it and the United States and Egypt. 
‘The need to put things back into perspective was apparent,’ according to Powell. Although by then 
aware that Dayan had convened a meeting, Powell decided not to raise hopes.1022 
 Powell’s briefing was successful for what it did not say. He refused to respond to leading 
questions as to whether he was personally ‘happy’ with the outcome. ‘I hope you understand the 
position I am in, in the sense that it is certainly not appropriate for me to say that I see very little 
possibility that these issues are going to be resolved,’ he said.1023 Powell also told reporters that the 
situation remained fluid, ‘so you’d better cover your ass.’1024  
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Most of the outlets attempted to hedge their coverage. Still, reports dramatised the mission, 
suggesting that Carter’s ‘gamble apparently came up a loser,’ that he was ‘abandoning’ hopes for a 
peace treaty, while also referencing the likely damage inflicted on the president’s prestige and 
possibly his political career.1025 Among the more judicious stories was that of The New York Times’ 
diplomatic correspondent, whose reporting held out the possibility of a ‘breakthrough’ in the 
morning talks. He had incorporated information given to him by an Israeli aide rather than relying 
entirely on White House sources.1026 
 Other journalists were less circumspect. CBS’ Cronkite led into that evening’s report by 
saying, ‘All indications now are that President Carter’s high-stakes gamble in the Middle East has 
failed ….’1027 In the next day’s Wall Street Journal, its White House correspondent reported that 
Carter’s peace mission had ‘failed. … While he may be given credit at home for trying, this failure 
undoubtedly will be cited by his critics as one more example that the President, though well 
meaning, simply can’t produce results.’1028 The AP’s White House correspondent also wrote a bleak 
piece: ‘President Carter is flying home via Cairo today, denied the triumph he had hoped to achieve 
…’1029 
 The distortions in the coverage stemmed from various factors. Deadlines were one issue. 
Broadcasters went on air in the evening, but newspapers had at least several more hours before 
going to press. Correspondents for West Coast publications typically had a few more hours to file, 
while wire reporters often had to file one story simultaneously for both morning and afternoon 
clients. Consequently, some correspondents sought to stretch the scanty information provided by 
Powell further than it could cover. 
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Structural factors also led to problems. For example, many of the negative reports emanated 
from the White House press corps rather than from diplomatic or foreign correspondents. White 
House reporters, as political correspondents versed in horse-race journalism, tend to focus their 
coverage on ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ That frequently led journalists to cover diplomatic negotiations 
in the same way as political campaigns: who was up and who was down, with the need for a clear 
victor. This tendency, compounded by the need for journalists to fill the information void left by 
Powell’s briefings, contributed to the distorted coverage. 
 ‘Any foreign policy initiative and any foreign policy trip by an American leader is not only 
diplomatic but political in nature, and … not only has foreign policy implications but clearly has 
domestic implications,’ according to a former White House and foreign correspondent. ‘You 
couldn’t write a story going into a summit meeting … without being aware that Jimmy Carter was 
in a lot of trouble (domestically).’1030 Journalists use this device because it helps frame issues for 
their domestic audience. However, in this case it magnified Carter’s difficulties by conflating his 
domestic struggles with his diplomatic challenges. 
 However, while some journalists formed their own conclusion on the state of the talks on 12 
March, Powell deserves much of the blame. By his own admission, he attended a party thrown for a 
correspondent after the briefings rather than enquire about Dayan’s meeting.1031 If he had done so, 
Powell could have learned of the ongoing contacts and thus helped those journalists with later 
deadlines. Such an act could have mitigated some of the criticism levied toward Carter by providing 
a more accurate picture of the negotiations. 
Regardless, by the time the accounts of 12 March’s disappointing surfaced in American 
outlets, the situation in Jerusalem was already changing. Ahead of Carter’s breakfast meeting with 
Begin, Vance sent the president a memo outlining the remaining issues and suggested formulations 
developed by the American delegation at Dayan’s suggestion.1032 The Israeli foreign minister had 
                                                
1030 Smith interview. 
1031 Powell, Other Side, 101. 
1032 Memo with attachments from Vance to Carter, 13 March 1979, Folder: ‘Middle East—President’s and Brzezinski’s 
Trips: [2/27/79-3/15/79],’ Brzezinski Donated, Box 14, JCL. 
                 
223 
told Vance the cabinet would accept American guarantees of Israel’s oil supply and an accelerated 
timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. In exchange, Dayan suggested the side letter neither 
mention Gaza as a special case nor refer to an Egyptian officer there.1033 
 The breakthrough came the morning of 13 March, first in a meeting between Begin and 
Carter, followed by a larger gathering involving Brzezinski, Dayan, Vance and Weizman. Carter 
presented the proposals recommended by Dayan and Vance as his own; Begin agreed to 
recommend them to the Knesset. Carter also suggested that Israel consider taking unilateral steps to 
ease conditions for Palestinians in the territories. Begin replied that he would sympathetically 
consider the request. For the Americans, that was as good as an agreement. 
The next step was to take the agreements to Sadat for approval. Greeting Sadat, Vice 
President Mubarak and Khalil at the Cairo airport later Tuesday, Carter told them his ‘assignment 
has been carried out satisfactorily. You’ll be pleased.’ In response to a request by Khalil to change 
one more word, Carter’s patience ran out: ‘For the last 18 months I, the President of the most 
powerful nation on earth, have acted the postman. I am not a proud man – I have done the best I 
could – but I cannot go back and try to change the language.’1034 Sadat agreed and approved the 
new proposals. 
Before Air Force One departed Egypt for the United States, Powell gathered journalists for 
one last briefing. Several reporters, concerned they had been used as instruments of diplomacy, 
expressed frustration over what they had felt had been Powell’s misleadingly pessimistic briefing 
the evening before. ‘Any time you think you can do better getting the news without any help from 
me, you are welcome to it,’ Powell said. ‘But I did the best I could to give an accurate portrayal of 
the situation last night …’1035 
However, Powell’s 13 March briefing provided hardly more information than the one the 
previous evening. ‘The problem was that I did not know exactly what had happened that morning to 
                                                
1033 Quandt, Camp David, 309-10. 
1034 NLC-128-11-18-15-2. 
1035 Transcript, Press conference, 13 March 1979, Folder: ‘3/7-13/79 President’s Trip to Egypt and Israel, Press 
Releases [1], 3/79,’ NSA, Brzezinski, Trips/Visits, Box 15, JCL 
                 
224 
turn defeat into victory,’ Powell later admitted. As a consequence, most journalists understood little 
about what had changed, except that the American delegation’s mood had brightened and success 
seemed at hand. Powell described a diplomatic success, but left the details scanty. He later noted 
with a touch of pride that rereading that briefing’s transcript, he found it ‘a model of double-talk 
and noninformation.’ On the plane ride back to Washington, one correspondent accused Powell of 
lying.1036 
This animosity helps explain some of the subsequent negative coverage. In their evening 
broadcasts on 13 March, both CBS and NBC cited Israeli officials’ complaints that the pessimistic 
American reporting on the status of the negotiations the previous day.1037 CBS’ White House 
correspondent also reported that “many” reporters speculated that the gloomy picture painted by 
U.S. officials was a campaign orchestrated by Rafshoon to make Carter ‘look as if he had 
accomplished a miracle in Jerusalem, something that might boost his ratings in the polls,’ once 
agreement came. A separate CBS report stated (erroneously) that the treaty would likely cost the 
taxpayer $10-20 billion, perhaps ‘the single most costly mediation effort in American history.’1038 
On 14 March, the Wall Street Journal’s White House correspondent similarly emphasised 
the treaty’s cost to American taxpayers. The reporter also speculated that despite Carter’s ‘apparent 
success … his sagging popularity isn’t likely to soar as sharply as it did after Camp David’ because 
of doubts that the treaty would bring lasting peace.1039 On 14 March UPI’s White House 
correspondent was more direct: 
[W]as the defeat-turned-victory a public relations coup? Some reporters who traveled with 
Carter believe White House press secretary Jody Powell painted an unnecessarily bleak 
picture during negotiations – either out of caution or hope that Carter might reap greater 
political benefit from a surprise agreement.1040 
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The coverage appeared to reflect journalists’ scepticism toward Carter, while showing only modest 
reservations about his role in the negotiations. 
These examples suggest that the outlets that produced the most pessimistic stories based on 
Powell’s 12 March briefing were also the ones most likely to frame the agreement in negative 
terms.1041 This dynamic likely stemmed in part from an attempt at editorial continuity: these media 
organs sought to report on the negotiations in a consistent manner, without allowing their stories to 
contradict flatly the previous day’s pieces.  
However, a more persuasive explanation may be that this coverage reflected a wider fissure 
in the White House—media relationship. The press, which had become antagonistic to a president 
whose competency it doubted, was primed for conflict, and failure. Consequently, most journalists 
were not predisposed to interpret the administration’s statements positively. 
Still, complaints by Carter and his advisors that the coverage played a prominent role in 
undermining domestic approval for the president’s achievement do not withstand scrutiny.1042 They 
imply that the negative tone diminished public appreciation for their accomplishments, and helped 
lead to lower poll ratings. Outlets indeed reported on the agreement from several angles. These 
reports tended to focus on the predicted negative reaction from other Arab states, concern that the 
pact did not deal adequately with the fate of the Palestinians and the cost of the treaty for U.S. 
taxpayers.1043 However, the vast majority of the reporting, opinion and analysis of Carter’s role was 
overwhelmingly positive.1044 
 Taking a wider approach, The New York Times’ editorial board praised the president’s 
performance as having electrified the country. ‘Thanks to Jimmy Carter, the making of a peace 
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treaty has become as exciting for Americans as the waging of war.’1045 Even AIPAC praised Carter, 
calling his mediation ‘masterful,’ although it warned the administration against trying to include the 
PLO in talks.1046 While the media viewed Carter’s tactics sceptically, ultimately the ends seemed to 
justify the means. 
 Meanwhile, the administration said 93 percent of the telephone calls, telegrams and letters 
about the negotiations received by the White House supported Carter’s role in the talks and their 
outcome. However, the tally before the 13 March announcement that a preliminary deal had been 
reached revealed greater fissures: only 35 percent of those who contacted the White House 
supported the president’s decision to travel to the region to push both sides toward an agreement.1047 
These figures suggest that public opinion roughly accorded with the press assessment that the result 
justified Carter’s personal involvement in the talks – but it perhaps would have been unforgiving 
had agreement not been reached. 
Carter later complained that he received only a single-point boost in approval ratings after 
the treaty was concluded.1048 Although the specific numbers depended on the survey, most polls did 
register a temporary jump. For instance, the president’s Gallup approval rating went from 37 
percent in February, to 47 percent immediately after the treaty deal was announced, and then back 
to 41 percent in early April.1049 In the CBS News/NYT poll, his approval rating moved from 37 
percent in late February to 42 percent one month later.1050 NBC News/AP polls similarly 
established a modest uptick in positive assessments of Carter’s overall performance.1051 
The low ratings were likely a factor of three dynamics. First, and perhaps most significantly, 
foreign policy rarely ranks highly among public concerns. Therefore, in any instance the treaty was 
unlikely to affect a major shift. The administration thus attached outsized political significance to 
Carter’s policy. Second, the dragged-out conclusion of the treaty likely wore out the American 
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public. For the six months after Camp David, as well as the 10 months prior to that, it had been 
reading headlines about incremental progress. By March 1979, the issue had exhausted the public’s 
patience and attention. Finally, Carter’s popularity among the public and the media had begun its 
downward spiral long ago; nothing short of a politically seismic event could have arrested it. 
Whatever its significance, a peace treaty did not affect the lives of most Americans and therefore 
mattered little in their overall assessment of their president. 
For now, the administration survived the virtual fusing together of Carter’s political fate 
with the resolution of a diplomatic crisis without major ill effects. Even the president himself fell 
into this trap upon his return to Washington on 14 March. ‘There were risks involved. They were 
pointed out to me by many people, political risks to me as President, therefore perhaps a risk even 
to the United States,’ he said.1052 
Carter’s statement again demonstrated the tensions that dogged him as a peacemaker-
politician. His dramatic, central involvement was sealed two weeks later when the treaty was signed 
in Washington rather than the Middle East. Carter had enmeshed the country more deeply in the 
peace process than ever before. Later, this tendency whereby every major international success or 
failure could be laid at the feet of the president created political problems for Carter, most notably 
with Iran.1053 
Brzezinski remained concerned about the president’s political exposure ‘in any post-peace 
follow-up. That follow-up is likely to be messy, and your accomplishment should stand on its own.’ 
The appointment of an envoy to conduct the autonomy negotiations on Carter’s behalf would allow 
the president to diminish his role, Brzezinski believed. Additionally, in order to limit negative Arab 
reaction, the president should emphasise three points: first, the goal remained a comprehensive 
peace; second, the Americans would seek to ‘resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects’; and, 
finally, that Washington still disapproved of Israeli settlement activity and would consider voting 
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against Israel at the United Nations on the issue.1054 These issues loomed large in the subsequent 
year. 
Nevertheless, the lingering issues were resolved in final talks in Washington, where the 
signing ceremony was held 26 March. The treaty served as a specific implementation of the 
principles developed at Camp David. The preamble indicates that the treaty was intended as a first 
step toward a ‘comprehensive’ peace and a resolution of the ‘Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects.’ 
Per Article One, Israel would withdraw from the Sinai to the international border, thereby restoring 
full Egyptian sovereignty, within three years. Full diplomatic relations would be established 
following the initial Israeli withdrawal. The other articles dealt with Sinai security, the deployment 
of U.N. troops, freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal, and further aspects of diplomatic 
normalisation, including the exchange of ambassadors 10 months after treaty ratifications.1055 
In two accompanying memoranda of agreement, Washington provided Israel with economic 
and military commitments, including a guarantee of Israel’s oil supplies for 15 years, in the event 
the pact was violated.1056 Egypt received no such guarantees. 
Finally, a joint letter from Sadat and Begin to Carter committed them to start talks on 
autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza within one month of treaty ratification. 
That allowed Begin to keep the Palestinian issue out of the treaty itself, while conversely Sadat 
clung to this letter as proof of linkage between the bilateral deal and Palestinian autonomy.1057 
 The signing ceremony finally represented the media-friendly event that the White House had 
craved. The administration invited a reporter to shadow Carter as he went about his daily business, 
an effort to dramatise the moment and showcase the president at his most statesmanlike.1058 U.S. 
networks devoted saturation coverage to the signing ceremony on the White House Lawn. ‘This is a 
day we hope will be remembered throughout history,’ ABC News’ anchor said as he opened his 
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network’s broadcast.1059 NBC covered the event with the greatest restraint, reminding viewers not 
to be overly optimistic because of the thorny nature of Middle East diplomacy.1060 
TV coverage had nearly come to define the peace process. ‘No one from any of the network 
news departments was asked actually to sign the Middle East peace treaties … but in a way the 
networks were parties to them,’ wrote one TV critic, who called the signing ‘an impressively staged 
theatrical production.’1061 This result was perhaps a logical climax of the year and a half since 
Begin and Sadat made an on-air agreement for the Egyptian leader to visit Israel. 
Although Carter’s objective in Arab-Israeli negotiations had been scaled back in part due to 
domestic factors, many commentators believed the burden for making the treaty work fell heaviest 
on the president. He needed to demonstrate ‘toughness’ at home and abroad, especially on the 
Palestinian issue, commented ABC’s Howard Smith. ‘Mr. Carter must press Israel on that question 
(of an independent Palestinian homeland) even at the cost of the enmity of American Jewry,’ he 
argued.1062 
Indeed, the most striking feature of the post-Camp David negotiations is the downgrading of 
Palestinian issues. At Camp David, the fate of the Palestinians in the occupied territories had been a 
primary, maybe even the primary, point of contention. Carter’s ability to push on West Bank and 
Gaza had been circumscribed by the sentiment of the pro-Israel lobby and broader domestic 
constraints. 
Begin would never have renounced completely his ideological attachment to the West Bank 
and Sadat’s primary interest remained in achieving a bilateral treaty that would help right his state’s 
economic ship. Yet intense U.S. psychological pressure at Camp David had helped Begin yield on 
at least two points: the acceptance of ‘Palestinian legitimate rights’ and the dismantlement of the 
Sinai settlements.1063 Although Carter told his advisors that he believed Sadat ‘did not give a damn 
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about the West Bank,’ the only way for the Egyptian president to avoid total regional isolation 
would be positive movement for the Palestinians.1064 
The Arab League denounced Egypt for making peace with Israel. It suspended Egypt’s 
membership and moved its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis.1065 The PLO’s Arafat expressed 
outrage.1066 In the territories, West Bank leaders similarly rejected the treaty and the proposals for 
autonomy.1067 Moscow criticised Carter’s push for the bilateral agreement and emphasised its 
support for the Palestinians.1068 
The American public welcomed the treaty, though perhaps not as enthusiastically as the 
administration had hoped. By the time the ceremony had taken place, many felt jaded by the 
decades of conflict and counter-conflict in the Middle East, and were uncertain about the durability 
of peace.1069 According to an AP-NBC News poll, a plurality of Americans – 43 percent – did not 
believe that the Egypt-Israel pact would act as a springboard for agreements with other Arab 
countries.1070 
Moreover, it remained unclear what implications would arise from a broken treaty now that 
Washington was so committed to the pact. The public appeared reluctant to support further U.S. 
moves to make the treaty work. According to one poll, only one in five respondent supported the 
proposed increases in aid and weapons for Egypt and Israel, while just one in three favoured selling 
oil to Israel if it was unable to buy it elsewhere. Moreover, only 27 percent believed long-term 
peace between Egypt and Israel was likely.1071 The administration, which scheduled a lavish White 
House ceremony following the signing, was no doubt displeased that the excitement over the treaty 
did not linger long in Americans’ minds. 
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Still, although Carter’s overall approval ratings saw neither a significant nor lasting jump, 
the public believed he played a positive role in the Middle East. Americans displayed less 
enthusiasm for his decision to travel to the region at the last minute, however. The polls 
demonstrate that Carter’s approval rating on foreign policy rose more than his overall ratings; in the 
case of the NYT/CBS News polls, his foreign policy approval jumped 14 percent.1072 
These results suggest that the public’s appreciation for Carter’s role was incident-specific, 
and did not extend to the rest of his presidency. Any political benefits generated by Carter’s 
demonstration of presidential persuasion was offset partly by the concomitant media coverage that 
depicted a leader desperate for success, even one that was short of what he had initially sought. 
 
Conclusion 
 Carter later admitted that his March 1979 journey put him in a ‘much more vulnerable 
political posture’ than at Camp David.1073 In his travels to Egypt and Israel, the president bucked 
protocol by deeply immersing himself in final negotiations on foreign soil. Carter outdid even 
Kissinger: by placing the president at the centre of negotiations, he set a precedent whereby little 
progress could be achieved without direct involvement from the occupant of the Oval Office. 
In his trip to Egypt and Israel, Carter’s dual roles of politician and peacemaker clashed, with 
one serving to weaken the other. Carter’s domestic troubles led Washington to blur the line between 
mediator and participant. As a mediator, Carter sought to facilitate any agreement between Egypt 
and Israel. As a participant, however, he had his own objectives. 
Domestic forces did not play a decisive role in Carter’s negotiations in Egypt and Israel, but 
likely influenced his position on the Palestinians. The pro-Israel lobby, White House perceptions of 
public opinion and elite consensus had established the guidelines within which Carter could 
work.1074 By March 1979, Carter could not afford to apply pressure on the Palestinian issue; too 
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many foreign policy challenges were in play. Strategically, Washington had become more 
concerned about stability in the Gulf than the fate of the Palestinians and consequently saw Egypt 
and the Gulf states, not Israel, as strategic allies.1075 However, a treaty that included firmer linkage 
on the Palestinian issue may have gained the support of other Arab states, thus making more 
strategic sense. 
Moreover, agreement was reached only after Washington pledged generous assistance to 
both countries, but especially Israel. Egypt was promised $1.5 billion in aid over the next three 
years. Israel, however, received $10.2 billion in American aid over the following four years, 
including $3 billion to help construct new air bases. This package far outstripped aid provided by 
any previous administration to Israel. Although these sums aroused media attention, their passage 
was guaranteed by strong pro-Israel sentiment in Congress. Thus, even amid a recession, both the 
Senate (73-11) and the House (347-28) overwhelmingly approved the package.1076 
The press did not determine the outcome of Carter’s negotiations in Egypt and Israel. 
However, in helping articulate, form and reiterate the political stakes for Carter, the media 
dramatised the consequences of failure. Conversely, reporters and commentators treated the 
president’s success conservatively, wary that any breakthrough would be tenuous. The coverage 
proved similar to public opinion: Carter was given credit for that specific success, but it did little to 
mitigate broader criticism of his presidency. 
The essential point is that Carter’s immersive diplomacy was predicated partly on 
assumptions about his need for a political victory to boost his domestic fortunes. A survey sent to 
the White House in April underscored Carter’s woes. Although a majority of respondents approved 
of Carter’s foreign policy, his approval rating continued to slip and, by a factor of more than 2-to-1, 
likely primary voters favoured Kennedy over the president. When asked about Carter’s specific 
accomplishments, his work on the Middle East topped the list, domestic and foreign, by a 
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considerable margin. Perhaps most tellingly, however, respondents only listed foreign policy 10th 
among major issues, below ‘pocketbook’ concerns such as inflation, taxes and unemployment.1077 
A speedy conclusion of the treaty could have changed the dynamic – it would have built on 
Camp David’s momentum, had salutary effects on the Democrats’ fortunes in the 1978 midterms 
and avoided six months of grinding negotiations. Moreover, the shah’s regime in Iran was 
crumbling but still intact in October 1978. A swift treaty resolution might have altered the way 
Washington approached those months of the revolution. 
 However, the delay in finalising the treaty had its most direct impact on Palestinian 
autonomy talks. Carter could have become personally involved in those negotiations, rather than 
delegating the task to special negotiators, because the domestic political calendar would have 
afforded him more time. By April 1979, the president’s re-election campaign loomed imminently 
and he could not afford to provoke further controversy by pressuring Begin. Instead, Carter’s policy 
in 1979-1980 was completely dominated by electoral concerns. 
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Chapter Eight: Blurred Lines – Carter, the Campaign and Final Troubles 
with the Politics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy, 1979-1980 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Foreign policy should offer you the greatest opportunity for the exercise of Presidential 
leadership, in a manner that could significantly influence the outcome of the elections,’ National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advised President Carter three months prior to Election Day 
1980. However, he added, ‘our biggest problem is … the need to get our story out more forcefully 
and effectively.’1078 Yet during the last year and a half of Carter’s term, even the Camp David 
Accords, which Brzezinski hoped to highlight as the president’s greatest foreign policy 
achievement, provided little political comfort to a president ricocheting from one crisis to another. 
 This chapter contends that in 1979-1980 the line dividing Carter’s Arab-Israeli policy from 
his domestic position had become virtually invisible. As the election approached, Carter’s inability 
to separate the domestic from the diplomatic burst into plain view. The circular pattern of influence 
had become set; each area served to reinforce the other. The Arab-Israeli dispute had little to do 
with Carter’s electoral fortunes. However, his experience underscored the hazards of staking his 
primary foreign policy legacy on such a domestically contentious area. 
With conclusion of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the focus of diplomatic activity turned to 
the stickier half of the Camp David Accords: Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. The United States held a supervisory role in the autonomy talks, which were held between 
Egypt and Israel beginning in May 1979. The negotiations, which took place without Palestinian 
representation, were intended to create the basis for self-government in the occupied territories. 
Carter, increasingly consumed by his re-election campaign, remained aloof from the 
negotiations. Instead, the president appointed a special negotiator – first Robert Strauss and, later, 
Sol Linowitz – to act as a ‘political shield’ to protect him from the negotiations’ domestic 
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repercussions.1079 ‘If anyone can keep these negotiations on track and protect me from the Jewish 
community politically, it’s Bob Strauss,’ the president believed.1080 
Yet Carter could not escape the domestic politics of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The autonomy 
talks, with diminished American participation, proceeded haltingly. Even relatively meagre U.S. 
efforts to bring Palestinians into the negotiations faltered in part due to domestic considerations: 
U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young was forced to resign following his unauthorised meeting with the 
PLO’s U.N. envoy, about which he subsequently misled the secretary of state. The fallout created 
strains between the American Jewish community and African-Americans, both prime components 
of the Democratic coalition.1081 Six months later, a communications breakdown led Young’s 
successor to vote in favour of a UNSC resolution criticising Israeli policy in East Jerusalem – 
contrary to Carter’s wishes. The president disavowed the vote, a sequence of events that wrecked 
his credibility with Israel and its U.S. supporters, as well as Arab states, and contributed to his 
defeat in the New York primary.  
Full explanations for the failure of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations, which were 
finally suspended in June 1982, lie beyond the scope of this chapter. Previous works on the 
autonomy talks suggest they only ever had slim chances for success for three primary reasons: first, 
the Begin government’s extremely narrow definition of Palestinian autonomy; second, lack of U.S. 
political will; and, finally, the absence of Palestinian representation.1082  
U.S. policy toward the Palestinians has been the focus of an increasing body of 
scholarship.1083 Pressman demonstrates that a genuine concern for Palestinian rights motivated 
Carter, but never did those rights fully trump Israel’s concerns for security. Ultimately, Carter 
intended to create a framework for negotiations toward Palestinian self-determination intended to 
                                                
1079 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 438. 
1080 24 April 1979, Carter, Diary, 315. 
1081 ———, Keeping Faith, 501-02. 
1082 Said, 'Peace and Palestinian Rights.'; Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 240-78; Tessler, Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, 514-31. 
1083 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine, 157-94; Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 
1945, 117-19 and 54-59; Harvey Sicherman, Palestinian Self-Government (Autonomy): Its past and Future  
(Washington: Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), 21-34; Terry, 'Carter Administration and the Palestinians.' 
                 
236 
outlast Begin’s Likud government.1084 The latest scholarship, however, reveals that Washington 
acquiesced to Israeli efforts to limit Palestinian autonomy.1085 
Regardless, none of these works sufficiently address the political drag that Carter’s Arab-
Israeli diplomacy had on his fortunes at home. Thus, through analysis of multiple archives, media 
sources, oral histories and public opinion surveys, this chapter explores how domestic politics 
informed Carter’s approach toward the negotiations, why the U.N. missteps cost the administration 
so dearly and how the president’s political needs helped doom efforts to bring the promise of the 
Camp David Accords to fruition. 
 
Starting the talks 
The PLO denounced the Egypt-Israel treaty and the autonomy negotiations. Washington 
came under particularly withering attack: in May, Arafat declared the United States the ‘principal 
enemy’ of the Palestinian people for mediating the treaty without a clear provision for the 
Palestinians.1086 The rival Peoples’ Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Marxist group, labelled 
the autonomy plan a ‘liquidationist scheme’ that constituted a ‘major element in the overall 
imperialist settlement.’1087 Nevertheless, in the initial months the administration moved cautiously 
toward trying to expand the negotiations to include Palestinian representation – possibly even the 
PLO. 
Two weeks after the Egypt-Israel treaty was signed, Brzezinski advised Carter on how to 
employ the administration’s foreign policy for political gains. ‘It is important that in 1980 you be 
recognized as the President both of Peace and Resolve,’ Brzezinski argued. In terms of priorities, he 
advised: 
… [G]iven the inevitable domestic time pressures, you will need to discriminate very 
carefully in the future between the things you must do in order to maintain momentum in 
your foreign policy and to shore up your important tangible accomplishments; the things 
that you should do because of their potentially positive impact on both foreign policy and 
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domestic politics; and things that you should not do because they either detract from your 
foreign policy accomplishments or because they would complicate your domestic political 
situation. 
 
In the final category, Brzezinski included the autonomy negotiations, ‘because of their impact on 
the Jewish community.’1088 This thinking deeply informed the administration’s approach toward the 
process. 
This shift in tactics concerned the regional actors, particularly Egypt. Cairo pushed for an 
expansive definition of Palestinian self-government, largely to prevent further isolation from other 
Arab states. Although Egypt’s stance toward involving Palestinians – especially the PLO – in 
negotiations was ambivalent, it nevertheless needed Washington to influence Israel. The month 
after the treaty was concluded, Egyptian Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal expressed ‘deep concern’ to 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that he and Carter were ‘walking away from the Middle East 
problem’ during the autonomy talks.1089 
Ghorbal’s conclusion was not surprising. Spring 1979 was a troubled time for U.S. 
policymaking. The ink was barely dry on the Egypt-Israel treaty when Ayatollah Khomeini returned 
to Iran, which remained in post-revolutionary ferment.1090 In addition to upending the U.S. security 
framework in the region, Iran’s oil production had nearly halted after the revolution. By summer, 
the White House won a temporary increase in Saudi oil production to compensate for Iran’s loss. 
However, that resulted in a stronger desire to placate the Saudis: progress on Palestinian autonomy 
was needed.1091 
In Washington, divisions between Brzezinski and Vance, which had heretofore been muted 
in Arab-Israeli policy, began to surface. A meeting in May revealed how central Vance believed the 
Arab-Israeli and Palestinian issues to be for Middle East and Gulf security, and why he attached 
deep significance to the autonomy talks. ‘I think it is clear that the basic sources of instability are 
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the Arab-Israeli conflict, plus inter-Arab tensions. There is also the Palestinian problem …’ Vance 
said. Defense Secretary Harold Brown concurred. However, Brzezinski and Energy Secretary James 
Schlesinger disagreed, arguing that the primary threat to Gulf stability came from external forces: 
the Soviets and nearby Moscow-backed states.1092 
Nevertheless, Carter decided to appoint a super-negotiator for the autonomy talks who could 
work for U.S. interests while also providing political protection-by-distance for the president. 
However, when making this selection, domestic necessities trumped diplomatic concerns. Carter 
tapped Robert Strauss, a former Democratic National Committee chairman and trade negotiator, to 
manage the American role in the talks. 
Strauss turned out to be a poor choice. Brzezinski believed he had taken up the appointment 
thinking it would turn him into a ‘Democratic Henry Kissinger, a mass-media star, the new 
peacemaker in the Middle East,’ but effectively gave up when obstacles arose.1093 Strauss’ rough-
hewn, Texas style did not translate well into the Middle East. For example, his tendency to use 
coarse language startled Egyptian and Israeli negotiators, and did not help build rapport. According 
to one U.S. diplomat, Strauss once voiced his frustration by telling both delegations that 
‘negotiating with you people is like wiping your ass with a wagon wheel. It never ends.’1094 
Moreover, as he later confessed, he simply lacked knowledge. ‘There were a lot of things I couldn’t 
do well out there because I didn’t know the issues well enough …’ Strauss said.1095 
Strauss’ appointment led to tensions with Vance. The secretary of state erupted in anger 
when Carter announced at a foreign-affairs breakfast that he would delegate responsibility to 
Strauss in order to mitigate domestic political fallout and allow Vance to focus on other issues. 
‘There is Lebanon, there is the Palestinian question, there is the question of the U.N. Do you want 
me literally to do nothing? … If you don’t want me to do this, I am going to resign as secretary of 
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state.’1096 Ultimately, Vance remained in his post until the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt in 
1980. However, this period marked a growing estrangement between Carter and his secretary of 
state. 
Strauss was largely ineffective. ‘He had no expertise, (and) it was pretty clear he didn’t plan 
on acquiring any,’ a U.S. diplomat recalled. ‘His view of this was basically Texas politics. … You 
scratch my back, I’ll find a way to scratch yours, and let’s move on. … The kinds of things he was 
good at weren’t going to work there.’1097 U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis concurred. 
‘Initially, he (Strauss) decided that his tried and true negotiation techniques could work in the 
Middle East as they had everywhere else,’ he said. But that ‘Texan approach,’ using ‘bonhomie’ 
with Begin and Sadat, was ineffective, Lewis said.1098 
There was little love lost between Strauss, who bristled at the notion of reporting to anyone 
other than the president, and Carter’s foreign policymakers. ‘I felt the State Department, most of 
them in the Middle East section, were very anti-Israel, and I didn’t trust them as far as I could throw 
them,’ he said. As a result, Strauss insisted, ‘I didn’t swallow everything I was fed.’1099 Strauss, 
who had cabinet-level status as a result of his previous role as a trade negotiator, also conceded that 
he had ‘a lot of difficulty’ with the NSC. ‘I didn’t like the idea of being a member of the Carter 
cabinet and going back and reporting to … a bunch of people at the State Department,’ he said.1100 
According to Brzezinski, Strauss ‘was from the outset particularly concerned with the 
domestic implications of our Middle East policy, and … made it clear to Carter that any pressure on 
Israel would be damaging politically at home.’1101  Similarly, Vance was prepared from the 
beginning that the negotiations would also play out within the United States ‘in Congress and with 
domestic groups.’ The White House hoped the Camp David Accords could serve as a beachhead for 
a wider peace, and Vance considered the administration’s ‘primary substantive job at the outset’ to 
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be building Arab support for the process. A major effort in that regard was to halt, or at least 
sharply limit, Israeli settlement building. ‘A final factor to be kept in mind is that, of all the issues 
with Israel, this is the one on which we can expect the best support from the US public and 
Congress,’ Vance advised Carter.1102  
Vance emphasised the importance of gradually bringing Palestinians into the negotiating 
process, with the goal by the end of 1979 to achieve PLO acquiescence in the emergence of a 
‘moderate’ West Bank leadership that was willing to participate in elections. Consequently, he 
believed the United States needed to maintain contact with the PLO and take opportunities ‘to 
articulate the US position on the issues of importance to Palestinians.’1103 
Moreover, Vance suggested the need for a robust domestic strategy, ‘so that we can expect a 
significant body of public support in this country for our position when the time comes to come to 
grips with these issues in the negotiations.’ He recommended the administration consult regularly 
with Congress and take opportunities to ‘reiterate publicly’ the White House’s known stances on 
issues particularly important to the Arab states, especially Israeli settlements and the 
Palestinians.1104 
At a PRC on the autonomy talks held shortly afterward, senior policymakers agreed that the 
best issue to challenge Israel on was the settlements and that, for now, administration members 
should emphasise the importance of adhering to the principles of Camp David. ‘The most important 
thing would be to take a stand on settlements. … I would try through diplomatic channels to get this 
done,’ Vance said. Brzezinski and Strauss concurred. The national security advisor emphasised: 
‘Israel will try to narrow the issues, and Egypt to expand them. Then later, we can try to define the 
issues in accordance with Camp David. But we should just start with the principles of Camp 
David.’1105 
                                                
1102 Memo from Vance to Carter, ‘West Bank/Gaza Negotiations,’ 2 May 1979, NLC-15-32-6-68. 
1103 Ibid. 
1104 Ibid. 
1105 PRC meeting minutes, n.a., ‘West Bank, Gaza Negotiations,’ 17 May 1979, NLC-132-75-4-1-7. 
                 
241 
However, what emerges most clearly from the meeting is tension between Strauss and the 
policymakers, as well as the new negotiator’s insistence on building domestic support for the U.S. 
position in the talks. Tellingly, when Vance asked the group, ‘Is there agreement that the goal of the 
negotiations is an outcome of the West Bank and Gaza that gives real, or full, autonomy?’ Strauss 
immediately responded: ‘I don’t want us to take any more positions, especially if I didn’t shape 
them. I want things left open. … I don’t know what the issues are yet.’ Strauss continually stressed 
that emphasising Washington’s commitment to the negotiations would be sufficient, and that the 
United States should avoid specific issues, such as settlements and Jerusalem.1106 
True to Carter’s purpose in selecting Strauss, the domestic aspect of the negotiations loomed 
large. ‘There may be some perception growing that I was appointed simply to handle the domestic 
problems associated with the negotiations,’ Strauss fretted. Brzezinski agreed, and admitted that the 
United States was ‘losing on both sides,’ because Arab states feared Washington was going to 
succumb to domestic priorities and U.S. Jewish groups were concerned that the White House was 
going to pressure Israel.1107 Little was done to mitigate these concerns, however. 
 Later, Strauss emphasised the importance of preparing the way in Congress and among the 
American Jewish community: 
I need to meet with more Jewish leaders. … Begin has to see that he can regain American 
public support that he is now losing. … If he can handle his domestic situation in Israel, I 
could convince him that he could make a big gain in the United States. The American 
Jewish community is uncomfortable with this question of settlements. So is Congress. He 
would make gains here, even if not in relations with Egypt. … [E]ven if Begin has to pay a 
price at home, he can make up for it here.1108 
 
In believing that support for Begin inside the United States could somehow compensate for any loss 
of support inside Israel, Strauss displayed a deep ignorance of regional politics and overestimation 
of American influence in Israel’s internal affairs. 
Nevertheless, Strauss used his contacts with the Anti-Defamation League to commission a 
poll demonstrating Israel’s falling support in the United States because he knew Begin would 
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respect a survey from that source. ‘… I was concerned number one as an American and number two 
as a Jew and number three in terms of the direct responsibilities I had there,’ he said.  According to 
Strauss, the poll showed that Begin’s ‘intransigence and his attitude was hurting him and hurting 
Israel in the American community.’  However, Begin told Strauss the survey was meaningless and 
he would disregard its findings.1109 
In June, Jewish community liaison Edward Sanders weighed in. He advised the 
administration against pushing Israel on settlements. ‘I believe that the interjection of a U.S. 
program to pressure Israel to change its policy would be counterproductive,’ he advised. ‘I do not 
believe that we should interfere with the healthy debate going on in Israel and in the American 
Jewish community. Our interference will only boomerang.’1110 
Meanwhile, Carter’s fortunes continued to fall. Pollster Patrick Caddell sent the president a 
series of alarming memos indicating that he believed Carter needed to do something drastic to turn 
his presidency around.1111 That process culminated in Carter’s ‘crisis of confidence’ speech1112 and 
subsequent cabinet reshuffle,1113 which contributed to the image of an administration in disarray.1114 
 
Changing 242 
 In June 1979, the Palestine Committee of the United Nations – composed of 23 member 
states – began circulating draft resolutions on Palestinian rights, including a Palestinian state. By 
July, Kuwait’s U.N. delegation had taken the lead in attempting to revise 242 in such a way as to be 
acceptable to both Israel and the PLO. The aim of this endeavour was to find a way to allow PLO 
representation in the autonomy talks by devising an acceptable formulation on Palestinian rights 
that did not prejudice Israel’s right to exist. 
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 Egypt was eager to demonstrate it had not abandoned the Palestinian cause for the sake of a 
bilateral peace. In doing so, it hoped to alleviate its regional isolation. The Carter administration 
was basically sympathetic to Egypt’s position and, in the initial months of the tripartite 
negotiations, pursued a strategy to broaden the talks to include Palestinian representation. As the 
administration had previously discovered, however, Israel and its supporters viewed negatively any 
move toward allowing Palestinians into the peace process. 
 In summer 1979, the Carter administration again made attempts to prepare American public 
opinion for bringing Palestinians to the negotiating table. Rhetorically, members of the 
administration, including Strauss, Vance and Carter himself, frequently suggested that for genuine 
peace in the region, Palestinians would need to be included in the process. Just how that would be 
achieved, however, was left vague. 
 Israeli raids and strikes in southern Lebanon, intended to target Palestinian guerrillas, often 
occurred in areas policed by U.N. peacekeepers. Washington believed Israeli military activity to be 
disproportionate, and disapproved of Israel’s apparent disregard for the U.N. peacekeeping mandate 
in Lebanon. American policymakers agreed Washington should take the lead on consultations for a 
Security Council resolution on Palestinian rights ‘in order to seek an outcome that will preserve the 
primacy of the Autonomy Talks, demonstrate our good intentions to the Palestinians (and others, 
like the Saudis), while minimizing the political risks with the Israelis.’1115 
 During a wide-ranging interview shortly afterward, Carter compared the Palestinian issue to 
the ‘civil rights movement here in the United States.’1116 The remark provoked an angry response 
from the Jewish community and other Israel supporters inside the United States, prompting Vice 
President Walter Mondale to take the lead in denying any change in policy toward the PLO.1117 
 ‘… [W]hy did [Carter] choose an analogy that so clearly implied that Israel is in the right 
wrong?’ AIPAC complained. Carter painted the ‘emotional Palestinian issue in stark right-versus-
wrong terms,’ it added, and ‘increased the growing anxiety of Israeli negotiators who are trying 
                                                
1115 Minutes from Brzezinski to Carter, ‘Senior Level Meeting on Middle East Issues,’ 25 July 1979, NLC-33-3-4-1-7. 
1116 Leonard Silk, ‘Carter Expects Rise in Joblessness; Believes GOP Will Pick Reagan,’ NYT, 1 August 1979. 
1117 Jim Hoagland analysis, ‘U.S.-Israeli Feuding Revives Dilemma,’ WP, 4 August 1979. 
                 
244 
against severe odds to view the Carter administration as an evenhanded mediator in the Palestinian 
autonomy talks.’1118 Arnold Foster, Anti-Defamation League counsel, said: ‘Carter’s suggestion 
that the PLO is akin to civil rights is the worst insult he could level at Americans trying to achieve 
true equality. … Americans are not murderers or false revolutionaries.’1119 
Carter’s linkage of the plight of the Palestinians to the civil rights movement was no 
accident. Carter had long seen the Palestinians issue primarily in human rights terms,1120 which was 
something that grew out of his Southern roots.1121 
 Nevertheless, the responses to his comments underscored the persistent problems plaguing 
American administrations in trying to involve Palestinians in negotiations. The unfortunate 
conflation of the Palestinians with the PLO, with little regard for the distinction between the 
Palestinians as a people and the PLO as a political entity, made discourse on the issue virtually 
impossible. 
 On 3 August, Carter noted that he discussed with his advisors how best to proceed on the 
U.N. resolution on the Palestinians and how the administration ‘could move toward peace without 
committing political suicide.’ Again, Carter felt he needed Strauss to take the lead in dealing with 
‘the Israelis, American Jews, and Arabs.’ Strauss needed to be visible in order to ease pressure on 
the administration. ‘There’s no advantage for me or Vance to be in the forefront of this difficult 
issue. We can set the policy; Strauss can carry it out with more political impunity,’ the president 
believed.1122 
Faced with criticism over his Palestinian comments, Carter stated: ‘I’m against the creation 
of a separate Palestinian state. I don’t think it would be good for the Palestinians.’ He added that he 
believed the Palestinians ‘should have a right to a voice in the determination of their own future.’ 
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However, he was nebulous on how that would come about except to reiterate that Begin and Sadat 
had agreed to those principles at Camp David.1123 
Washington had meanwhile made clear its opposition to any U.N. resolution on Palestinian 
rights that might include a reference to a Palestinian state. It believed that a debate, confrontation 
and vote on the issue would be unhelpful at that stage in the autonomy talks. Ambassador Young 
thus sought to delay the Security Council’s consideration of the issue until new wording could be 
developed. 
 As part of this effort, Young on 26 July met with Zehdi Terzi, the PLO’s envoy to the 
United Nations, at the residence of the Kuwaiti ambassador to explain the American position. 
Although the meeting was brief and did not delve into substantive issues, it ran contrary to 
Washington’s Sinai II pledge to Israel not to negotiate with the PLO.1124 The Israelis learned of the 
meeting and leaked it to the media. Young at first denied that he had met with Terzi, before 
conceding they had indeed encountered one another, but that it had been inadvertent. Finally, 
Young admitted he knew Terzi would be present at the meeting.1125 
 Carter and Vance were furious. ‘This is an almost impossible problem to resolve without 
Andy leaving,’ Carter believed.1126 Carter insisted he would have fought to retain Young in his 
position if he had not initially misled Vance about the meeting.1127 In his letter of resignation to 
Carter, Young wrote: ‘I want you to fulfill the tremendous promise of your administration, and that 
depends to a great extent on a settlement … in the Middle East. It is therefore extremely 
embarrassing that my actions … may have hampered the peace process.’1128 Publicly, Young said it 
had been his decision to quit, but that he did not ‘feel a bit sorry for anything that I have done’ and, 
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given the same situation, he would do it ‘again almost exactly the same way.’1129 Carter accepted 
Young’s resignation ‘with deep regret.’1130 
 Young insisted the problem was that he admitted to the meeting, whereas the State 
Department had officially denied other U.S. contacts with the PLO. ‘There were a number of other 
meetings around … and we were denying them. And I was the only one who wouldn’t deny 
meeting with the PLO … and that pissed off the State Department,’ he said.1131 
The Young affair exacerbated tensions between Israel and the United States. Of all the 
issues of contention between the two countries, the Palestinian issue was perhaps the most sensitive 
for Israel. Young’s meeting with Terzi, moreover, appeared to many observers to be the latest in a 
string of U.S. gestures toward Palestinian representation in the West Bank talks.1132 
Regardless, as with so many other aspects of American Arab-Israeli policy, the incident 
quickly converted from a diplomatic issue into a domestic one. General public sentiment on 
Young’s resignation appeared to be mixed. According to one poll, a plurality of respondents (49 
percent) believed Young had been wrong to meet with Terzi.1133 However, another survey found 
that a majority – 55 percent – did not feel that Young should have lost his job over the incident.1134 
Still, as a general political issue, Young’s resignation gained little traction. As an ethnic political 
issue, however, it had more salience. 
Young was a prominent member of the African American community. He had been highly 
visible in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and was a former U.S. congressman. By the late 
1970s, many African Americans held politically influential positions, but none were as close to the 
president as Young, who like Carter hailed from Georgia. 
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Many prominent African Americans blamed the Jewish community for forcing Young to 
quit.1135 No evidence exists to support that claim. Alexander Schindler insisted the Presidents’ 
Conference made the “unanimous decision” not to call for Young’s ouster. It indicated it held the 
State Department, not Young, responsible.1136 AIPAC also stopped short of demanding that Young 
quit. Yet it believed that his meeting with Terzi was ‘but one sign of [a] policy shift’ toward 
American engagement with the PLO.1137 
A misleading New York Post front page that read, ‘Jews Say: Fire Young,’ fed the furore.1138 
Moreover, the site of the controversy – New York – exacerbated the situation because of the city’s 
function as the cultural centre for both the Jewish and African American communities. Carter, who 
was on a weeklong trip down the Mississippi as the controversy raged, took weeks to refute the 
accusation that pressure from the Jewish community had forced Young out, which allowed it to 
fester.1139 
The issue was especially sensitive to the president because of the importance of African 
Americans, whose support enabled Carter to carry the Southern states in 1976, and the Jewish 
community for the Democratic Party. According to one report, ‘extensive interviews with blacks, 
both rank-and-file and leaders’ across the United States ‘found hostility (toward Jewish Americans) 
that was often intense.’ Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Ind., said that the reactions of Israel and 
American Jewish groups indicated to the African-American community that they ‘didn’t realize 
how large a stake Andy had with us and how important he was and is to us. It … calls for a 
reassessment of black relations with the White House, the Jewish community and traditional 
attitudes toward Israel and the Arab world.’1140 
Surveys indeed revealed divisions. According to one poll, 39 percent of respondents 
believed Young’s resignation would ‘hurt relations between blacks and Jews in the U.S.’ a ‘great 
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deal’ or ‘to some extent,’ while a plurality – 42 percent – felt that ‘troubles in the Middle East’ had 
caused a great deal or some trouble ‘between blacks and Jews in the U.S.’1141 Moreover, despite 
attempts by Carter, Young and others to quell tensions, nearly a quarter (24 percent) of respondents 
to a separate survey believed the ambassador was forced to resign because ‘of pressure from 
Jews.’1142 
Meanwhile, a group of African American leaders expressed support for Palestinian ‘self-
determination’ after meeting with the PLO’s Terzi.1143 Black leaders called for a greater voice in 
U.S. foreign policy and some sought U.S. recognition of the PLO.1144 Sensing an opportunity to 
gain support, an editorial in the newsletter of the NAAA argued that ‘black involvement with the 
Middle East is now moving into broad-based, institutionalized frameworks that will provide 
vehicles for sustained effort.’1145 Separately, the PLO warned: ‘The Palestine Question is not only a 
fact in the Middle East, but it is becoming … a fact within American society. Whether the present 
U.S. Administration wants it or not, Palestine is coming.”1146 
After his resignation, Young received a flood of angry letters accusing him of betraying 
Israel. Many writers, some of whom forthrightly expressed racist views, claimed that Young’s 
decision to talk to the PLO was the equivalent of African American civil rights leaders in the 1950s 
and 1960s being willing to sit down to talk to the Ku Klux Klan.1147 
The problems over the Young resignation were as damaging to Carter for their timing as for 
the constituencies involved in the dispute. The push by Arab states for a U.N. resolution on 
Palestinian rights came at a delicate time, when Washington was trying to gain support softly for 
greater Palestinian representation in the autonomy process. Moreover, Young’s unauthorised 
                                                
1141 By contrast, 49 percent believed Young’s resignation would harm black-Jewish relations ‘not very much’ or ‘not at 
all.’ Gallup/Newsweek Poll, 29-30 August 1979, Roper Center. 
1142 LAT Poll, 9-14 September 1979, ibid. 
1143 Lee Lescaze and Thomas Morgan, ‘Black Leaders Back Palestinian Rights,’ WP, 21 August 1979. 
1144 Morgan and Lescaze, ‘Foreign Policy Voice Demanded By Top Blacks,’ WP, 23 August 1979. 
1145 ‘Blacks and the Middle East (II),’ Political Focus, 15 November 1979, Folder: ‘Arab-[American] Newsletters 
10/79-7/80,’ Aiello Files, Box 38, JCL. 
1146 ‘U.S. Administration in Disarray’ (editorial), Palestine PLO Information Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 15 (16-31 August 
1979), 3, IPS. 
1147 See Folder: ‘Palestine Liberation Organization, 1979,’ Box 201, AYP. 
                 
249 
meeting – and deception about it – contributed to an image of a president lacking control of his 
administration. 
The prospect for a Palestinian resolution triggered a debate within the Carter administration. 
Although the president and his top aides supported amending 242 into a resolution that would allow 
the PLO to accept Israel’s right to exist, several others did not. Sanders, the Jewish community 
liaison, believed any attempt to bring the PLO into the process through a reworking of 242 would 
lead to “almost certain catastrophe.” He urged the White House to ‘cease any activity at the UN’ on 
a Palestinian rights amendment and ‘indicate that we will veto any resolution in that forum.’ 
Instead, it should pour its efforts into making the autonomy talks successful.1148 His view was 
supported by Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, who believed the autonomy negotiations 
represented the ‘only’ forum for progress to be made on the Palestinian issue.1149 
Nevertheless, Strauss was tasked with presenting the administration’s proposals for 
reworking 242 to both Egypt and Israel. However, he did not disguise his lack of support for White 
House efforts and presented the plan unenthusiastically. Unsurprisingly, Begin and Sadat both 
rejected it.1150 
 The high-profile failure of Strauss’ mission – and his penchant for voicing his disagreements 
with policy to reporters – increased Carter’s problems even as he was reeling from the fallout from 
Young’s resignation. Upon Strauss’ return, The New York Times reported that he met with 
Brzezinski and Vance to clarify policy ‘against a background of apparent confusion and indecision’ 
in the administration’s Middle East approach.1151 The same newspaper asked in an editorial: ‘Is 
there an American Middle East policy, and if so, who is shaping it?’ and added that the ‘present 
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disarray is sad and pointless.’1152 The Wall Street Journal labelled U.S. policy in ‘flamboyant 
disarray.’1153 
 Against this backdrop, Brzezinski again argued that the president needed to display 
toughness and resolve. ‘I believe that both for international reasons as well as domestic political 
reasons you ought to deliberately toughen both the tone and the substance of our foreign policy,’ he 
advised1154 While Brzezinski was particularly concerned about U.S. policy toward the Soviet 
Union, the ‘disarray’ of Arab-Israeli policy also needed a corrective. 
 Regardless, efforts for a new U.N. resolution on Palestinian rights were quietly dropped in 
late August. Still, the episode left a residue of domestic political angst and largely ended Carter’s 
efforts to introduce a greater role for the Palestinians in the negotiations. His domestic political 
weakness contributed to Washington’s inability to move the talks forward. ‘We are concerned about 
the Mideast talks becoming stagnant, which may be the best state for them until Sadat gets his land 
(Sinai) back and we solidify our political support among American Jews,’ he noted in his diary.1155 
Events in the summer and autumn 1979 conspired against robust U.S. action in the 
autonomy talks. Moreover, the absence of a strong, unified American policy and lack of political 
will undermined efforts. ‘We made modest progress but not toward anything really substantive,’ 
Strauss conceded.1156 Those efforts became more difficult later in the autumn, when Strauss left his 
post to lead Carter’s campaign. In Strauss’ place, Carter tapped Sol Linowitz. 
 
Taken hostage 
However, events outside American control soon intervened. On 4 November, Iranian 
students took dozens of Americans hostage in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The crisis, which 
vividly suggested to Americans how weak their country had become, consumed the remainder of 
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Carter’s presidency and was only resolved in its final moments. Then, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December seemed to spell an end to détente and the Carter administration’s efforts 
to get the Senate to ratify SALT II. 
These events threw into doubt the administration’s policy assumption that its course in 
Arab-Israeli diplomacy offered the best route to stability in the Gulf region. Indeed, by the end of 
1979, a U.S. intelligence assessment concluded, ‘US influence in the area has declined, and 
manifestations of anti-American feeling have increased, in part because the United States is seen as 
irresolute, but basically as the result of a historical trend that is not likely to be reversed.’1157 
 Consequently, by the time Linowitz joined the autonomy talks, the media’s focus had turned 
to the Iran hostage crisis. Gone were the heady early months of the Carter administration, when the 
media played a central role in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Instead, neither the president nor the public 
displayed much interest in the autonomy talks; both were fixated on hostages in Tehran. 
Before Linowitz’s trip, he was advised to frame his work through an Iran prism. ‘It seems … 
that shock waves from Iran are going to spread pretty far in the Middle East, and these Washington 
correspondents might welcome the opportunity to get their own insights via a trip with you,’ a State 
Department official suggested.1158 Linowitz was also advised to make his first trip largely about 
rebuilding confidence in Carter’s commitment to the talks. ‘Your public image on this visit is 
almost as important as your private image,’ Linowitz’s special assistant suggested.1159 
 Moreover, Linowitz faced a challenge not just in attracting the attention of the media, but 
also the president. ‘Linowitz was working very hard trying to make progress but he did not have the 
energetic support that Carter had given prior peace accord efforts,’ Ambassador Lewis 
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commented.1160 Meanwhile, Dayan, often considered a moderating influence in Begin’s cabinet, 
resigned in October 1979, in part over differences with the premier over autonomy.1161 
 
A mistaken vote 
 Although the United States scaled back its effort to bring Palestinians into the negotiations, 
it remained opposed to Begin’s settlements policy, especially in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
By early 1980, the work of the U.N. Settlements Commission, which was mandated by UNSC 446 
‘to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, 
including Jerusalem,’ had generated momentum toward a fresh resolution condemning Israeli 
settlements.1162 Carter believed Begin undertook settlement construction to upset the autonomy 
negotiations and ‘to keep the Palestinians from becoming moderate and cooperative.’1163  
Meanwhile, a U.N. effort was afoot to devise a resolution that might accelerate the 
negotiating process, possibly including reworking 242. AIPAC was furious. ‘Changing 242 would 
be disastrous,’ it argued. ‘They should try to build on what has already proved successful, rather 
than try new formulas that could destroy the foundation of all that has been achieved.’1164 
From Tel Aviv, Lewis cabled that Begin had become ‘increasingly suspicious’ over the U.S. 
stance on a settlements resolution because Vance had seemed evasive about the American position. 
According to Lewis, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald McHenry, who had succeeded 
Young, told Begin and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron that Washington did 
not support the Settlements Commission, but that even U.S. opposition did not preclude a 
continuation of its mandate. Lewis told Begin ‘that we would do what we could to achieve what 
Israel has consistently asked us to do: i.e., get rid of the Settlements Commission …’ Lewis added 
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that he ‘carefully stayed away from any discussion of whatever else the resolution might contain 
and how we might or might not vote on it.’1165 
 The story of the March 1980 U.S. vote on a U.N. Security Council Resolution condemning 
Israeli settlement activity in East Jerusalem provides an example of poor communication, the perils 
of divisions at the top of the policymaking hierarchy and politically feckless decision-making. In 
this incident, the public appearance of disorganisation matched the record of internal decision-
making. Most troubling for the administration’s public image in an area that was once its strength, 
in this period the word ‘disarray’ again came to characterise Carter’s policy. 
 In November 1979, Kennedy launched his challenge to Carter for the Democratic 
nomination. This rare primary challenge to a sitting president meant that Carter spent much of 1980 
fending off criticism from the left while also protecting himself against attacks from eventual 
Republican nominee Ronald Reagan on the right.1166 It also made Carter particularly vulnerable in 
Northeastern states such as New York, where the Kennedy clan had strong support.1167 New York’s 
primary voters headed to the polls on 25 March 1980. 
 Against this backdrop, the UNSC prepared to vote on Resolution 465, which condemned 
Israel’s settlement activity in East Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories.1168 The White House 
believed it had made its instructions clear to its delegation: only vote favourably on 465 if it omitted 
all references to Jerusalem. Carter thought the resolution as it stood violated his understanding with 
Begin, forged at Camp David, that the United States would not take a public stand on Jerusalem nor 
demand the dismantlement of existing settlements during the autonomy negotiations. However, 
Vance apparently understood Carter’s instructions to mean that he wished only for the deletion of 
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Paragraph Seven, which dealt with religious freedom in Jerusalem. That, Vance believed, would 
settle the president’s concerns.1169 
According to Hamilton Jordan, the language of the resolution had been raised at the White 
House’s Friday foreign-affairs breakfast. Jordan believed that Carter gave Vance ‘oral’ parameters 
on what was acceptable in the resolution, but that Vance interpreted them too liberally.1170 
Nevertheless, McHenry believed 465’s original wording to be ‘virtually identical with American 
policy.’1171 After instructions from ‘others in the State Department’ McHenry on 29 February 
negotiated the necessary changes, including the removal of Paragraph Seven, and informed Israel’s 
U.N. ambassador and other delegations that the United States would vote favourably on the 
resolution – against Israel. 
Yet that was not the end of it. Shortly before casting the vote, McHenry received a call from 
the State Department requesting that he negotiate further changes. Frustrated with the confusion, 
McHenry asked for an immediate adjournment until the following morning. ‘I blew my stack,’ he 
recalled. ‘Now, with the word out of how we were going to vote, Council in session, vote expected 
momentarily, they were asking for a further change, and I thought it was unreasonable.’1172 
In the subsequent discussions, McHenry recommended a favourable vote on the resolution. 
In the event of any blowback, he felt Washington could explain away any ‘minor changes’ that the 
United States had failed to obtain.1173 Vance spoke twice to Carter on the morning of 1 March. The 
president, informed that the offending Paragraph Seven had been deleted, gave the go-ahead for 
McHenry to vote in favour of the resolution.1174 Carter had not been told, however, that the 
resolution still contained no less than seven references to Jerusalem. ‘I don’t think that McHenry 
had clear instructions that involved the special sensitivity of the word Jerusalem,’ he admitted.1175 
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Although the vote was technically consistent with American policy stretching back to 
Lyndon Johnson, reporters nevertheless heralded it as a ‘significant stiffening’ of the U.S. stance 
toward Israel1176 and a ‘sign that the United States had grown more sensitive to the interests of 
Arabs in the area.’1177 By the end of 3 March, McHenry recalled, ‘we were dealing then with a 
firestorm. … People in the administration who saw an election coming up in 1980 were concerned 
about what the Jewish community was going to do in terms of their votes and their money.’1178 
According to Carter, he was only shown the final resolution, which included the Jerusalem 
references, on 3 March. ‘I couldn’t believe it,’ he wrote. Later that day, Carter met World Jewish 
Congress leaders, with whom he reiterated his opposition to West Bank settlements, although he 
stressed the issue should be handled through negotiations and that Washington firmly supported 
Israel’s security.1179 
Carter attempted to disavow the vote, which was not technically possible, and accepted 
responsibility for the fiasco. He emphasised that Washington did not believe outposts should be 
dismantled. ‘We believe that the future disposition of existing settlements must be determined 
during the current Autonomy Negotiations,’ Carter said. The vote was made under the belief that all 
references to Jerusalem had been deleted. ‘The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote 
in favor of the resolution rather than abstention,’ he added.1180 Subsequently, Carter reiterated that 
the vote was a ‘genuine mistake, a breakdown in communications … we will be much more careful 
… in the future’1181 and admitted that ‘it would obviously have been better, in retrospect, for me to 
study very carefully the text of the U.N. resolution.’1182 
 That did not assuage the criticism. The New York Times labelled Carter’s vote repudiation a 
‘pathetic confession.’1183 Later, it blamed ‘sabotage’ by State Department aides more sympathetic 
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than Carter to the Arab cause and argued for their removal.1184 The Washington Post called the 
disavowal ‘pathetic’ and blamed State’s ‘Arabists.’1185 The Wall Street Journal believed it showed 
‘rampant incompetence.’1186 
 Carter later acknowledged the problem. ‘I think it was a rapidly changing thing as far as the 
exact wording of the text that created the confusion,’ he recalled. Moreover, the back-and-forth on 
the resolution gave ‘the impression that we were not only wrong but confused.’1187 
 Many people looked to cast blame. Jordan believed it was an inadvertent – but revealing – 
error on the part of Vance, who favoured a hard line toward Israel’s settlement activity. ‘I felt like it 
was an honest mistake, but I think the mistake reflected … (Vance’s) own policy biases, that we 
had to be tough on that issue, on that point,’ he said.1188 Conversely, a group of 50 Jewish leaders 
made it abundantly clear to the NSC that they felt that McHenry was ‘the villain.’1189 
Kennedy quickly made the vote, the disavowal of which came on the eve of his victory in 
the primary in his home state of Massachusetts, a campaign issue.1190 The senator had been 
struggling before the New York primary, which he ultimately won (59 percent to 41 percent), along 
with the vote in Connecticut (47 to 41 percent).1191 According to a New York Times/CBS News poll, 
the U.N. vote played an important issue in New York’s primary, leading Jewish voters to support 
Kennedy nearly 4 to 1 against Carter.1192 Pollster Patrick Caddell concurred. ‘It’s the UN vote in the 
Jewish community. We’re getting wiped out. It’s almost as if the voters know that Carter’s got the 
nomination sewed up but want to send him a message. It’s a protest vote,’ he said.1193 The victories 
breathed new life into Kennedy’s campaign and enabled him to push his primary challenge to the 
Democratic Convention on 12 August. 
                                                
1184 Editorial, ‘Wrong Number on Israel,’ NYT, 9 March 1980. 
1185 Editorial, ‘Up the Hill, Down the Hill,’ WP, 6 March 1980. 
1186 Editorial, ‘Bungle Fever,’ WSJ, 7 March 1980. Also: Editorial, ‘For America, Diplomatic Discomfort,’ LAT, 4 
March 1980; Editorial, ‘A Foolish Confession,’ CT, 5 March 1980. 
1187 Carter interview (II), SEP. 
1188 Hamilton Jordan interview (I), 11 May 1992, Folder 6, Box 64, SEP. That was also the British interpretation. 
UKNA: PRO PREM 19/295, ‘The Situation in the Middle East.’ Telegram from U.K. Embassy Washington 
(Henderson) to FCO, ‘US Statement on the vote on the occupied settlements,’ 4 March 1980. 
1189 Evening Report from Middle East/North Africa Desk to Brzezinski, 11 March 1980, NLC-25-126-6-7-2. 
1190 Adam Clymer, ‘Kennedy Campaign Seeks Gains From Confrontation Over U.N. Vote,’ NYT, 6 March 1980. 
1191 Chan, ‘Jimmy Carter and the New York Democrats.’ 
1192 Hedrick Smith, ‘Inflation, Israel and Aid to City the Main Issues,’ NYT, 26 March 1980. 
1193 Jordan, Crisis, 234. 
                 
257 
 Jordan felt the furore was ‘tremendously harmful politically’ and if not for that, ‘we might 
have gotten Kennedy out of the race then.’1194 British Ambassador Nicholas Henderson felt his 
presence in the campaign would affect U.S. policy. ‘Indeed so long as Kennedy remains in 
contention for the Democratic nomination, his strong pitch for the pro-Israeli vote can be expected 
greatly to complicate the administration’s Middle East task,’ he wrote to London.1195 
Alexander Schindler called it ‘another watershed moment’ in ‘its impact on the voting of 
American Jews.’ He believed that Reagan’s November advantage with Jewish voters was 
‘undoubtedly due to that Jerusalem resolution.’1196 McHenry concurred. ‘… [T]here is no question 
but that the position that we took probably reinforced among the Jewish community and among the 
Israelis an underlying concern about President Carter and the Middle East,’ he said.1197 The affair 
also simply made Carter look inept. ‘The question is: Is anyone really in charge’ at the White 
House? ABC’s Donaldson asked in closing one report.1198 
The politics of the affair put Washington in an impossible diplomatic position. It 
simultaneously harmed American credibility with the Jewish community, Arab states and Israel, 
McHenry believed. ‘Moreover, it was going to raise questions about our policy: Did we stand by 
our policy, or didn't we stand by our policy?’ he asked.1199 AIPAC claimed that, regardless of the 
revelation that it was a mistake, the vote was ‘a bow to Arab extremism.’1200 
It was indeed embarrassing. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter, who recalled a 
‘world of goddamn screaming’ over the mistake, said his ‘job was to go down and apologize 
abjectly and to … crawl on my belly, and let people jump up and down on me, which is what 
happened.’1201 Britain’s U.S. ambassador called the incident ‘a shambles.’1202 
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The situation was made worse afterward. Called before the SFRC, Vance admitted under 
questioning that, yes, the resolution was consistent with U.S. policy. ‘I can envisage a report or a 
resolution with some items in it dealing with the question of settlements in which we would vote in 
favor … because our position is clear on settlements,’ he stated. Asked if the administration 
regarded East Jerusalem as occupied territory, Vance replied affirmatively. Yet he denied that the 
disavowal could be attributed to domestic pressure.1203  
In her memoir, first lady Rosalynn Carter expressed anger over Vance’s remarks. ‘Heaven 
knows, Cy Vance doesn't have a political bone in his body. His concern for his country is his total 
commitment, but I went straight to the telephone to call Jimmy. “Doesn't Cy know we're in a 
campaign?”’1204 
 The Jerusalem vote damaged Carter politically and undermined confidence in American 
policy at a moment in which Washington was mulling new action to prod the autonomy talks 
forward. From New York, Britain’s U.N. mission reported to London: 
Having witnessed the increasing disarray in the US performance here on the Middle East 
since the New Year, I firmly believe that it is unrealistic to think in terms of our being able, 
at any time before the presidential elections, to formulate any resolution designed to “fill the 
gap in 242”, which would be both minimally acceptable to the Arabs and would not attract a 
US veto.1205 
 
Linowitz believed ‘the (U.N.) episode hovered over our negotiations.’1206 Egypt and Israel 
exchanged ambassadors in February 1980, without significant problems, demonstrating that the 
bilateral process remained on track. However, Carter had the previous month told Vance 
‘something positive must be attempted after ambassadors are exchanged.’1207 That no significant 
U.S. initiative took shape from March 1980 onward suggests that the U.N. vote incident helped to 
undermine that effort. As evidenced by Jordan’s comments, the incident also suggests that Vance 
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was given sufficient free rein to interpret policy according to his own beliefs rather than Carter’s. In 
this case, Carter’s confidence in his subordinates was misguided, and it hurt him politically. 
 
Autonomy talks limp toward election 
 The autonomy talks continued haltingly through 1980, though Sadat suspended them twice. 
Still, hope faded quickly. ‘A full autonomy agreement by May 26 is virtually out of the question,’ 
Brzezinski’s deputy, David Aaron, wrote to Carter, ‘both because of Begin’s concerns on issues like 
long-range security and preventing a Palestinian state; and because of Egypt’s position … that some 
issues … cannot be decided … without Palestinian participation.’1208 
 The following month, British diplomats in Israel expressed similar sentiments. ‘It is now 
clear, as seemed inevitable from the start, that the Camp David negotiations will not lead to a 
comprehensive agreement. No agreement on the West Bank and Jerusalem is possible on the Camp 
David basis,’ the embassy wrote to London. Meanwhile, Palestinians would be driven to 
‘extremism.’1209 
Britain’s Cairo Embassy was unimpressed with Sadat’s stance on autonomy and his reliance 
on Carter. He ‘neither understands nor cares about’ the specifics of the Palestinian negotiations, it 
reported to London. Sadat’s April 1980 trip to Washington would achieve little. ‘It seems most 
likely that he will return to Egypt … as planned, proclaiming his confidence that Jimmy Carter will 
fix everything,’ the embassy wrote.1210 
 Palestinians were dismissive. ‘Egypt’s decision not to resume the autonomy talks with Israel 
is meaningless, for in any case they cannot achieve any results whatsoever, whether resumed or not’ 
because of the lack of Palestinian representation, WAFA argued.1211 Even Sadat’s 1980 proposals 
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for a Gaza-first option for a self-governing authority failed to win support from Palestinians in the 
territories.1212 
 Carter’s decision to prioritise domestic politics when he appointed Strauss to launch the 
autonomy negotiations significantly damaged the U.S. role. ‘We all believed that … had Linowitz 
been appointed first and had he been able to carry the negotiations from the beginning, there might 
have been a chance that we might have achieved success in the autonomy talks,’ Lewis recalled.1213 
Foreign diplomats seemed to concur. Britain’s Washington embassy believed that Linowitz was 
‘easier to work with than Strauss,’1214 while its Tel Aviv mission wrote that he seemed ‘a most 
attractive personality, and a great improvement on his predecessor. … Linowitz must be about the 
most hopeful thing that has happened to the autonomy negotiations since they started …’1215 
Toward the end of his appointment, Linowitz claimed the two sides had agreed on 80 
percent of the areas of responsibility that a self-governing Palestinian authority would have.1216 ‘… 
[I]t was a fair thing to say … and each party could probably agree to that. The problem was the 
remaining 20 percent were the toughest issues,’ according to a U.S. diplomat.1217 Indeed, the 
unresolved issues – water, land, security, settlements, and details about who would be able to vote 
and in what form the electoral procedures would take place – were fundamental. 
Sadat again suspended participation in July 1980 after Begin’s government annexed East 
Jerusalem. Although Linowitz continued his role in the talks, results were scanty, and the U.S. 
media and public – not to mention the president himself – grew ever more fixated on the inexorably 
linked stories of the 1980 race for the White House and the Iran hostage crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
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In 1979-1980, Carter was increasingly consumed by his re-election campaign and 
decreasingly involved in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Limitations were imposed by the electoral cycle 
and the president’s need to attend to domestic politics. The administration’s poor record on 
Palestinian autonomy did not stem from any special enmity toward the Palestinians, nor any affinity 
for Begin’s interpretation of Camp David. Rather, it shows concretely how the domestic political 
calculus made it unfeasible for the administration to exert much pressure on the Palestinian issue. 
The administration knew the negotiations would never solely be a diplomatic matter. 
However, by appointing Strauss as his first special negotiator to the autonomy talks, Carter 
prioritised domestic political considerations over diplomatic objectives. Strauss brought an 
American – and specifically Texan – attitude toward the negotiations that did not serve broader U.S. 
interests. Later, when Carter appointed Linowitz to the post, progress was made toward American 
objectives, but even that came up short. A multitude of factors militated against an agreement on 
autonomy, foremost of which was the Begin government’s resistance to relinquish Israeli control 
over the West Bank. Nevertheless, Strauss’ early appointment did not serve American policy ends 
and may have contributed marginally to the stalemate. 
Moreover, as opposed to Carter’s first two and a half years in office, the 1979-1980 period 
demonstrated a complete absence of political will. Carter had already been hampered by his too-
close identification with the peace process as well as his many public confrontations with Begin 
over settlements. For Carter, there was simply no gain to be had from pushing for Palestinian rights.  
The forced resignation of Young was not primarily due to Middle East policy. However, the 
fallout from his resignation underscores how the ramifications of Arab-Israeli policy can affect 
domestic politics in unforeseen ways. Carter’s poor handling of the affair contributed to the image 
of a president lacking control of his own foreign policy and furthered alienated his own political 
constituencies. 
The U.N. vote on Jerusalem in March 1980, meanwhile, fed the public image of an 
administration that lacked competence and a president who lacked leadership. Had Carter left the 
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matter alone and not attempted to disavow the vote, the matter might have had little impact 
domestically beyond, perhaps, the New York primary. In turn, if Carter had defeated Kennedy in 
New York, it is possible that the senator would have dropped his campaign, allowing the president 
to focus on the Republicans. 
Carter tried to distance himself from Middle East diplomacy in his final year and half in 
office. However, by this time, it had permeated American politics, and become virtually inseparable 
from his electoral prospects. These domestic pressures do not prove conclusively why Palestinians 
were not brought into the political process. However, they contribute to our understanding about the 
development of administration policy and why the White House was reluctant to challenge the 
Begin government from 1979 onward. 
Whether Carter would have devoted a great deal of time to Palestinian autonomy if he had 
won a second term is an open question. However, his results show that even a president as 
motivated as Carter can only with great peril risk going against the system. Unfortunately for the 
administration, moreover, by 1979-1980 the media and public had become so fixated on the Iran 
hostage crisis as to erase Carter’s earlier gains in the Middle East. What remained was a bitter 
residue of domestic tension and conflict, a divided Democratic Party and a resurgent Republican 
Party. 
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Conclusion 
In August 1980, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sent President Carter a 
memo on how to use his stewardship of U.S. foreign policy to his advantage in the final stages of 
his campaign against Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. In summarising the themes of the 
presidency, Brzezinski wrote that, ‘in time it will become clear that [the Carter administration 
offered] the proper course for the nation at this time: a building presidency, not a flamboyant, “fire-
fighting” one.’1218 It was a far cry from Brzezinski’s ambitious early advice, which spoke of 
initiating ‘a new phase in U.S. foreign policy.’1219 A unique constellation of factors, foreign and 
domestic, had come together to undermine the Carter administration’s global agenda.  
This thesis has offered a critique of Carter’s role as American diplomat-in-chief in the Camp 
David peace process. It has examined the possibilities and, especially, the hazards of presidential 
diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. It has argued that the unique domestic aspects of the conflict, 
acting in tandem with regional dynamics, ensured that Carter’s unprecedented presidential attempts 
for peace became mired in domestic politics. By the end of Carter’s term, the reciprocal influence of 
domestic politics and his Arab-Israeli policy had become so prevalent that it was nearly impossible 
to determine in which direction the influence flowed. Rather, it had simply become clear that each 
side served to reinforce the other. 
Domestic politics inevitably influence the foreign policy of any democratic polity. However, 
the unique feature of Carter’s presidency lay in how dramatically and intensively he involved 
himself in the diplomatic minutiae of the Arab-Israeli arena. He never had to turn to his foreign 
policy specialists and ask, ‘“Would you explain to me the history of this particular issue,” or “Will 
you show me on the map where the lines run or where is this town located,” because I knew it. And 
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I could negotiate for hours with the subordinates of Begin and Sadat,’ Carter said later. ‘I knew 
personally what the issues were because I felt like that was a presidential responsibility.’1220 
Presidential involvement also engaged different governmental – namely, political – actors. 
That meant Carter’s Arab-Israeli policy received input from predominantly domestic political 
advisors like Patrick Caddell, Stuart Eizenstat, Jody Powell, Gerald Rafshoon and, especially, 
Hamilton Jordan. ‘Here I was from South Georgia and was being exposed to all these problems at 
the very highest level without having a background or context for understanding a lot of these 
things,’ Jordan recalled. ‘It was exciting, it was stimulating, but I was not always able to understand 
or put into context some of the things I was working on.’1221 
As a result of this presidential prioritisation, Carter became intimately identified with 
American policy toward the peace process. That activated a number of reinforcing domestic factors, 
some general to American foreign policy and others specific to U.S. Arab-Israeli policy, that served 
to constrain what Carter could ultimately achieve. This thesis has explored the process by which 
Carter’s role as chief diplomat in the Camp David peace process interacted with those factors and 
explained how that process affected the development of policy. 
From the onset, the Carter administration appeared insufficiently prepared for the intense 
emotions that animated the Arab-Israeli issue for many domestic actors, particularly the organised 
American Jewish community. Despite periodically flirting in 1977-1978 with a public 
‘confrontation’ or ‘showdown’ with Israel, especially over its settlements policy, the administration 
ultimately refrained from taking such a course. This thesis contends that, regardless of whether a 
‘confrontation’ strategy would have provoked a change in Israeli behaviour more toward Carter’s 
liking, the administration’s fear of adverse domestic response played the central role in its decision 
not to pursue such a ‘showdown.’ 
The present work has used a unique source base. By reviewing Carter’s domestic, foreign 
and media advisors’ materials, it has revealed the similarities and reinforcing tendencies of the 
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advice reaching the president from multiple sources. Moreover, it has incorporated material on 
American public opinion in a way that transcends mere reliance on polling data. It has contended 
that, as a by-product of its ‘agenda-setting’ role, the news media is fundamental in creating the 
political environment within which the president can function. Thus, this project has scrutinised 
commentary and reportage in conjunction with polling data to develop a better understanding of the 
political climate that enveloped Carter. It has used reportage predominantly for what it indicates 
about the general assumptions toward Carter and the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
The existing historiography has mostly elided the perils attendant to Carter’s unique style of 
presidential diplomacy. However, this thesis has set forth the fresh argument that Carter’s 
involvement as the chief U.S. diplomat in the Arab-Israeli conflict ensured that the presidency itself 
became the locus of domestic opposition stemming both from the substance of his proposals and the 
style with which he set them forth. Carter’s personal role in Arab-Israeli negotiations helped compel 
Egypt and Israel toward an agreement, but created its own problems. His diplomatic immersion had 
the consequence of activating domestic forces deeply invested in the dispute and set a precedent 
whereby regional parties require presidential attention for deals to be concluded. The expectation of 
high-level involvement, which began to take shape under Henry Kissinger, became concretised 
under Carter, whose particular political style deeply influenced the course of American 
involvement. 
The characteristics that helped propel Carter to the presidency fed many of his problems in 
Arab-Israeli diplomacy. In 1976, American voters wanted a president who spoke his mind without 
having to craft carefully his words. They wanted a leader who seemed to be above politics – who 
did what was right for its own sake. But faced with a range of economic and international problems, 
after four years, Carter’s ‘freshness and innocence’ lost its appeal, in the words of Carter’s energy 
secretary, James Schlesinger.1222 As Carter’s term progressed, his freshness began to resemble 
naïveté, and his innocence and candour shifted from asset to liability. 
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Three broad characteristics of Carter’s political style exerted powerful influence on his 
Arab-Israeli diplomacy. First, Carter learned through rough experience that speaking publicly – 
indeed, with too much candour and openness – on the Middle East could have severe domestic 
repercussions. His early comments on the contours of a settlement, though generally consistent with 
existing American policy, alarmed many of Israel’s U.S. supporters, who feared the new president 
was applying pressure unevenly on Israel. Moreover, Carter’s open style heightened the distrust of 
elite opinion, which was already uneasy about the self-described outsider president. Carter’s public 
enunciation of his ambitious objectives had the consequence of magnifying the import of each 
subsequent policy shift and reinforcing the popular perception that he was willing to bow to 
pressure. 
Second, Carter’s penchant for taking on seemingly intractable and unpopular issues to prove 
that he was up to the challenge led him to pursue a sometimes reckless course in Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy. ‘We were dealing with a generation of (foreign policy) issues that no one had dealt with 
because they were so politically controversial,’ Jordan recalled. These issues were all political 
‘losers,’ he said.1223 In the Middle East, this translated into a willingness to challenge Israel on 
settlements, to try bringing Palestinians into the peace process, and to strengthen strategic ties with 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which was sometimes interpreted as weakening the U.S.-Israel bond. 
Carter’s willingness to tackle these issues, despite their political consequences, demonstrated how, 
in communications chief Gerald Rafshoon’s words, Carter ‘never governs like he has to run for 
office again.’1224 Generally, Carter’s reluctance to participate in the cut and thrust of politics 
damaged his performance as president, which remained fundamentally a political job.  
Finally, Carter’s comprehensive approach to problem solving led him to cling for too long to 
the idea of Geneva as a forum for a final agreement even after regional obstacles made that outcome 
unlikely. Fuelled by his training as an engineer, and encouraged by close advisors like Eizenstat, 
Carter’s comprehensive approach led him to embrace solutions that were often difficult to explain 
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to, and therefore gain support from, the public.1225 Most pertinent for this study, Carter’s focus on 
resolving all outstanding issues in the entire Arab-Israeli dispute through Geneva led to his sluggish 
response to Anwar Sadat’s Jerusalem initiative. 
Neither foreign policy generally, nor the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically, played a decisive 
role in Carter’s 1980 loss.1226 However, Sigelman and Conover show that the public’s rapidly 
diminishing support for Carter during the hostage crisis was attributable in part to previous 
unfavourable impressions of his presidency.1227 The hostage ordeal was undoubtedly a political 
disaster for Carter. ‘The news about this swamped everything,” Vice President Walter Mondale 
said. ‘So, it wasn’t that we couldn’t do other things. It was that the sort of milieu that ensued from 
the capture of our hostages and the way [the hostage-takers] played the game really paralyzed 
us.’1228 Moreover, recent studies suggest that voters have traditionally punished Democratic 
presidential candidates, including Carter, for perceived dovishness, but not for hawkishness.1229 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that Carter’s attempt to run on a foreign policy of peace and resolve, 
highlighting his Camp David achievements, made little inroads at a moment when Americans 
perceived a hostile international environment, largely as a result of Iran and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
 However, the domestic conflicts over Carter’s Arab-Israeli policy were significant in that 
they contributed to the climate of criticism surrounding the incumbent. Brzezinski and others hoped 
to point to the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel treaty as Carter’s greatest achievements, 
but those legacies remained, in 1980, ambiguous. Carter had difficulty trumpeting his role in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process when the winding road from his early months pushing for a 
comprehensive accord, to the disastrous U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué, through the contentious F-
                                                
1225 Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency, 50-51. 
1226 William Schneider, 'Conservatism, not interventionism: Trends in foreign policy opinion, 1974-1982,' in Eagle 
defiant: United States foreign policy in the 1980s, ed. Kenneth Oye, Robert Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1983). 
1227 Lee Sigelman and Pamela Johnston Conover, 'The Dynamics of Presidential Support during International Conflict 
Situations: The Iranian Hostage Crisis,' Political Behavior 3, no. 4 (1981). 
1228 Walter Mondale interview, 27 April 2004, ADST. Retrieved 22 August 2013, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
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1229 Shana Kushner Gadarian, 'Foreign Policy at the Ballot Box: How Citizens Use Foreign Policy to Judge and Choose 
Candidates,' The Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010). 
                 
268 
15 sales debate, to the evanescent triumph of Camp David Summit, the tardy conclusion of the 
Egypt-Israel treaty, and then to the inconclusive Palestinian autonomy talks, had been so riddled 
with potholes. 
Moreover, saturation media coverage of the Iran hostage crisis was almost certainly a 
contributing factor to Carter’s 1980 loss.1230 Yet Carter’s overall relationship with the news media 
had been poor throughout his term. ‘Another of my key failures as president … was my inability to 
form a mutually respectful relationship with key news media,’ Carter judged later. ‘Our consistent 
attempts to run an open administration had little beneficial impact.’1231 
Simply put, most members of the White House press corps did not like Carter. ‘There were 
things about his personality that people didn’t like, and over time that just bugged the White House 
press corps,’ according to The New York Times’ Hedrick Smith. ‘Carter was hurt by the fact that the 
press didn’t like him. Certainly by the third or fourth year, the White House regulars were down on 
Carter and they were not inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt.’1232 
Carter’s starring role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy thus attracted media attention from those 
least sympathetic to him. The coverage of the complex diplomatic negotiations was tinged with the 
negative political tone that characterised so much of the rest of his presidency. Carter’s personal 
role ensured that many journalists covering the negotiations interpreted lack of conclusive, 
unambiguous agreement as political defeat or setback, rather than part of the ebb and flow of 
diplomacy. More broadly, Carter’s poor relationship with the press helped his critics gain the upper 
hand and establish a reliably negative narrative for his foreign policy, from which his administration 
could not emerge to pursue its agenda. 
The 1980 election was also a disaster for congressional Democrats, who lost 34 seats in the 
House. The party fared worse in the Senate, however. It lost 12 seats – and its majority – to the 
Republicans, who for the first time in a quarter century gained control of one house of Congress. 
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James Glen Stovall, 'Incumbency and News Coverage of the 1980 Presidential Election Campaign,' The Western 
Political Quarterly 37, no. 4 (1984). 
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Again, this was not a result of Carter’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, 
throughout his presidency he harmed his party not only through the substance of his policies, but 
also the timing of his initiatives. This dynamic was clearly illustrated in the 1978 Middle East 
airplane sales, which occurred in a midterm election year virtually simultaneously with the Panama 
Canal Treaties ratification. Moreover, Carter’s frequent clashes with Israel’s U.S. supporters, 
especially his poor relations with the American Jewish community, led many Democratic 
lawmakers, some of whom depended on those groups’ support for re-election, to distance 
themselves from the president. As Election Day 1980 approached, the president found himself 
isolated, with few political allies. 
On Election Day, Carter complained that ‘most of the things that were difficult,’ including 
the Camp David Accords, ‘cost us votes in the long run.’ He spent ‘a major portion of [his] time 
trying to recruit back the Democratic constituency that should have been naturally supportive,’ with 
Jewish Americans at the top of that list.1233 Indeed, perhaps Carter’s most notable domestic failure 
in regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute was his alienation of a significant portion of the American 
Jewish community. After winning 71 percent of the Jewish vote in 1976, his Jewish support 
dropped to just 45 percent in 1980 – the worst performance of a Democratic presidential candidate 
since 1920.1234 
In its post-vote analysis, AIPAC concluded that Reagan and Carter effectively tied among 
Jewish voters. ‘… [T]his represents a radical shift in traditional Jewish allegiances to the national 
Democratic ticket,’ it noted. AIPAC’S analysis found that the Jewish defection represented the 
greatest among all voting blocs. ‘… [V]oting patterns point to concern over Carter’s handling of 
Middle East matters and approval of Reagan’s pro-Israel posture as the prime factor motivating 
Jewish voters,’ it wrote.1235 
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An example of how intertwined the domestic and Arab-Israeli issues had become toward the 
end of Carter’s term can be found in the Mondale staff’s time analysis. In 1980, for example, the 
vice president’s ‘meetings with Jewish leaders’ were classified under ‘foreign policy, defense, 
intelligence’ issues. As the election campaign hit its peak in August, Mondale spent more time with 
‘Jewish leaders’ than on ‘defense.’1236 
Moreover, in a bid to win back some Jewish allegiance, Carter’s aides tried to push ‘two 
major policy proposals (through Congress) aimed at strengthening [the president’s] Jewish support.’ 
Eizenstat and Jewish community liaison Al Moses wanted to reschedule Israeli debt repayment and 
establish a joint military facility with Israel.1237 These proposals had relatively little to do with the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, but rather dealt with internal Israeli issues and showcasing Washington’s 
commitment to Israel. Neither specifically came to pass before the election. Nevertheless, during 
Carter’s term the United States continued to offer Israel favourable treatment and special benefits 
on assistance not typically accorded to other countries. As part of the Egypt-Israel treaty, the United 
States in 1979 gave Israel nearly $4.9 billion – mostly to finance the cost of dismantling airbases in 
the Negev Desert – which remained through 2009 the highest single-year total ever provided by the 
United States to Israel.1238 
 Nevertheless, all of these problems came together with the pressures of the electoral cycle to 
undermine Carter’s efforts in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The haste with which Carter pursued his 
Arab-Israeli goals in his first year stemmed in part from considerations imposed by the electoral 
cycle. Later, Carter’s disengagement from the negotiations with the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel 
treaty and the commencement of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations stemmed from his need to 
place a ‘political shield’ between himself and any attendant political controversy. Moreover, the 
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pressures of the approaching election also undergirded the politically inept disavowal of UNSC 465 
on Jerusalem in March 1980. 
Carter’s experience demonstrates the virtual impossibility of separating American domestic 
politics from Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Carter may not have been able to gain Begin’s acquiescence 
to American desiderata on settlements and the Palestinians. However, the president could have used 
a more robust carrot-and-stick approach toward Israel. Carter, for example, failed to use all of the 
weapons in his arsenal – most notably, by not attempting to halt U.S. economic or military aid to 
Israel. In the end, Begin played the political clock against Carter. The longer he waited, the less able 
was Carter to push on Palestinian autonomy because of his need to protect himself domestically. 
Carter’s political difficulties were significant in so much as they facilitated Begin’s vision of the 
Land of Israel, which largely meant retaining control of the West Bank.1239 
This thesis has demonstrated that domestic politics collectively did influence the 
development of Carter’s policy and exerted its most direct impact in the final stages of his 
presidency in the context of the electoral cycle. Moreover, Carter’s introduction of presidential 
diplomacy had the effect of magnifying the impact of these domestic factors. The influence was not 
decisive, either in U.S. policy outcomes or Carter’s 1980 defeat, but it nevertheless permeated the 
decision making process. Indeed, Carter’s policy cannot be understood in a bureaucratic 
policymaking vacuum. Instead, domestic factors provided clear constraints on Carter’s options and 
at which points he attempted to bring his presidential influence to bear. 
Domestic politics were brought to bear forcefully on U.S. policy in several clear instances. 
The alacrity with which the administration backed away from the U.S.-Soviet Joint Communiqué in 
October 1977, for example, stemmed mostly for concern over adverse domestic reaction. The 
desperation that infused Carter’s March 1979 shuttle to Cairo and Jerusalem was made more urgent 
by the president’s need to clear the Egypt-Israel negotiations from his agenda so he could attend to 
pressing political problems at home. Moreover, his appointment of Robert Strauss as his first 
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negotiator in the autonomy talks clearly arose from political imperatives, but did little to advance 
the diplomatic process. 
More generally, however, domestic politics exerted powerful influence by altering public 
debate and limiting policy options. This ‘permissive consensus’ was shaped through broad public 
opinion and the elite, which consisted most prominently of the media, Congress and interested 
pressure groups. This consensus, within which Carter’s team formulated and carried out policy, 
narrowed as controversy around the president grew. Carter ran afoul of the consensus early in his 
term through his use of open diplomacy. He also alarmed Israel’s domestic supporters by taking 
public positions – such as suggesting that Israel return to its pre-1967 borders, criticising Jewish 
settlements, urging consideration of the Palestinian role in the peace process – that previously had 
been spoken only privately to Israeli officials or made publicly by lower-level U.S. officials. 
However, many of the controversial aspects of Carter’s policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, such 
as his emphasis on the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians, reaching out to the PLO or 
strengthening U.S. ties with oil-producing Gulf states – became routine in succeeding 
administrations. 
Historians who indulge in counterfactuals risk dramatic oversimplification; changing or 
removing a single factor from past events can render the rest unrecognisable. It can quickly turn 
into a futile exercise because it is virtually impossible to extract meaning from an imagined scenario 
with any authority. However, that important caveat aside, limited speculation in this direction can 
sometimes serve to elucidate history’s lack of predetermination. 
Carter approached the Arab-Israeli dispute with a missionary zeal rare among presidents. It 
is difficult to imagine another recent American leader essentially setting the rest of his work aside to 
lock himself away at Camp David for 13 days and attempt to resolve, alongside the leaders of two 
hostile countries, one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. Moreover, Carter’s open-ended, last-
minute trip to the Middle East in March 1979 to conclude the Egypt-Israel treaty against the advice 
                 
273 
of his advisors demonstrated a particular combination of political boldness and recklessness that is 
unusual for the occupant of the Oval Office. 
On the other hand, across the entirety of the Camp David peace process, a different 
president – one less focused on the Holy Land, more familiar from the outset with the domestic 
political hues of the Arab-Israeli issue, better suited to maintaining a domestic coalition, less 
determined to retain personal control of the negotiations – could also have achieved different 
results. Carter’s poor relations with the press, Congress, and the rest of the elite ensured that he 
soon found himself without allies and with little political capital. Moreover, a president prepared to 
delegate authority to his staff for negotiations would have decreased the pressure and vitriol 
directed at the White House over the policy. In turn, the Arab-Israeli arena might not have 
contributed to Carter’s negative domestic narrative. 
Nonetheless, had Carter faced fewer domestic constraints, it is highly unlikely that he would 
have achieved his initial objective of a comprehensive settlement because of regional opposition. 
Yet Carter still could have pursued his determination to involve Palestinians in the negotiations, 
clung longer to the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union and limited U.S. aid to Israel as 
an incentive to make concessions. While such a course may not have changed the regional outcome, 
such shifts in American policy would have set important – or, at least, different – precedents for 
succeeding administrations. 
Carter also had to contend with a spectrum of domestic and international challenges that 
were unique to the late 1970s and impacted his Arab-Israeli policy. For example, domestically he 
had to contend with a more assertive Congress and emboldened news media, both of which were 
critically important to developing the domestic consensus. He also had to deal with a resurgent U.S. 
conservative movement, which had its roots in détente and U.S. failures in Vietnam – both policies 
that antedated Carter’s term. Internationally, the crumbling of U.S.-backed regimes in Iran and 
Nicaragua, as well as the decision to offer diplomatic recognition to China at the expense of 
downgrading relations with Taiwan, led to concern among allies such as Israel about the 
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steadfastness of the American commitment. Thus, Israel likely felt more strongly about concretising 
Washington’s strategic, not just moral, commitment to its security. Moreover, several intermestic 
issues that arose earlier in the decade ripened by the time Carter took office. Most notable among 
these were the after-effects of the Arab oil embargo, which led Carter to prioritise energy policy at 
home and stronger ties with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, and growing inflation worldwide, which 
partly stemmed from soaring oil prices. Nevertheless, if Carter had not been forced to reckon with 
one or more of these issues, it is conceivable that his peacemaking path could have been smoother. 
Ultimately, Carter attempted to balance the functions of diplomat and politician in the Arab-
Israeli dispute like no other president. However, his role as president-mediator blurred the lines 
between domestic and international, politics at home and negotiations in the Middle East. Carter’s 
personal involvement created a circular pattern of influence between politics and diplomacy, as it 
engaged political actors, focused public attention and raised the domestic stakes. As his term 
progressed, he subordinated his diplomatic objectives to his political needs, which in fact had been 
made more urgent by diplomatic controversy in Arab-Israeli negotiations. Moreover, Carter’s 
service as diplomat-in-chief during the Camp David peace process imbued American policy with 
the political character of the president. Carter’s experience vividly demonstrates that a president 
who embraces eagerly the role of diplomat-in-chief, especially in a policy area as domestically 
controversial as the Arab-Israeli conflict, risks trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. 
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